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Optimal control theory and differential game theory is applied to the study of the
defense of high value airborne assets, particularly in the case of a single threat such
as an adversarial aircraft or missile. Rather than utilizing onboard defenses of the
high value airborne asset, defense is proposed using a teamed unmanned combat air
vehicle.
The common scenario throughout this dissertation involves the defense of a high
value airborne asset (evader) teamed with an unmanned combat vehicle (defender)
against a single threat (pursuer). The unmanned combat air vehicle (defender), pro-
vides defense in one of two ways: kinetic or directed energy. When defense is kinetic
in nature, the defender launches a missile which strives to reach the threat before the
threat reaches the high value airborne asset – damage to the pursuer is dealt through
capture. When defense is provided through directed energy, the defender strives to
keep the incoming threat inside his weapon engagement zone for as long as possible
– damage to the pursuer is dealt over time.
Leveraging differential game theory and optimal control theory, a series of sce-
narios are proposed and solved which illustrate different optimal strategies for the
successful defense of a high value airborne asset against the incoming threat. In the
event that defense is kinetic in nature, the defender-evader team strives to be as far
(in range) from the captured pursuer at final time while the pursuer strives to mini-
mize said range. When defense is provided by means of directed energy, the pursuer
strives to capture the evader in minimum time while the defender strives to maximally
expose the pursuer prior to the evader’s capture.
In addition to considering the optimal strategies for the successful defense of a high
iv
value airborne asset against an incoming threat, an investigation of various numerical
methods is conducted. The investigation compares and contrasts four different direct
methods. The comparisons between the different numerical methods are used to
suggest a single method that may be applicable for future hardware implementation.
v
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OPTIMAL DEFENSE OF HIGH VALUE AIRBORNE ASSETS
I. Introduction
“What we call the beginning is often the end.
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from.”
— T. S. Eliot, Little Gidding
1.1 Motivation
The defense of a High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) in theater is one of the many
priorities considered in offensive and defensive aerial operations [1]. Typical means
of providing defense to HVAAs include fighter escort and passive mission planning
around offensive systems. In the event that missiles are engaged on the HVAA,
various options are considered including, but not limited to: Defensive Counter Air
(DCA), evasive maneuvers, chaff, flares, decoys, and electronic countermeasures [2].
As adversary air and missile threats continue to grow in quantity and capability [1],
the need for effective airborne defensive strategies and solutions also grows.
Identified as an area with potential advantages for meeting the challenges of
a newly forming adversarial environment, autonomous systems provide a consider-
able opportunity to enhance future Air Force operations [3]. Described as “game-
changing” [4], autonomous systems are of interest to the Air Force toward ensuring
air superiority. In a recent report, unmanned systems were determined to be a “pre-
ferred alternative for dangerous missions” [5]. Currently, Remotely Piloted Aircraft
(RPA) are employed to assist a broad range of Air Force missions [6]. Programs such
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as Loyal Wingman have been proposed to assist missions such as Intelligence, Surveil-
lance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), air interdiction, counter Integrated Air Defense Sys-
tem (IADS), offensive counter air, Command and Control (C2), and weapons hosting
[7]. Rather than viewing autonomy as an intrinsic property of an unmanned vehicle
in isolation, the design and operation of autonomous systems needs to be considered
in terms of human-system collaboration [8]. The consideration of manned-unmanned
teams is a way to address autonomous systems in future engagements, and in this
case, for HVAA defense.
1.2 Problem Statement
This work focuses on the defense of a HVAA from an inbound threat such as a
missile or adversarial aircraft. Defense is provided using an autonomous platform
which contains either missiles or directed energy weapons. The problem statement
which motivates this work is the following: How may a HVAA be defended against
an incoming threat when it is teamed with a defender?
1.3 Research Questions, Tasks, and Scope
In this work, the HVAA is defined as the “evader,” the attacking threat or ad-
versary is referred to as the “pursuer,” and a friendly asset is referred to as the
“defender.” The defender and the evader make up a team which conflicts with the
objective of the pursuer. Specifically, the pursuer’s goal is to capture the evader
while the cooperative team made up of the defender and evader aim to protect the
evader from the pursuer. Two means of providing DCA are considered herein: kinetic
defense and directed energy defense.
2
Research Questions.
Hypothesis: The successful defense of a High Value Airborne Asset may be solved
utilizing differential game theory as well as optimal control theory. From the hypoth-
esis, the following are a list of research questions which arise:
1. How may meaningful mathematical models be generated for HVAA defense
scenarios? The models used in this work, accompanied with a discussion of
their various assumptions and limitations, are presented in Section 3.2.
2. How may HVAA defense scenarios be posed and solved as either optimal control
problems or differential games? A series of HVAA defense scenarios are con-
sidered as either optimal control problems or differential games in Chapter IV
and Chapter V. When solving a scenario where only one agent aims to optimize
its behavior, optimal control theory is leveraged. However, when two agents,
at odds with one another, strive to perform optimally, a differential game is
considered. Both optimal control theory and differential games are discussed,
in brief, in Section 3.3.
3. How may HVAA defense differential games be transformed into optimal control
problems which may be solved either analytically or numerically? In Chap-
ter III, Apollonius Circle and how it relates to solving two-agent pursuit-evasion
scenarios is described. The use of Apollonius Circle for transforming a differ-
ential game into an optimal control problem is demonstrated in Sections 4.1
and 4.2. In Section 4.1, the solution to the differential game is found analyti-
cally. In Section 4.2, the solution to the differential game is found numerically.
4. In the event that a HVAA can’t maneuver, what are the optimal strategies of
both the defender and the pursuer in the three-agent problem? In Sections 4.1
and 4.2, the saddle-point strategies of the defender and pursuer for the kinetic
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defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA are presented. In Section 5.2, the optimal
defender strategy for the directed energy defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA
is presented.
5. How should the HVAA aid in its own defense if it is able to maneuver? The
defense of a HVAA which is able to maneuver is considered in Sections 4.3
and 4.4. Using a 2-D kinematic model as described in Section 3.2, the turn rates
of the HVAA are bounded and the HVAA is allowed to maneuver. Using direct
methods of optimal control theory, the optimal strategy for a maneuverable
HVAA is found when both the pursuer and defender are assumed to be missiles
guided by proportional navigation.
6. What unique aspects occur when the defender is a missile or directed energy
weapon, and what are the critical parameters for the defender to be successful?
Various kinetic and directed energy defense scenarios are considered in Chap-
ter IV and Chapter V. In each of the scenarios, a discussion of the optimal agent
strategies is presented along with examples. For each scenario, the parameters
which influence the optimal strategies are described.
7. What numeric methods are suitable for aerospace hardware systems which re-
quire fixed time steps and minimal computational effort? Considering four
direct methods of optimal control, the kinetic defense of a maneuvering HVAA
is posed and solved in Section 4.4. Assuming a fixed mesh of time, a com-
parative study is conducted between different direct methods of solving optimal
control problems. For each of the four methods the following is emphasized: the
computational time, the number of algorithmic iterations, the number of cost-




The following research tasks aim to address the research questions posed above.
1. Develop meaningful mathematical models to pose and solve HVAA defense sce-
narios.
2. Describe HVAA Defense as either a differential game or an optimal control
problem; pose and solve them using either analytic or numeric methods.
3. Using geometric methods, describe how HVAA defense differential games may
be transformed into optimal control problems, which can be solved either ana-
lytically or numerically.
4. Pose and solve 2-D and 3-D HVAA defense differential games where the defender
is either a kinetic weapon or directed energy weapon. Consider both the kinetic
and directed energy defense of a non-maneuvering evader. Determine optimal
strategies taken by the defender to protect the evader.
5. Investigate the optimal maneuvers made by a slower moving HVAA if engaged
by a faster, more maneuverable, pursuer in the event that a defender with
similar capabilities as the pursuer is in the local airspace. Consider agents to
be restricted to a plane.
6. Formulate both kinetic and directed energy defense scenarios and identify crit-
ical parameters of interest which influence the outcome of HVAA defense sce-
narios.
7. Investigate efficient direct methods for computing optimal solutions which could
potentially be implemented on hardware.
A scenario matrix which describes the various engagements considered in the
scope of this research is shown in Table 1. Scenarios 1-3 consider kinetic defense,
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while Scenarios 4-6 consider directed energy defense. In Scenario 1, the pursuer and
defender implement the Proportional Navigation (PN) guidance law while the evader’s
strategy is solved as an Optimal Control Problem (OCP) in the two-dimensional (2-D)
Cartesian plane. In Scenario 2 and 3, a Differential Game (DG) is considered between
the pursuer and the defender. In this DG the evader has constant bearing and the
defender strives to intercept the pursuer before the pursuer can intercept the evader.
In Scenario 3, the engagement from Scenario 2 is extended to three-dimensional (3-D)
Cartesian space. In Scenario 4 and 5, an OCP is considered where the defender makes
use of a directed energy weapon and aims at maximizing the time that the pursuer
is inside the Weapon Engagement Zone (WEZ). In Scenario 4, special attention is
given to the pursuer and the defender. The optimal defender strategy for keeping
the pursuer in its WEZ for the maximum amount of time is found when the pursuer
is constant speed and non-maneuvering. In Scenario 5, the results of Scenario 4
are extended to include the evader. In this scenario, the evader is assumed to be
non-maneuvering, the pursuer aims to capture the evader in minimum time, and the
defender aims to keep the pursuer in its WEZ for the maximum amount of time. In
Scenario 6, the results of Scenario 4 are extended from the 2-D Cartesian plane to
3-D Cartesian space.
Table 1. Research Scenario Matrix
Scenario Pursuer Evader Defender 2-D/3-D Defense
1 PN OCP PN 2-D Kinetic
2 DG Const. DG 2-D Kinetic
3 DG Const. DG 3-D Kinetic
4 Const. N/A OCP 2-D Directed Energy
5 OCP Const. OCP 2-D Directed Energy
6 Const. N/A OCP 3-D Directed Energy
6
Research Scope and Assumptions.
The scenario which is considered in this research is that of the defense of a single
HVAA teamed with a cooperative defender against a single threat. This generalized
engagement involves a total number of three agents. At the onset of the scenario,
aircraft are considered to be in motion at their respective altitude and velocity.
The consideration of an effective HVAA defense requires development of mean-
ingful models. A common assumption for long range scenarios where agents are
considered Beyond Visual Range (BVR) is to consider the engagement in 2-D rather
than 3-D. By reducing the solution space to 2-D the assumption is made that the
relative altitude difference between agents is small compared to their range. This
assumption is commonly made to reduce the computational complexity of the added
third-dimension and allow for planar geometry to be utilized. Additionally, one may
model agents using simple motion. This model allows agents to turn instantaneously
and is a common assumption in differential games [9]. Simple motion is often used
when turn radii of agents is small relative to the spacing between agents. Simple mo-
tion models are more common in literature because analytic expressions for optimal
strategies are less common under turn rate constraint. In general, the use of turn rate
constraints requires solutions to be obtained numerically rather than analytically. In
this work, Chapter III describes the mathematical methods and models used to pose
and solve the HVAA defense scenarios of interest.
Differential game theory distinguishes between games of kind and games of degree
[9]. A game of kind is one where the objective is to find the domain of strategies or
initial conditions where a specific player wins or loses the game. A couple of examples
of this are: Was the evader captured by the pursuer, or was the evader able to escape?
and Where should a player begin in order to guarantee that he wins or loses? Games
of kind are concerned with the outcome of an engagement, whereas games of degree
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are concerned with how well an objective has been achieved. Some examples of a
game of degree include: Assuming one of the players wins the game, how fast can
that player win? or Assuming that a player loses the game, how can that player
minimize their loss? The scope of this work is restricted to solving games of degree.
Identifying the space of initial conditions of all agents which ensure successful defense
is considered as future work.
Obtaining insight into the defense of a HVAA using mathematical models requires
the abstraction of physical systems into tractable models. This abstraction of phys-
ical systems commonly involves assumptions of those physical systems. Common
assumptions include factors such as modeling fidelity, sensor measurement models,
communication integrity between agents, and governing guidance strategies. Con-
siderable effort is required to develop numerical models which address each of these
factors. Because the focus of this work is to gather intelligent conclusions about
the actions taken by the pursuer, evader, and defender, the development of accurate
high-fidelity systems is outside the scope of this work. Rather, simplified 2-D and
3-D models are used to analyze the optimal strategies of multi-agent problems. It is
assumed that optimal solutions are representative of their high-fidelity counterparts.
In order to simplify the models, it is assumed that all sensors produce perfect
measurements, hence sensor noise is neglected. While this is not realistic, because
real systems make measurements which involve uncertainty, it is not the goal of
this work to model or accurately represent measurement or process uncertainty in
this work. Further, the idea of limited communication between agents is also not
addressed; messages between agents are assumed to arrive frequently and reliably.
Scenarios involving restricted communication, although interesting, fall outside the
scope of work.
It is the focus of this work to consider differential games, where the strategies
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of agents are not predetermined. However, in some cases, the guidance strategies of
players may be assumed to solve problems using optimal control theory. The single
agent optimal control problem may be used to gather insight into the optimal behavior
of a single agent and is, in general, more tractable than solving differential games.
Considering a kinematic level of modeling, the mass of individual agents is not
considered, only their orientation and position in space are considered. The states
and equations of motion for all agents are described in each control problem, whether
2-D or 3-D.
For the directed energy scenarios, circular and spherical regions are used. This
model assumes that the directed energy weapons are assumed to be effective in all
directions, independent of vehicle orientation. The spherical and circular models also
assume that the directed energy weapons are effective inside a specified range and
ineffective, otherwise.
1.4 Research Methodology
There exist multiple approaches for solving optimal control problems. These ap-
proaches are typically classified as either direct or indirect methods. The indirect
method aims at solving optimal control problems by finding the states and co-states
which in-turn define the optimal control. The general approach for posing and solving
indirect optimal control problems involves utilizing the Hamiltonian, forming co-state
equations, and leveraging Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle (PMP) for scenarios in-
volving constraints [10, 11, 12]. The direct method solves optimal control problems
by utilizing nonlinear programs to iteratively search for the optimal control and state
trajectories directly [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
In order to solve differential games, the utilization of analytic methods described in
[9] provide a means of posing and solving differential games. While there exist meth-
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ods of posing and solving optimal control problems directly using nonlinear programs,
less common are methods of computing differential games directly. Differential games
strive at locating a saddle-point strategy corresponding to optimal performance from
multiple players. Using the methods described by Isaacs [9] and direct transcription
methods [18, 19], various HVAA defense scenarios are posed and solved in this work.
1.5 Expected Contributions
The expected contributions for this research effort are as follows:
1. Solutions to HVAA defense optimal control problems and differential games
2. Optimal strategies for providing successful defense of a HVAA using either a
kinetic or directed energy weapon
3. A comparative study of direct methods for finding optimal strategies for HVAA
defense focusing on methods suitable for hardware implementation
4. Provide tools for mission analysis concerning HVAA defense, remote sensing,
and pursuit-evasion
Combined, these contributions provide the necessary analytical foundation for the
autonomous defender whose mission is the defense of the HVAA.
1.6 Document Outline
This dissertation contains six chapters. In Chapter I, the motivation of solving
optimal HVAA defense problems is provided including the research questions, tasks,
scope, and methodology. Chapter II provides a literature review for multi-agent dif-
ferential games highlighting relevant work to HVAA defense. Also in Chapter II is
a section which describes the research gaps and how this work addresses the gaps in
10
literature. Chapter III describes the methodology and techniques used for the pro-
posed research, followed by the solution approach for each research task. Chapter IV
presents the optimal strategy for defending a HVAA when doing so with a kinetic
weapon.Chapter V presents the optimal strategy for defending a HVAA when doing
so with a directed energy weapon. Finally, in Chapter VI, a summary of remarks,
the contributions made, and identified future work are provided.
11
II. Literature Review
The only thing greater than the power of the
mind is the courage of the heart
— John Forbes Nash Jr.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter includes an in-depth literature review of multi-agent pursuit-evasion
as it relates to optimal HVAA defense. First, this section begins with outlining seminal
work in the area of differential games highlighting important contributions and poten-
tial applications. Following this, a taxonomy of pursuit-evasion differential games is
discussed: one-on-one (1v1), N-pursuers-1-evader (Nv1), 1-pursuer-M-evaders (1vM),
N-pursuers-M-evaders (NvM), the active target defense differential games (ATDDG)
with at least three players, and ISR in an optimal sense as it relates to directed energy
defense. A more descriptive difference between differential game theory and optimal
control theory is presented in Chapter III.
2.2 Seminal Work
The development of differential games started with the works of Isaacs [20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 9]. In these publications, Isaacs outlined the idea of posing problems
governed by differential equations in a dynamic game-theoretic framework; he called
this paradigm “Differential Games”. In his seminal treatise [9], Isaacs employed the
principles of game theory, calculus of variations, and control theory, albeit unknown to
him, to solve problems involving a dynamic conflict between multiple agents/players
[9]. Isaacs used the method of differential dynamic programming and introduced
critical mathematical constructs such as dispersal, universal, and equivocal surfaces
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used to describe the optimal flow field in games and derive optimal saddle point
strategies.
It is important to recognize some of the founders of static/dynamic games and
optimal control including RAND scientists such as Richard E. Bellman, Leonard D.
Berkovitz, David H. Blackwell, Melvin Dresher, Wendell H. Flemming, and John
F. Nash. Early contributions on dynamic games in the former Soviet Union were
published by N. Krasovskii, A. Melikyan, L. S. Pontryagin, and A. I. Subbotin [25].
Furthermore, the first conference dedicated exclusively to dynamic games: “First
International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Differential Games” in
Amherst, MA, September 29-October 1, 1969, was organized by Ho and Leitmann.
Isaacs, Berkovitz, Bernhardt, Blaquiere, Breakwell, Case, Friedman, Merz, Pontrya-
gin, and Shubik were among the invited speakers at the conference. Although Pon-
traygin was not able to attend the meeting, these mathematicians and scientists
planted the seeds of the theory of optimal control and differential games.
Of the large number of mathematicians and scientists that were involved in the
development of differential games, Rufus Isaacs, Richard Bellman, John Breakwell,
and Lev Pontryagin can be seen as principal contributors to the development of the
theory of differential games; Isaacs being the father of differential games. His seminal
work and his book, with motivating examples, highlight the possible use of differential
games [20, 9]. Bellman, known for the method of dynamic programming, provided a
tool whereby state feedback optimal strategies could be directly obtained as opposed
to methods based on necessary conditions as in the calculus of variations [26, 27].
Pontryagin, a Soviet mathematician, is recognized as developing his Maximum Prin-
ciple, more commonly referred to as, “Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle” (PMP). The
use of PMP was developed to assist with satisfying the necessary conditions for op-
timal control in the presence of hard constraints on control. Using methods derived
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by these four mathematicians, differential games were formulated and solved in many
works to be described throughout this survey.
2.3 Pursuit-Evasion
At the center of differential games lies the fundamental conflict of two parties
known as “Pursuit-Evasion”. Pursuit-evasion involves at least two agents or groups,
labeled pursuers and evaders. The goal of a pursuer is to capture evading agents,
while the converse is the goal of an evader, to avoid being captured by a pursuer.
This is a zero-sum game where the cost/payoff is the time-to-capture. Basic questions
arise, What path should an evader or pursuer take to achieve their goal of avoiding
or ensuring capture; and, under optimal play, by either pursuer or evader, is capture
at all possible? In this chapter, this conflict is briefly discussed and the current
literature available describing strategies, methods, and applications as they relate to
optimal HVAA defense is presented. For a more complete review of differential games,
great historical documentation and literature surveys of Isaacs’ work is documented
in [25, 28].
The idea of pursuit-evasion differential games is not limited to physical entities
chasing after one another; Isaacs defined kinematic equations that described the sur-
faces upon which states were constrained. Using these differential equations, one can
propose problems in a multitude of research areas including but not limited to eco-
nomics, sports, robotics, and air-combat. This survey focuses on differential games
involving pursuit-evasion. It is important to note that the applications of these math-
ematical tools are not limited to simple toy problems, rather they serve as a syllogism
for more complex scenarios that may not be suitable for the public domain.
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2.4 One Pursuer, One Evader Differential Games (1v1)
The premise of a differential game starts with the conflict between two players
who share a common performance functional; the goal of the pursuer and evader are
counter to one another, where one tries to maximize the performance functional/pay-
off and the other tries to minimize the cost or payoff. These are minimax problems,
that is, zero-sum-games, since an optimal solution is one in which one player’s strat-
egy strives to minimize the performance functional while the other aims to maximize
the same performance functional. Constraints on the player’s come in the form of
dynamics. These constraints can be linear or nonlinear. The classical problem of
pursuit-evasion can be seen in an early work by Ho, Bryson, and Baron [29]. In their
work, a two-player differential game was formulated in a Linear-Quadratic form to
capture the basic pursuit-evasion conflict. Later, in the NASA technical report of [30],
differential models were employed in order to gauge the differences in performance
between a manually piloted vehicle and an optimally controlled one as provided in
the earlier work [29]. The experiment showed that the use of differential games in-
deed provided useful information to pilots, but a cautionary statement at the end
of the technical report stated that, “...differential game problems will, in general, be
more complicated theoretically than their optimal control counterparts.” The NASA
report concluded that the idea of solving differential games was thought to be useful
as information provided to a pilot, but not yet accepted to be a means of automatic
control, a popular research topic today.
In a dissertation by Satimov [31], the application of differential games was envi-
sioned for use in various fields such as economics and military operations. Satimov
also stated that in the case of a single-player, differential games amount to optimal
control problems, and that different modifications of Isaacs’ method give the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for optimality. The relationship between optimal control
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and differential games is through the use of variational techniques [9, 12]. If all but
one of the player’s control laws are given, the differential game reverts to a one-sided
optimal control problem.
Homicidal Chauffeur Differential Game.
In his seminal text, Isaacs proposed the famous “Homicidal Chauffeur” toy prob-
lem [9]. In this game, a hypothetical slow but highly maneuverable holonomic pedes-
trian is pitted against a driver of a motor vehicle that is faster but less maneuverable
(a.k.a. a Dubins Car). In this somewhat macabre scenario, the driver attempts to run
over the pedestrian. The question to be solved is: Under what circumstances, and
with what strategy, can the driver of the car guarantee that he can always catch the
pedestrian or conversely, the pedestrian guarantee that he can indefinitely elude the
car. And, if the pedestrian’s demise is guaranteed, what is the chauffeur’s optimal
strategy that will minimize the time-to-capture of the pedestrian, and what is the
latter’s strategy to maximize his time? Surveys have documented the history and
notable work related to the “Homicidal Chauffeur Differential Game” [32, 25, 33, 34],
going into detail and expanding about the various aspects of this problem. Figure 1
shows the geometry of the Homicidal Chauffeur game where the pursuer, P , has a
minimum turn radius specified by R and the evader, E, can maneuver freely. Fig-
ure 1 also includes a plot of the performance functional which is the solution of the
differential game. Constant-value lines are shown on the x-y plane.
A definitive work on the Homicidal Chauffeur differential game is Merz’s Ph.D.
thesis [35]. Merz investigated the Homicidal Chauffeur differential game in great
detail describing two new singular lines known as: “switch envelope” and “focal line.”
These new lines further expand on Isaacs’ “barrier”, “universal”, and “equivocal”
singular lines. His work gives great detail and insight into the problem. Breakwell
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Figure 1. A coordinate frame and performance functional describing the Homicidal
Chauffeur problem [34]. The Pursuer, P, had minimum turn radius specified by R.
and Merz helped motivate the complete solution of the Homicidal Chauffeur game
at a conference in 1969 [36]. Marchal also studied the Homicidal Chauffeur game in
great detail describing how using Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle could assist the
interpretation of complex solutions [32].
The Differential Game of Two Cars.
A variation of the Homicidal Chauffeur differential game is the differential game
of two cars, where two players, each controlling a car with minimum turning radius,
are engaged in a pursuit-evasion game. In early work, Meier investigated the game
of two cars, where both players had the same minimum turn radius, the pursuer was
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slower than the evader, and capture was defined by coming inside the range, l, of
the evader [37]. Another analysis of the game of two cars was performed by Getz
and Pachter [38, 39]. In their papers, regions of capture, escape, and barrier surfaces
between those regions were presented. Figure 2 describes the geometry of the game
of two cars. Radius R1 and R2 describe the minimum turning radii of each player, u1
and u2 describe the curves associated with a max rate turn, and w1 and w2 describe
each player’s velocity.
Figure 2. The coordinate frames and turning radii used to describe the game of two
cars [38] is shown. The minimum turning radii of each player is labeled R1 and R2, the
curves associated with a max rate turn are labeled u1 and u2, and the players velocities
are labeled w1 and w2. © 1981 Springer Nature
In [38] both agents have sector based regions of capture, typical of an aerial
dogfight; but, in [39], the regions of capture were different, describing a heterogeneous
model of on-board weapon systems. Similarly, in [40], Greenfield looked into the
game of two cars, endowing the pursuer with a surveillance capability of range, l.
The objective, to escape the surveillance region in minimum time. In an earlier
work, Lewin investigated a similar differential game called the “Surveillance-Evasion
Differential Game” [41]. In the game, the evader strives to escape as soon as possible
from the pursuer’s detection circle, while the pursuer’s desire is the opposite. Rather
than consider point capture, Greenfeld and Lewin were interested in surveillance
range.
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A complete analysis performed by Bera, Makkapati, and Kothari goes into detail
of both games of kind and degree with studies on differing agents’ speeds, capture
radius, and maneuverability constraints [42]. In their work, they develop the three-
dimensional plots of the state space, highlighting the barrier and switching surfaces
for the different scenarios.
Pursuit-Evasion in Constrained Environments.
In an effort to consider differential games in a more realistic way, the introduc-
tion of boundaries and constraints on states allows for finite spaces and regions to
be included in the game formulation. By imposing limitations on physical states,
the pursuit-evasion differential game can be restricted to a bounded area or obstacles
may be applied. In a paper by Fisac and Sastry [43], a two-player differential pursuit-
evasion game is proposed where an obstacle is added to delay the pursuer’s capture or
avoid it entirely. Similarly, Oyler, Kabamba, and Girard considered pursuit-evasion
games in the presence of obstacles that inhibit the motion of the players [44]. In their
work, the use of polygons, line-segments, and asymmetric obstacles (an obstacle that
affects one player differently than another) are developed. Fuchs and Khargonekar
motivated the use of escort regions through manipulation of the performance func-
tional [45]. Kalyanam, Casbeer, Sundaram, and Pachter constrained their pursuer
and evader to road networks [46]. In another work, a one-sided constraint is imposed
where the pursuer is not restricted to a road network, while the evader is [47].
Pursuit-Evasion with Insufficient Information.
In cases where one or more agents do not have complete information about the
state of the game, these are problems called differential games of “Insufficient In-
formation.” In his seminal work, Isaacs stated that the ability to pose problems
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which restricted information to the individual players “...appears to be the most vital
area for future research” [9]. Roxin and Tsokos, introduced stochastics as a means
of modeling partial information that one agent might have relative to another [48].
Chernousko and Melikyan described a differential game where incomplete informa-
tion is provided to one of the agents [49]. This idea was proposed in order to account
for information delay or gaps of information during game play. Yavin proposed an
incomplete information pursuit-evasion differential game by restricting the pursuer’s
information on bearing and allowed the evader to have perfect information in the
engagement [50]. Giovannangeli, Heymann and Rivlin tackled the problem of pursuit
while avoiding convex obstacles by using Apollonius Circles to provide paths in which
the pursuer’s visibility of the evader is guaranteed throughout the engagement [51].
In [52], Hexner considered the problem where a parameter is unavailable to only one
player at the beginning of the game, and the other has only a probability density func-
tion that describes the parameter. Pachter and Yavin investigated the effects of noise
on the Homicidal Chauffeur problem by introducing stochasics to the pursuit-evasion
differential game dynamics [53]. Battistini and Shima also employed a stochastic vari-
able to overcome the limitations imposed by bearing-only measurements made by a
pursuer [54]. Using a Kalman filter a performance functional is used which maximizes
observability of the evader. Their Monte-Carlo simulations show that the maximum
observability functional outperforms a minimum range objective cost functional in
the successful pursuit of an evader under uncertainty.
Basimanebotlhe and Xue also employed stochastics to study the optimal con-
trol in a differential game with nonlinear stochastic equations where two players are
subjected to noisy measurements [55]. Lin, Qu, and Simaan presented an N-pursuer-
1-evader differential game where the evader can observe all the pursuers but the
pursuers have limited observations of each other and the evader [56]. Kalyanam, Cas-
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beer, Sundaram, and Pachter investigated a pursuit-evasion game where a pursuer
engaged an evader through using Unattended Ground Sensors (UGSs) that detect the
evader’s passage in a road network; when the pursuer arrives at an instrumented node,
the UGSs inform the pursuer if and when the evader visited the node [47, 57, 46].
Pursuit Evasion in Aerial Engagements.
Applications of pursuit-evasion differential games relating to tactical air-to-air
applications have been investigated. Shinar and Gutman developed a closed-form
solution to a 3-Dimensional missile-aircraft pursuit-evasion game [58]. Shinar also
investigated a realistic pursuit-evasion engagement involving a missile engaged on
an aircraft and air-to-air scenarios using variational methods [59]. Shinar concluded
that, although the work was done in the plane, the move to 3-D should not present
much difficulty. Hillberg and Chalmers investigated a pursuit-evasion game between
two realistic aircraft in a dogfight. They took into account constraints such as struc-
tural limits and aerodynamic stall, and used the air-vehicle’s separation distance as
a metric for optimization. Considering naval applications, Pachter and Milch framed
their two-player engagement as a Homicidal Chauffeur differential game where the
dynamics of the ships are taken into account [60]. Greenwood developed a realistic
differential game in 3-dimensions by modeling fighter aircraft [61]. Greenwood used
the dynamics of two fighter aircraft in space and even considered firing envelopes as
part of his analysis. Ehtamo and Raivio considered a numerical approach to solving
a pursuit-evasion differential game involving a missile-aircraft encounter [62]. Imado
and Kuroda proposed a differential game involving a pursuit-evasion engagement in-
volving a missile and an aircraft. In the game formulation, the miss-distance was
used as a payoff/cost functional [63]. Shinar, Glizer, and Turetsky, investigated a
pursuit-evasion game where the dynamics of the pursuer can be changed during the
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pursuit a finite number of times [64]. In [65], the evader has the ability to change
its dynamics during the engagement a finite number of times. Merz investigated the
problem of pursuit or evasion selection if both agents were endowed with capture sets
and the prior assignment had not been implemented [66]. Related to dog-fights and
aerial combat, Merz’s concern was with role assignment in pursuit-evasion differential
games and of course the outcome. In more recent work, Garcia, et al. have investi-
gated target area defense differential games described in more detail in Section 2.8.
Other 1V1 Works.
The Homicidal Chauffeur problem is an example of a pursuit-evasion game with
turn constraints imposed on the pursuer. Games where both players have simple
motion kinematics (holonomic) are also of interest. One such scenario involves the
interception of one ship by another. Given two ships of constant speed the question
becomes: What heading should the pursuer take to close in on his target fastest. The
solution can be found using basic geometry [67]. Figure 3 shows the application of
Apollonius Circles to a three-body engagement [68].
Another example of posing the pursuit-evasion problems using simple motion kine-
matics in a differential game is in a work by Leitmann [69]. In his paper, a simple
differential game between a pursuer and evader was proposed, and variational tech-
niques were applied to determine outcomes of the game where terminal miss distance
was used as the payoff/cost functional.
In [70], Calise and Yu use simple motion kinematics as well as expanded control
energy to formulate a game involving the pursuit-evasion of two aircraft at medium
to long range. Using a reduced-order model based on control energy, Calise and Yu
are able to find trajectories similar to minimum time intercept using only four states
to model the encounter.
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Figure 3. The use of an Apollonius Circle to pursuit-evasion differential games de-
scribed in [68]. In this example, the attacker, A, defender, D, and target T have
constant velocity motion with fixed headings. © 2015 IEEE
The “Lion and the Man” differential game discussed by Quincampoix is a pursuit-
evasion differential game where the lion pursues a man [71]. The lion and the man are
free to change their velocity direction instantaneously but are limited to the intensity
with which they do so. Since the lion is faster than the man, the regions of escape
and capture are of interest and were numerically determined.
2.5 N Pursuers, 1 Evader (Nv1)
The two-pursuer-1-evader problem had been well documented [72, 73, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78]. Hagedorn and Breakwell investigated two pursuers engaging one evader
which was required to pass between the two pursuers [72]. Pashkov, Terekhov, and
Levchenkov considered the game of degree by employing as a payoff/cost functional:
the distance between the object being pursued and the pursuer closest to it, when
a fixed-time engagement terminates [73, 74]. Others such as Ganebny, Kumkov,
Le Menec, Patsko studied the three-player game in detail by briefly discussing the
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surfaces of the differential game when pursuers were both stronger, both weaker,
and one stronger-one-weaker than the evader [75]. In their paper, Garcia, Fuchs,
and Milutinovic study the case where faster pursuers cooperate to capture a slower
evader in minimum time [77]. The evader, knowing that it is being pursued by
two cooperative pursuers, tries to maximize the capture time, while the pursuers
aim to minimize capture time. A solution of this differential game is determined
based on the geometric properties of the game. Unlike previous work, Kalyanam,
Darbha, Khargonekar, Pachter, and Chandler set up a problem of two pursuers and
one evader in a restricted environment (grid road network); moreover, the pursuers
do not have direct knowledge of the location of the evader [76]. The two pursuers,
instead are notified, when they reach a node if the evader had passed through that
node or not. Hayoun and Shima restrict the pursuer’s controls to be bounded and
their intercept times equal [78]. Using two “strong” pursuers, closed-form optimal
controls are derived, and it is shown that the addition of a second pursuer introduces
a new singular zone to the game space in which the pursuers can guarantee equal
misses, regardless of the evader’s actions.
In the more general case, where there are N-pursuers and 1-evader, challenges
with task allocation and strategy become more apparent. To aid the task allocation
between the N-pursuers, Huang and Bakolas employ the Voronoi diagram construct.
It is often used when capture of an evader within a bounded domain is considered
[79, 80]. In their work, Borowko and Rzymowski present sufficient conditions for the
existence of an evasion strategy where simple motion kinematics for the players is con-
sidered [81]. Chodun investigated a more general of N-pursuers engaged against one
evader in his work [82]. Huang et al. employed a decentralized control scheme based
on the Voronoi partition of the game domain, where the pursuers jointly shrink/min-
imize the area of the evader’s Voronoi cell [79]. Figure 4 is a visualization of the
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individual pursuer cells from [80].
Figure 4. A Voronoi Diagram [80] describing the task allocation in an N-pursuer-1-
evader problem. Each color describes a cell from which a pursuer would capture an
evader if starting in that cell. © 2010 IEEE
Ibragimov, Salimi, and Amini investigated the N-pursuer-1-evader problem in
their work by focusing on guaranteed escape of the evader [83]. Alias, Noorsuria,
Ramli, Ibragimov, and Narzullaev imposed controls constraints on the players and
allow for the speed of the players to vary up to a maximum speed of 1 [84]. In their pa-
per, they focus on the game of degree by briefly discussing the estimation of the time to
capture. Kothari, Manathara, and Postlethwaite considered identical non-holonomic
players [85]. In their work, they find that “solving such a problem is computationally
intractable,” and instead propose a computationally efficient algorithm to obtain ap-
proximate solutions. Next, Awheda and Schwartz and separately Al-Talabi developed
solutions to the multi-pursuer single-superior-evader pursuit-evasion differential game
using fuzzy logic methods [86, 87]. In Aweheda [86], the formation control mechanism
guaranteed that the pursuers were distributed around the superior evader in order
to avoid collision between pursuers and guaranteed that the capture regions of each
pair of adjacent pursuers were such that the capture of the fast evader was guar-
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anteed. VonMoll et al. also have considered multiple pursuers engaged on a single
evader [88, 89, 90]. By utilizing the Apollonius Circles, they exploit the benefits of
cooperation amongst the pursuers in order to reduce the capture time of the evader.
2.6 1 Pursuer, M Evaders (1vM)
The single pursuer against M-evaders differential game is a game where a pursuer
tries to capture M-evaders in finite time. One challenge is to select the order in which
the pursuer accomplishes his task in minimum time. In, these problems the pursuer
is faster, more maneuverable, or has other advantages over the evaders.
The case which involves two evaders and one pursuer has received much attention
[91, 92, 93, 94, 95]. Fuchs, Khargonekar, and Evers investigated the case where a
single pursuer engages two evaders [91]. The goal of their work was to investigate a
differential game where the pursuer tries to capture either of the evaders, minimizing
its cost, and the evaders strive to escape the pursuer for as long as possible, increasing
the payoff/functional of the pursuer. Fuchs and Khargonekar also investigated the
manipulation of payoff/cost functionals to achieve attacker retreat through defender
cooperation [92]. With one pursuer and two evaders they show that under certain
conditions, the defenders should cooperate with the attacker so that retreat becomes
the most attractive option; thereby, fulfilling the defensive goal of protecting the high-
value target. Scott and Leonard investigated a scenario where two evaders employ
coordinated strategies to evade a single pursuer, but also to keep them close to each
other [93]. In [94], Breakwell and Hagedorn investigated the capture of two evaders in
succession by one pursuer in minimum time. Pachter and Yavin proposed a differential
game of pursuit-evasion with one pursuer and two evaders, the motion of the players
being affected by noise [95]. In their work, a stochastic game of degree is considered,
where the pursuer strives to maximize the probability of his winning the game, i.e.,
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of capturing at least one of the evaders. A 3-Dimensional pursuit-evasion differential
game consisting of a pursuer engaged against a team consisting of two evaders was
proposed by Abramyants, Maslov, and Yakhno [96]. The team of evaders consisted of
a true evader and false decoy evaders; the evaders coordinate their actions to ensure
the true evader escapes without capture.
Figure 5. Example of 1-pursuer-2-evader engagement and 1-pursuer-5-evader engage-
ment found in [97]. Since the pursuer is much more capable than the evaders, capture
of all agents is guaranteed. © 2013 IEEE
In a more general case of one pursuer engaged against many evaders, the pursuer
aims at capturing all evaders, while the evaders coordinate their escape. Liu and
Zhou investigated a game involving a single-pursuer-multiple-evader pursuit-evasion
game where a superior pursuer attempts to minimize the total capture time of all the
evaders [97]. In Figure 5 the capture of M-evaders in succession is shown [97]. Scott
and Leonard motivated a model of pursuit, herding, and evasion for three agents [93].
In their work, a single pursuer, e.g. a bear, chooses a target point along the line
connecting two evaders, and the two evaders, e.g. a mother caribou and her calf,
each choosing a strategy that trades-off evasion and herding. In [84] the study of
capture time for many pursuers against one or more evaders is investigated. Wang
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and Peng formulate and solve a pursuit-evasion game in which a single faster player
chases several homogeneous evaders [98]. In their work, they apply a task allocation
method to simulate the optimal engagements for “fixed sequence capture” and “free
sequence capture” of the pursuer.
2.7 N Pursuers, M Evaders (NvM)
The most general case of N-pursuers and M-evaders allows for more complex en-
gagements to be analyzed. Katz et al. investigated a zero-sum differential game
formulation for the control of military air operations using the method of characteris-
tics [99]. Although their examples were shown for 1-pursuer 1-evader, their work has
extensions to N-pursuer M-evader problems. Rusnak proposed a dynamic game called
“The Lady and the Body-Guards versus the Bandits” [100]. The Bandits team’s ob-
jective is to capture the Lady while the Lady and her Body-Guards objective is to
prevent it. The Body-Guards are trying to intercept the Bandits prior to their arrival
to the proximity of the Lady. In [100], the formulation and solution of the game is
presented. As described in Section 2.8, this problem is a similar problem, but with
more players involved. A creative approach to handling the task allocation of many
agents was proposed by Bakolas and Tsiotras by employing the Voronoi diagram con-
struct [80]. Using the Voronoi diagram, such that a pursuer residing inside a given
set of partitions can intercept a moving target faster than any other pursuer out-
side the set. Another means of task allocation was proposed in [101] where Awheda
and Schwartz proposed a fuzzy logic based decentralized control scheme using the
Apollonius Circles construct.
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2.8 Active Target Defense Differential Games (ATDDG)
Target Defense Differential Games (TDDG) are recently introduced pursuit-evasion
differential games with three agents. A target (T) is pursued by an agent called the
Attacker (A). A third player, the defender (D) pursues A in order to defend T. T
and D cooperate while playing against A. The outcome of the three-player game is
simple: If D captures A before A captures T, then the target is successfully defended;
however, if A captures T before D can capture A, then the defense is unsuccessful
and A is the winner. When the target is able to maneuver in the three-player game
and this scenario is known as the Active Target Defense Differential Game (ATDDG).


















Figure 6. Defender-Attacker-Target Geometry describing the Active Target Defense
Differential Games where the defender pursues the attacker who pursues the actively
maneuvering target [102, 103].
There exist a number of popular performance metrics that are used when posing
the ATDDG. In games of kind, the interest lies with the outcome of the defense: does
the target succeed in evading the attacker or is it captured? In games of degree, when
the target escapes, the range from the attacker to the target at the instant when the
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attacker is intercepted by the defender is used. When the target is captured by the
attacker, the distance between the defender and the attacker at the instant of capture
of the target by the attacker is used. These range metrics are popular because they
help to quantify the outcome of the engagement and are readily computed. Other
metrics, such as time to capture, are also of interest.
The two-players one target game of [104] is an early version of target defense. In
the paper, a two-player differential game is played wherein one of the players wants
the state of the system to reach a target, while the other player wants the state of
the system to avoid this target. Introduced by Boyell, the defense of a ship from
an incoming torpedo using a counter-weapon was described [105, 106]. Yamasaki
and Balakrishnan proposed the defense of an active target by launching a defensive
missile [107, 108]. In their work, they proposed a closed-loop feedback control law
to defend a target aircraft. Using simple motion kinematics, Pachter, Garcia, and
Casbeer consider a zero-sum three-agent pursuit-evasion differential game [67]. The
two-agent team consisted of the target and defender.
Rubinsky and Gutman presented an analysis of the end-game ATDDG scenario
based on the attacker-target miss distance for a non-cooperative target-defender. The
authors develop linearization-based attacker maneuvers in order to evade the defender
and continue pursuing the target using the LQ paradigm [109, 110]. Rusnack, Weiss,
and Hexner had also analyzed the ATDDG. In their work, the limiting values of the
three participants optimal strategies are studied as the quadratic weight on the de-
fending missiles acceleration command were reduced to zero [111]. They show that in
the limit, the intercepting missiles and the target’s optimal strategies are identical in
form to that obtained in the game without the defending missile. Ratnoo and Shima’s
work includes a game theoretic analysis of the ATDDG problem using conventional
guidance laws for both attacker and defender [112, 113]. The cooperative strategies
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proposed by [114] allowed for a maneuverability disadvantage of the defender with
respect to the attacker and the results show that the optimal target maneuver is
either constant or arbitrary depending upon the missile-defender zero-effort-miss dis-
tance state variable. Shafermen and Shima implemented a Multiple Model Adaptive
Estimator (MMAE) to identify the guidance law and parameters of incoming mis-
siles and optimize defender strategies to minimize the control effort [115]. Earl and
D’Andrea present a scenario where multiple agents defend a common target from a
group of pursuers [116]. Earl and D’Andrea commented that the task assignment of
defending agents was “...most difficult to solve when the capabilities of the adversaries
are comparable.” Sun, Chen, Qi, and Lin investigated the three-agent game using
zero-effort-miss (ZEM) [117].
The team involving Casbeer, Fuchs, Garcia, Pachter, Pham, Von-Moll, and Wein-
traub have investigated the ATDDG in great detail [67, 68, 118, 119, 120, 102, 103,
121, 122, 123]. Pachter, Garcia, and Casbeer analyzed the ATDDG using simple mo-
tion kinematics [67, 68]. In their work, they consider a three-player differential game
which involves the defender engaged in the pursuit of the attacker, and the attacker
engaged in the pursuit of the target, which is trying to evade the attacker. To find
the optimal strategy for the defender to intercept the attacker, the geometric concept
of the Apollonius Circle is used. In their analysis, they are able to look at the critical
target/attacker speed ratio to ensure the target’s survival. Figure 3 shows how these
circles are used in the simple motion kinematics case [68].
Garcia, Casbeer, Pham, and Pachter continued their investigation for optimal
maneuvers when the defender and attacker use Pure Pursuit and Proportional Nav-
igation [118]. In [119, 120] Casbeer, Garcia, and Pachter considered the use of two
defenders to better engage the attacker. Garcia, Casbeer, Fuchs, and Pachter inves-
tigated when the defender had a non-zero capture radius, and its effect on the simple
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motion kinematics example in [122]. While in previous work, information between all
players was shared, Weintraub, Garcia, Casbeer, and Pachter investigated the opti-
mal evasion of the Target assuming the defender’s and attacker’s control laws were
proportional navigation [102, 121]. Information was restricted to the attacker and
defender, and heading rate constraints were imposed on the target. Later, in [103],
an Extended Kalman Filter was used to investigate the same engagement with sensor
models.
2.9 Directed Energy Defense
The Directed Energy Defense (DED) scenario considers the defense mechanism to
be energy-based rather than kinematic. This differs from the ATDDG which aimed
at solving the kinematic interception of an attacking agent in order to defend a target
vehicle. The DED scenario considers three agents: the target, attacker, and defender.
The goal of the defender is to keep the attacker inside its Weapon Engagement Zone
(WEZ) of the defender for as long as possible before it reaches the target. If the
attacker is in the WEZ for some predetermined amount of time, the attacker may be
considered neutralized.
Similar to the DED scenario is the ISR mission of maximum observation. In the
maximum observation problem, an ISR platform solves for the strategy which keeps
a target within a connection range for the maximum amount of time. By utilizing the
mathematical models for maximum contact time in an ISR problem, the maximum
time exposure of a directed energy weapon can be posed and solved. Although energy-
based defense is a means of removing enemy threats, few publications are available
which address DED as a multi-agent control problem, motivating the inclusion of an
ISR mission review.
ISR missions have been of great interest to the aerospace community [124, 125,
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126, 127]. One goal of an ISR platform is the observation of a target, whether it
be moving or stationary. The mathematics of maximum-time surveillance to DED
assumes that the target in the surveillance problem is an attacking threat in the DED
problem. The threat in the DED problem is mobile, and the goal is to keep the threat
inside an envelope of a defender’s WEZ for as long as possible. For an ISR mission
persistent surveillance corresponds to observing the target for as long as possible; in
the DED scenario, this amounts to keeping the target inside the WEZ for as long as
possible.
The task of observation of slower ground targets by an aerial platform were consid-
ered in [128, 129, 130]. In [128], a quad-rotor utilizing a downward-pointing camera
tracks a ground vehicle restricted to a road network. In [129], an ISR platform
equipped with a gimbaled camera was considered, thus allowing the ISR platform
to observe a ground target at various aspect angles. Similarly, Skydio, a startup
company aimed at personal unmanned air platforms, has considered a quad-rotor
aircraft for persistent surveillance of a mobile ground target [130]. The quad-rotor
platform performs persistent surveillance and obstacle avoidance in order to record a
designated mobile target.
Some examples of works that consider multiple ISR platforms that act in coordi-
nation, tasked with identifying a single mobile target are [131, 132]. In [131], sensor
coverage effectiveness for a single mobile target and a group of mobile sensors was
investigated. In their work, the authors showed the connection between the numbers
of searchers, the amount of searcher motion, and how that trade-off was dependent on
the amount of motion for the searcher relative to the target. In [132], the coverage of
a mobile sensor network resulting from continuous movement of sensors was studied.
In their work, the authors took a game theoretic approach and obtained the optimal
mobility strategy for sensors and intruders.
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Investigation of differential games concerning the surveillance of an evading agent
were considered in [133, 134, 41, 135, 136, 137]. In these differential games a pursuer
with a detection region was pitted against an evader whose goal was to escape as
soon as possible. The differential game studied by Dobbie and Taylor considered a
fast pursuer with turn restrictions and circular surveillance region against a slower
maneuverable evader capable of instantaneous changes in heading [133, 134]. Different
to Taylor’s work, Lewin imposed a turning rate constraint on the pursuer and allowed
the pursuer’s speed to vary from full stop to a bounded maximum [41, 135]. Another
differential game investigated by Fuchs involved a fast pursuer with a specific radar
cross section pitted against a slower and less maneuverable evader [136]. In the game,
the pursuer strives to accumulate enough information about the target to achieve a
defined probability of identification while the evader tries to evade the pursuer to
remain undetected.
In similar work, a numerical approach to solving the maximal information sharing
between UAVs was presented in a work by Garnett and Flenner [138]. In their work, a
model for maximal information sharing between UAVs was posed and solved utilizing
optimal control. They assumed the ISR platform was faster than the targets being
tracked and a polar function was utilized to model sensor effectiveness. Because of
model complexity, they required the use of a nonlinear program solver to numerically
find the optimal control that maximized the sensing problem.
While the previous works have described optimal means of conducting ISR mis-
sions when the ISR platform is faster than the target (evader), less common is the
consideration of conducting ISR on targets that are faster. In an early work by
Breakwell, a pursuit-evasion game was posed wherein a slower pursuer was employed
against a faster evader [139]. Breakwell, also considered a nonzero capture radius for
the slower pursuer. The approach taken by Breakwell solved for the acquisition of a
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faster evader by a slower pursuer, but the DED scenario requires keeping the evader
within the surveillance range, akin to a WEZ, of the pursuer for as long as possible
in addition to acquiring it as soon as possible. To successfully protect the evader, the
defender must neutralize the threatening attacker before it reaches the evader.
2.10 Research Gaps
This work addresses the defense of an evader from an attacking pursuer by teaming
the evader with a defender. Two defense mechanisms are considered: Kinetic capture
of the pursuer by the defender and maximal exposure of the pursuer by the defender’s
directed energy weapon.
Formulating differential games around aircraft were considered in Isaacs’ seminal
text [9]. To achieve the objectives of this work, meaningful mathematical models
must be developed. Using kinematic models, aircraft are modeled in both 2-D and
3-D Cartesian space. Simple motion is often used when the turn radii of agents is
small relative to the spacing between agents. In this scenario (small turn circle rel-
ative to vehicle range) it has been shown in [140] that optimal strategies assuming
simple models provide a very similar performance when implemented in turning rate
constrained vehicles. Simple motion models are more common in literature because
analytic expressions for optimal strategies are less common under turn rate constraint.
In general, the use of turn rate constraints requires solutions to be obtained numeri-
cally rather than analytically. In this work, Chapter III describes the mathematical
methods and models used to pose and solve the HVAA defense scenarios of interest.
In their work, Garcia, Casbeer, and Pachter investigated an evader engaged by a
faster pursuer using pure pursuit and defended by a similarly capable defender also
using pure pursuit [121]. In their analysis, the evader’s motion was not restricted to
a maximum turn rate. Moreover, simple motion was considered in order to obtain
35
analytic and numeric solutions in [67, 68, 118, 119, 120]. To address this gap, one aim
of this work is to include turn rate constraints for the evader in planar engagements.
A bulk of the research performed on the active target defense scenario assumes that
the evader is free to travel in any direction to aid in its defense [67, 118, 141, 68, 142].
One aim of this work is to investigate HVAA defense with a non-maneuvering evader.
Previous work on the ATDDG considered defense to be through kinematic capture
of the pursuer by the defender restricted to a plane, similar to long-range missile
defense scenarios [105, 106, 67, 68, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 142, 143, 144, 111]. An
investigation of optimal defense strategies for the active target defense scenario in
3-D Cartesian space is not found in literature. To address this gap, one aim of this
work is to consider kinematic defense in 2-D and 3-D Cartesian space.
Many works have considered pursuit strategies for achieving maximum observ-
ability of an evader [41, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139]. By leveraging the work in this
area, differential game theory, and optimal control theory, one aim of this work is to
solve the active target defense scenario when the defender is endowed with a directed
energy weapon.
Various indirect methods have been used for investigating the active target defense
scenario in [105, 106, 67, 68, 142, 143, 144, 111]. A study of various direct optimal
control methods to the active target defense scenario is not found in literature. To
address this gap, one aim of this work is to compare various direct methods to the
active target defense scenario emphasizing hardware implementation. The means of
directly computing the optimal control for a specified system has been a popular
research topic for the scientific community. In his survey paper, Betts [145] describes
in great detail various methods of computing optimal control directly. Betts, goes
into detail, describing various advantages and disadvantages of direct and indirect
methods. Rao described four different direct methods in his survey including more
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modern approaches of solving optimal control problems [19]. In Section 4.4, each
of the direct methods described in Rao’s survey are considered. The four direct
methods include: Single Shooting Method [146, 11], Multiple Shootings Method [13,
14], Collocation Method [18], and Pseudospectral Method [147, 148, 149, 150].
2.11 Concluding Remarks
In summary, the research in pursuit-evasion differential games has been significant
since the inception of Isaacs’ work. By posing tactical scenarios, which involve mul-
tiple players as differential games, the optimal strategies for all players in the game
may be achieved. This literature review has outlined a significant body of work in
the area of multi-agent pursuit-evasion and has highlighted specific work in the active
target defense scenario and work related to the directed energy defense scenario. Even
though numerous works have investigated these tactical problems, these three-agent
problems still remain open.
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III. Methodology
Nothing takes place in the world whose
meaning is not that of some maximum or
minimum.
— Leonhard Euler
This chapter presents the methodology used to evaluate the problems presented
in Chapter I. First, the various models used to mathematically describe aircraft are
presented. Next, the methods of solving optimal control problems and differential
games are described. After that, the Apollonius Circle is presented, emphasizing
how the geometry may be leveraged to solve pursuit-evasion engagements. Then,
a proposal of how geometric methods may be leveraged to transform the defense
differential game into an optimal control problem. Next, the generalized kinetic
defense and directed energy defense objectives are presented. Finally, a solution
approach for solving each of the research questions is presented.
3.1 Overview
Investigating the optimal strategies for the successful defense of a HVAA, one must
utilize mathematical models for the aircraft involved. The abstraction of real aircraft
systems into a set of governing differential equations will be referred to as the model.
Utilizing these models, several scenarios are posed which correspond to the kinetic
and directed energy defense of a HVAA. This work aims to leverage geometric tools,
such as the Apollonius Circle, to either solve or aid in the optimal solutions to the
various engagements. When analytic solutions are intractable, the use of a Nonlinear
Program (NLP) may be used to directly compute optimal strategies or control. The
objective of this research is to develop optimal strategies for the aerial defense of a
HVAA which are either kinetic or directed energy in nature.
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3.2 Models
In this work, mathematical models are used to represent aircraft in space. In the
case where aircraft are far from one another and are at relatively similar altitudes, a
2-D model with simple motion may be sufficient. While a high-fidelity model which
considers every nuance of an aircraft in flight would be accurate and realistic, tractable
closed-form solutions to optimal control problems which use high-fidelity models are
unlikely. By considering kinematic models, the following benefits are seen:
1. The number of required states is dramatically reduced.
2. Visualization of the state space becomes easier.
3. Closed form solutions may become tractable.
4. Solutions to the optimal control problems may be computed very quickly.
5. Computed optimal solutions serve as great initial seeds to more complex optimal
control problems which may be otherwise intractable analytically.
Vehicle Motion in Two-Dimensions.
When the range between aircraft and missiles are relatively large compared to
their respective altitudes, the use of a 2-D model may be sufficient when analyz-
ing aircraft guidance strategies. As previously mentioned, one advantage of posing
pursuit-evasion scenarios in 2-D is that the number of states used to model the en-
gagement is reduced. As a result of the reduced state space, the likelihood of finding
optimal strategies in closed-form increases rather than those involving many states;
and, numerical simulations operate faster when analytic solutions are intractable.
When considering a planar aircraft model, the equations of motion for the individual
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aircraft/missiles are of the form:
ẋi(t) = vi cosψi(t)
ẏi(t) = vi sinψi(t)
ψ̇i(t) = u(t).
(3.1)
Define for each agent i, the North (yi), East (xi), speed (vi), and heading angle (ψi).
In eq. (3.1), the heading rate is utilized for controlling the aircraft location in the 2-D
Cartesian plane.
Since Isaacs, the term simple motion has been used to describe a vehicle whose
control input is its heading, not its heading rate. When the range between aircraft
are relatively large compared to their respective altitudes and the turning radius is
small compared to the range between vehicles, a simple motion 2-D model may be
sufficient when analyzing aircraft guidance strategies. When considering a simple
motion model in 2-D, the equations of motion for the individual aircraft/missiles are
of the form:
ẋi(t) = vi cosψi(t)
ẏi(t) = vi sinψi(t)
ψi(t) = u(t).
(3.2)
This model differs from eq. (3.1), as the heading is utilized for controlling the aircraft’s
motion in the 2-D Cartesian plane. By controlling the heading directly, instantaneous
turns are considered. The dynamics described in eq. (3.2) are less realistic than those
in eq. (3.1); however, analytic solutions to pursuit-evasion scenarios are more tractable
as a result of commanding the heading directly.
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Vehicle Motion in Three-Dimensions.
When agents are far in range and differ greatly in altitude, the aircraft may be
modeled in 3-D using a turn rate and heading rate limited model. This model is an
extension of the 2-D vehicle motion in eq. (3.1) and is as follows:
ẋi = vi cos γi(t) cosψi(t)
ẏi = vi cos γi(t) cosψi(t)




Define for each agent i, the North (yi), East (xi), altitude (zi), speed (vi), heading
angle (ψi), and flight path angle (γi). The heading rate and flight path angle rate are
used for controlling the aircraft position in the Cartesian space. These equations of
motion are purely kinematic in nature and therefore neglect mass, inertia, and any
form of acceleration. In the event where turn and climb-rates constraints are imposed,
the control magnitude may be bounded to model the physical limitations of aircraft.
If vehicles are very far from one another and differ greatly in altitude a simple
motion model in 3-D implies that a vehicle climbs/dives and turns relatively quickly
compared to the distance it traverses in Cartesian space. This model is a simplification
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of the 3-D vehicle dynamics in eq. (3.3) and is as follows:
ẋi = vi cos γi(t) cosψi(t)
ẏi = vi cos γi(t) cosψi(t)




Different from eq. (3.3), the 3-D simple motion model in eq. (3.4) allows for the
heading and flight path angle to be instantaneously changed. While vehicles require
time to change their flight path angle or heading rate, this model suggests that the
time it takes for maneuvers to be made is small compared to the overall distance
traversed. Further, it assumes that the vehicle is capable of making such maneuvers,
no matter how aggressive.
3.3 Solution Methodology
One may use optimal control theory as well as differential game theory to under-
stand optimal defense tactics. In this section, the general optimal control problem
and differential game problem are described. Two popular approaches to solving op-
timization problems include the indirect and direct methods; both are presented in
brief.
In optimal control theory, the metric by which the performance is measured and
subsequently leveraged to find an optimal control is called the objective cost. In
differential game theory the performance measure is called the value function of the
game. When HVAA defense is posed as an optimal control problem or differential
game the corresponding term is used to describe the performance measure.
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Optimal Control.
In optimal control theory, the goal is to find the controls which cause a system
to satisfy a set of constraints while at the same time minimize some performance
criterion [146]. One aim of this work is to determine the trajectory of a defending
asset whose aim is to eliminate a threat farthest from the HVAA. Using optimal
control theory, in a general sense, the goal is to find the control input u∗(t) in the
set of admissible controls U, that causes the system dynamics, ẋ = f(x(t),u(t), t)
given some initial condition at t0 to follow an optimal trajectory, x
∗(t), in the set
of admissible trajectories X, that minimizes the objective cost, J , and satisfies the
boundary and path constraints.
Define the objective cost as follows:
J = Φ(x(tf ),u(tf ), tf ) +
∫ tf
t0
g(x(t),u(t), t) dt. (3.5)
The objective cost is a functional – it is a mapping of the state space trajectories,
x(t); control input signals, u(t); and time, t to a scalar value, J . The objective
cost is constructed of a terminal penalty, Φ(·) and running cost, g(·). This form of
the objective cost is called the Bolza problem [146]. When the integrand g(·) = 0,
the objective cost depends solely upon the terminal penalty, Φ(·); in this case, the
objective cost is called the Mayer problem. When the terminal penalty Φ(·) = 0, the
objective cost depends solely upon the running cost, g(·); in this case, the objective
cost is called the Lagrange problem.
In scenarios where only one agent’s strategy is optimized, the goal is to find that
agent’s optimal control, u(t), which minimizes the objective cost, J . When finding
the control which minimizes, J , one must ensure that the dynamics are upheld. The
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dynamics, also referred to as the equations of motion, are as follows:
ẋ = f(x(t),u(t), t), t ∈ [t0, tf ]. (3.6)
Moreover, the boundary conditions on states, control, or time, are described as follows:
h(x(t0),u(t0), t0,x(tf ),u(tf ), tf ) = 0, t ∈ [t0, tf ]. (3.7)
Finally, through an inequality constraint, the path constraints are described as follows:
c(x(t),u(t), t) ≤ 0, t ∈ [t0, tf ]. (3.8)
Optimal Control - Indirect Method.
Indirect methods of optimal control [10] utilize the calculus of variations [12] and
Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle [151] to develop the necessary optimality conditions
which relate the optimal states, x∗(t), and control, u∗(t), to the optimal costates,
p∗(t); the superscript, ∗, represents optimality. To compute the costates, the calculus
of variations describes the Hamiltonian as the inner product of the costates and the
state dynamics summed with the integrand of the objective cost (running cost),
H (x(t),u(t),p(t), t) = g(x(t),u(t), t) + pT (t) [f(x(t),u(t), t)] . (3.9)
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If the control, u(t), is unbounded, taking the following partials derivatives of the












Equations (3.10) to (3.12) are used only when the control is unbounded. If there are
limits on the control, the use of Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle (PMP) is required,
H (x∗(t),u∗(t),p∗(t), t) ≤H (x∗(t),u(t),p∗(t), t). (3.13)
Simply stated in eq. (3.13), for all admissible controls, u, the Hamiltonian is a mini-
mum under optimal control. Boundary conditions are also developed depending upon










∗(tf ), tf ) +
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∂t




the Two Point Boundary Value Problem (TPBVP) is formed.
While the indirect approach provides the optimal states, costates, and control
for a given objective, analytic solutions quickly become intractable when nonlinear
equations of motion, and/or the number of states grows. The challenge of interpreting
the costates, and computing the necessary conditions can present difficulties with
solving optimal control problems indirectly.
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Optimal Control - Direct Method.
Rather than solving the optimal control using the calculus of variations, direct
methods serve as a means of finding optimal state and control trajectories using a
numerical search algorithm [17]. Four popular direct methods for solving optimal con-
trol problems include the Single Shooting Method (SSM), Multiple Shootings Method
(MSM), Even Collocation Method (ECM), and Pseudospectral Method (PSM). These
methods have various similarities and differences which are of interest to this work. A
brief description of each method along with the various advantages and disadvantages
between each of the four methods is presented.
Single Shooting Method (SSM).
SSM, outlined in Figure 7, is a numerical technique for finding the optimal control
to a dynamic system which achieves a given objective subject to boundary conditions
and path constraints. The procedure begins with some initial state, x0, and a guess
for the control for the entire time series, {uk|k = 1, . . . , N}. Using the guess for the
control and the initial state, an NLP solver, such as Matlab’s FMINCON(), computes
the optimal control through iterative search. The NLP performs the search for the
optimal control by first shooting the dynamics forward through time using an Or-
dinary Differential Equation (ODE) solver such as the Runge-Kutta Method [152].
Next, the NLP computes the objective cost using the propagated state trajectories.
After the cost is computed, the NLP evaluates if a local minimum has been found.
If the cost is a minimum, by some convergence criteria, the guess is considered the
optimal control. However, if the objective cost is not considered a minimum, then an
update to the guess for the control is made, and the process starts again. One such
method for updating the guess is the method of finite differences. As is the case in
FMINCON(), the searching gradient is computed using finite differences.
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Nonlinear Program (NLP)                                                     FMINCON()
Sequential Quadratic Program (SQP)












J =  (xN , uN ) +
PN
k=1 l(xk, uk, k)
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Figure 7. Shooting Method Flow Diagram
There exist multiple numerical techniques to update the guess for the control, one
popular technique is the method of Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) [16].
The SQP algorithm, in short, is a gradient-based technique for finding the optimal
control which minimizes the objective cost subject to equality and inequality con-
straints. It strives to satisfy the first-order necessary conditions for optimality, called
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, by updating guesses until the objective cost
is at a minimum and all constraints are satisfied to some tolerance. To determine how
to update the guess for the control, the algorithm perturbs the control throughout
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its trajectory. By observing the change in the objective cost, as a function of the
perturbations, updates are chosen to improve the guess for optimal control. In the
event the KKT conditions are satisfied, the optimal guess for the control sequence,
{u∗k|k = 1, . . . , N}, and optimal states, {x∗k|k = 1, . . . , N}, is produced.
The requirements to begin the shooting method is a guess for the control sequence
uk. Assuming that time is discretized evenly from t0 to tf into N points, the initial
guess is described as
uk, k = 1 . . . N. (3.15)
The overall size to compute the optimal control using the shooting method is quite
large. Assuming that time is evenly discretized into N points, the dynamics would
need to be propagated every time the objective cost is computed (N -times). Further,
let R be the number of iterations required to obtain an optimal control. Since pertur-
bations are made at every time step, the number of times the dynamics are forward
propagated would be approximately R(N + 1). (The 1 represents the evaluation of
the current guess, while the N represents the evaluation for each perturbation made
of the guess.)
Since the dynamics are guaranteed by the accuracy of the ODE solver, the feasi-
bility of the solution is ideal. Although the computational time associated with using
an ODE solver may be large, it ensures that the dynamics are upheld. In the ATDS
the initial state (x0) is provided, the final state is free, and no equality constraints
are applied.
Multiple Shooting Method (MSM).
MSM differs from single shooting in that it aims at reducing the computational
time by parallelizing the shooting operation. Breaking the shooting operation into
smaller segments, MSM makes use of multiple processors to shoot each segment in
48
parallel. In exchange for parallelizing the shooting operations, discontinuities occur
in-between each connecting interval. A series of equality constraints, one at each
transition from one interval to the next are formed as continuity constraints. Figure 8
describes the process of searching for the optimal control and optimal state trajectories
using MSM.
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Figure 8. Multiple Shooting Method Flow Diagram
The procedure begins with a guess for the control for the entire time series, {uk|k =
1, . . . , N}, and a value for the states at the beginning of each segment. Assuming
there are M segments, n states, and the initial state is known to be x0, the size of
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the initial guess for the states at each segment is n(M − 1). In total, the size of the
guess is N + n(M − 1) when the initial states are known.
Using the SQP algorithm, the optimal states and control are iteratively searched
for until the KKT conditions are satisfied. If the step size of the guess is below
some threshold, the change in the objective cost is also below some threshold, and if
the feasibility (defined as the equality constraints from the continuity conditions) is
within some tolerance, then the NLP returns the optimal control as well as the values
of the states at the beginning of each of the segments.
Although the overall size of MSM is less than the shooting method, it still requires
the use of an ODE solver such as the Runge-Kutta Method. Since the shootings
are conducted in parallel, the size of the algorithm is reduced. If the number of
computational threads is equal to the number of segments, the effective computational
time for shooting the dynamics is reduced by a factor of M . However, the introduction
of the continuity constraints requires the addition of n(M−1) unknowns to be solved
in addition to the control.
Even Collocation Method (ECM).
ECM takes advantage of computational efficiency by transcribing a dynamic opti-
mization problem, which requires numerical methods for solving differential equations,
into a static optimization problem. The method begins with considering the dynam-
ics and control at evenly spaced points in time from t0 to tf . Consider N points, the
guess for the states and control are as follows:
xk, k = 1, . . . , N (3.16)
uk, k = 1, . . . , N. (3.17)
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Using the guess for the state and control trajectories, ECM imposes the dynamics as a
set of equality constraints rather than using an ODE solver such as the Runge-Kutta
Method. The equality constraints are formed by a simple subtraction,
ẋ− f(x(t), u(t), t) = 0 t ∈ [t0, tf ]. (3.18)
Assuming that there are n states, the number of equality constraints formed from
imposing the dynamics are nN given by the first-order Euler approximation:
hk(xk, uk, k) = xk+1 − xk − f(xk, uk, k)∆t k = 1, 2, ..., N. (3.19)
Using the definition of the equality constraints in eq. (3.19) to satisfy the dynam-
ics of the problem, an ODE solver is no longer required to propagate the dynamics.
Rather, the dynamics are satisfied through an equality constraint which the NLP
considers feasibility criteria. The flow diagram which describes ECM can be seen
in Figure 9. The procedure begins by providing a guess for the state and control
trajectories. As described, the dynamics are transcribed into an equality constraint,
and a FOR() loop is used to compute each equality constraint at every time step.
Additionally, the objective cost is computed as a function of the states and control.
Since the collocation points are evenly spaced, any terms inside the integral of the
objective cost are approximated using a quadrature method such as trapezoidal or
rectangular integration. Using the SQP search described earlier, the objective cost
and equality constraints are minimized through iterative search until the KKT con-
ditions are satisfied. Upon completion, the solution provides the optimal control and
corresponding state trajectories at each collocation point.
In this analysis, there are N evenly spaced collocation points. However, a finer
or coarser mesh can be implemented to increase or reduce the number of collocation
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Figure 9. Even Collocation Direct Method Flow Diagram
points. By reducing the number of points, the number of function evaluations may
be reduced. By increasing the number of points, the accuracy of the quadrature is
increased at the cost of computational effort. Using the First-Euler approximation
of the dynamics as an equality constraint it is important to consider if the meshing
becomes too coarse; if this is the case then the small time step assumption made
earlier may no longer hold. Methods of changing the spacing between nodes are
described as adaptive meshing techniques. The general concept of adaptive meshing
is to decrease the spacing between nodes where more accurate computations of the
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states are required and allow the spacing of other areas to be larger to reduce the
total number of points. For this comparative study, the use of adaptive meshing is
not considered. Since the ODE solvers employed in the shooting method are fixed
time-step solvers, fixed meshing is used for the collocated methods to make a fair
comparison.
The overall size of ECM is much smaller than SSM and MSM. By allowing the dy-
namics to be accurate to a prescribed threshold, the use of ODE solvers is eliminated.
In the example, the derivative is computed using a first-order Euler’s Method which
isn’t the most accurate, but for small time steps is sufficient. Furthermore, using a
low-order quadrature method such as rectangular integration, the objective cost is
computed. Since there are no uses of ODE solvers, the size of ECM is to find the
optimal solution to the state and control trajectories, a size of N(n + 1). Assuming
there are R iterations, the number of function evaluations will be around the order
of RN(n+ 1).
Pseudospectral Method (PSM).
PSM refers to a series of techniques which are employed to solve optimal control
problems by taking advantage of efficient computational methods. Figure 10 describes
the process of conducting a search for the optimal control and optimal state trajecto-
ries using PSM. PSM enforces dynamics at a set of collocation points (just as before)
by means of equality constraints and the objective cost is computed through Gaus-







In eq. (3.20), x̂ is the polynomial approximation of the state, x, and the Lagrange







i = 1, ..., n+ 1. (3.21)
By using Lagrange interpolating polynomials, there is zero error of the interpolating
polynomial at each collocation point,
xi = x̂(ti), (3.22)
and since the interpolated function is a polynomial, any number of derivatives are
guaranteed to exist. In-between the collocation points, the error can be found by the
subtraction,






The point ξ is the value of t where the (n + 1)st derivative of the state x is equal to
zero. It would be ideal if ξ were a constant; but, most likely ξ will depend upon t.
However, the error can be bounded by choosing ξ to bound that derivative. Upon
the first investigation, the error can be reduced by adding more points, but the
Runge Phenomenon, where high-order derivatives cause the error to increase near
the endpoints can be problematic. To overcome this phenomenon, the collocation
points are spaced by the roots of an N th-order Legendre polynomial on the interval
[−1, 1). This not only reduces the Runge Phenomenon but also leads to exponential
convergence in quadrature. Using an affine transformation, the time series, [t0, tf ],
must be mapped to the [−1, 1] domain where the collocation points are determined




2t− (tf − t0)
tf − t0
. (3.24)
Derivatives may also be computed by means of a matrix multiplication which is more
efficient than first-order Euler approximations, and faster since operations can be
computed by means of matrix multiplication rather than for-loops. Using standard
techniques, a differentiation matrix eq. (3.25) may be computed [153]. Using the
differentiation matrix, equality constraints eq. (3.26) are used to ensure the dynamics
are upheld, namely,
ẋ ≈ Dx, (3.25)
h(x, u) = Dx− ∆t
2
f(x, u) = 0. (3.26)
Quadrature weights, wk, are associated with the collocation scheme and approximate
the integration of the running cost, as follows:
∫ tf
t0




wkg(x(τk), u(τk), τk). (3.27)
Similar to ECM, constraints (inequality or equality) may be enforced at any colloca-
tion point; equality constraints are used to enforce boundary conditions and inequality
constraints are used to implement path constraints.
The use of adaptive meshing for PSM aids in computational efficiency. By in-
creasing the polynomial order for the number of points in a mesh, it is feasible to
map the entire time sequence to one mesh of points and one polynomial. How-
ever, with higher order polynomials, Runge phenomenon, can be a source of error.
This Runge phenomenon is reduced by selecting the collocation points defined by
Legandre-Gauss-Radau (LGR) spaced collocation points [148, 154]. To reduce the
error from this phenomenon, HP-adaptive meshing [155] turns the mesh into a series
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of segments which are of no higher order than a prescribed maximum number. This
means that mesh refinement occurs where necessary, and in the event nonlinearities
in the dynamics require more precise computation of the states, the mesh is able to
adapt.
As far as computational size, PSM tends to be the most efficient means of com-
puting the optimal control and state trajectories [18, 19, 145]. Leveraging sparse
matrices and using matrix multiplications, the computational size is on the order of
N for enforcing the dynamics and the order of N for computing objective cost. Ex-
ponential convergence is also seen as a result of using PSM. Since adaptive meshing is
employed, the number of collocation points are reduced, and the size of the problem
is less than the even collocation problem. Further, the use of Gaussian quadrature
methods ensures that integrations are exact for the approximated polynomial. Also,
the integral can be computed by a weighted summation of the polynomial evaluated at
the collocation points. The number of function evaluations, assuming with N points,
n states, and R iterations, will be of the order of RN(n+1). The size of PSM is equal
to that of ECM, but the efficient methods which are employed by PSM produce a
more accurate approximation of the objective cost and more accurate implementation
of the dynamics.
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Figure 10. Pseudospectral Methods Flow Diagram
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Comparison.
Each of the four methods described has various advantages and disadvantages;
Table 2 summarizes the various properties of the four methods. To begin with, SSM
is simple to construct, and initial guesses only require the control sequence. However,
SSM inefficiently computes the cost by shooting the dynamics for each evaluation.
Moreover, shooting methods are very sensitive to the initial guess due to the gradient
search methods employed by the SQP. Rather than adjusting the state trajectories,
SSM only modifies the control with each successive guess for the optimal control.
Similar to ECM, MSM imposes dynamics as a series of inequality constraints; but,
rather than using a first-order Euler approximation to the dynamics, an ODE solver
is used to forward propagate the dynamics. Also, the introduction of states to the
guess reduces sensitivity to the initial guess and allows for state and control to be
provided at the end of the iterative search.
As compared to SSM and MSM, the accuracy of the solution that ECM produces
is poorer. While SSM and MSM provide accurate integration using ODE solvers,
ECM uses a first-order Euler approximation. Furthermore, the use of rectangular
integration by ECM produces a coarse approximation of analytic integration. While
ECM aims at outperforming the speed of solution provided by SSM and MSM, it
does so at the cost of accuracy. However, by setting the dynamics as a constraint
rather than imposing the dynamics through shooting, ECM is less sensitive to initial
guess than SSM and MSM.
PSM is for all intents and purposes, an accurate and efficient version of ECM.
Since it uses LGR collocation points and computes integration using Gaussian quadra-
ture, integration is exact for the approximating polynomial and is found by a simple
weighted sum. PSM also makes use of a differentiation matrix to enforce the dynam-
ics through equality constraints. This is much more efficient than ECM’s for-loop.
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The main disadvantage of PSM is the complexity and level of understanding required
to implement the algorithm. It should be noted that tools do exist which may aid the
novice control-theorist with setting up an optimization method using PSM discussed
in [19, 18, 156].
Table 2. Method Property Comparison
Metric SSM MSM ECM PSM
Easy to formulate • •
Guess includes control • • • •
Guess includes state • • •
Solves for control traj. • • • •
Solves for state traj. • • • •
Sensitive to init. guess • •
Employs ODE solvers • •
Eq. constr. satisfy dynamics • • •
Low convergence times • • •
Table 3 presents a summary of the size of the guess and equality constraints to
set up each of the four methods. While at first glance, the shooting method appears
to be the smallest size, it is the most computationally inefficient means of searching
for the optimal control. Due to the number of ODE solver calls, shooting takes much
more time to compute than the other three direct methods. Multiple shooting aimed
at reducing the computational time by shooting segments in parallel but introduced
continuity constraints. Although the computational size of the problem is reduced by
parallelizing the ODE solver calls, the method requires special hardware and software
to perform this operation. ECM removed the requirement to shoot the dynamics; in-
stead, the dynamics were implemented through a series of equality constraints. Since
ECM does not require shooting the dynamics, a fine grid of points is required for
the first-order Euler approximation for the dynamics to be sufficient. Additionally,
ECM is much less sensitive to initial guesses due to gradient-based search techniques.
Finally, PSM aims at reducing the error of rectangular integration and low-order dy-
namics by using Gaussian quadrature and spacing the points accordingly. In spacing
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the LGR points, the number of collocation points is reduced to achieve the same ac-
curacy as the other direct methods, and as a result, solutions to the optimal control
problem are found much faster. Table 9 shows a comparison of the size required to
run each of the four direct methods.
Table 3. Method Size
Method Initial Guess No. Ukn. Eq. Const. NLP Output
SSM u[k], k = 1..N N 0 u∗k, k = 1 . . . N
MSM
u[k], k = 1..N
x[j], j = 2..M
N + n(M − 1) n(M − 1)
u∗k, k = 1 . . . N
x∗j , j = 2 . . .M
ECM
u[k], k = 1..N
x[k], k = 2..N
N + n(N − 1) n(N − 1)
u∗k, k = 1 . . . N
x∗k, k = 2 . . . N
PSM
u[k], k = 1..N
x[k], k = 2..N
N + n(N − 1) n(N − 1)
u∗k, k = 1 . . . N
x∗k, k = 2 . . . N
Differential Games.
In pursuit-evasion, two or more agents select a control which aims at either min-
imizing or maximizing a common performance metric called the value function [9].
More specifically, the value function arises after the successful minimization/max-
imization of the objective cost/payoff function by the players. Here and in other
instances below, it may be more accurate to say min-max the objective cost. In
general, the pursuer aims at minimizing the value function, while the evader aims at
maximizing it. What makes the game differential, is that the dynamics of each of the
agents is defined by a set of governing equations of motion,
ẋ = f(x(t),u(t),v(t), t). (3.28)
The dynamics of a game, eq. (3.28), differs from that of the optimal control problem,
eq. (3.6), in the fact that two controls, u and v, are explicit. This is to emphasize that
60
the dynamics are influenced by both players. For the formulation, at a given time
t ∈ [t0, tf ], the pursuer’s admissible control is u(t) ∈ U and the evader’s admissible
control is v(t) ∈ V. Similar to the boundary condition described in optimal control
theory, eq. (3.7), a terminal constraint can be imposed as follows:
h(x(tf ),u(tf ),v(tf ), tf ) = 0, t ∈ [t0, tf ]. (3.29)
Further, the value function of the differential game is
J = Φ(x(tf ),u(tf ),v(t), tf ) +
∫ tf
t0
g(x(t),u(t),v(t), t) dt. (3.30)
It is the goal of the differential game to find the admissible optimal strategies u∗(t) ∈
U and v∗(t) ∈ V for all t ∈ [t0, tf ] such that the value function is a minimax:
J(u∗(t),v(t)) ≤ J(u∗(t),v∗(t)) ≤ J(u(t),v∗(t)). (3.31)
The search for the optimal control for the pursuer and evader such that the value func-
tion as a minimax is conducted. The necessary conditions for the minimax problem
relates to the Hamiltonian in eq. (3.9) just as before,
H (x(t),u(t),v(t),p(t), t) = g(x(t),u(t),v(t), t) + pT (t) [f(x(t),u(t),v(t), t)] .
(3.32)
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Utilizing the Hamiltonian, eq. (3.32), which is explicit in each player’s control, the


















The optimal control for the pursuer and the evader are those that drive the Hamilto-
nian to a saddle point where the pursuer minimizes the Hamiltonian and the evader
maximizes it [9]. This optimal solution is commonly referred to as a saddle point strat-
egy. The saddle point strategy explicitly states that the performance of an agent’s
opponent only improves when that agent performs any control which is not optimal.
While the necessary conditions for optimality serve as a means of determining the
optimal state trajectories and strategies of both players, it is common to have difficul-
ties solving the system of equations described in eqs. (3.33) to (3.37). Consequently,
numerical approaches for finding the optimal state and control trajectories are pur-
sued. Uncommon to differential games are solutions found directly using numerical
techniques. Although numeric techniques exist for locating saddle points [158, 16],
the topology of the Hamiltonian and objective cost in the state space is critical for
locating the saddle points. Only by locating the saddle point of the Hamiltonian does
one locate the optimal strategies of the differential game. One alternative to locat-
ing saddle points directly is obtained by transforming the problem of minimax into
that of only minimization (transforming a differential game into an optimal control
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problem). Once the differential game can be reduced to that of an optimal control
problem, an analytic solution may become tractable, or direct methods may be used
to solve them.
Geometric Methods for Solving Differential Games.
One popular method of transforming a differential game into an optimal control
problem is by utilizing geometric tools such as Apollonius Circle [159, 68, 122, 44,
9, 67, 120, 160, 101]. When considering simple motion, Apollonius Circle solves for
the optimal headings which result in a min-time interception of the slower evader
by a faster pursuer. Apollonius Circle describes the locus of points for all possible
interceptions depending upon the heading of the slower evader. Because the optimal
trajectory of the faster pursuer is a direct mapping through the Apollonius Circle,
from the heading of the slower evader, the optimization of two variables (pursuer and
evader headings) into an optimization of only one (evader heading) can be conducted
using the geometry of Apollonius. The Apollonius Circle for a fast pursuer and slow







Figure 11. The min-time interception of an evader (E) by a faster pursuer(P) illustrated
by the Apollonius Circle interception geometry.
In order to construct an Apollonius Circle, define the speed ratio, µ = vE/vP .
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Moreover, the radius of the Apollonius Circle is:
R = OI =
µEP
1− µ2 (3.39)
Called Foci, the initial conditions of the evader, E, and the pursuer, P , along
with their relative velocities, µ, can fully define the Apollonius Circle as described in
eqs. (3.38) and (3.39).
3.4 HVAA Defense Scenarios
This section contains a description of both kinetic and energy-based defense of a
HVAA against an incoming threat. In Table 1, six different engagements are described
which are considered in this work. The research scenarios detailed in this section
outline how the kinetic and directed energy defense scenarios may be posed as either
optimal control problems or differential games. Special attention is given to defining
the engagements and how to pose and solve these problems as differential games or
optimal control problems.
Notation.
Throughout this work, the states and control are vector valued functions explicit
in time and denoted x(t) and u(t) respectively. For the sake of compactness, the
real-valued n-dimensional state and m-dimensional control at a single instant of time
are denoted as x ∈ Rn and u ∈ Rm, respectively. The same notation is used for
a single state; for example, xi represents the x-location for an agent i for a single
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instant of time.
Kinetic Defense of a Maneuvering HVAA in 2-D.
The kinetic defense of a maneuvering HVAA in 2-D is outlined in Scenario 1 of
Table 1. In this scenario, the pursuer and defender are assumed to be guided by the
proportional navigation guidance law, and the evader maneuvers to escape its capture
by the pursuer while assisting the defender in capturing the pursuer.
The dynamics of the evader follow the 2-D vehicle motion model as described in
eq. (3.1). The complete state of the optimization problem at an instant in time in the
2-D Cartesian plane is defined as xT = [xD, yD, ψD, xP , yP , ψP , xE, yE, ψE] ∈ R9. The
pursuer’s heading rate and the defender’s heading rate is selected to be proportional
to the line of sight rate to the evader and the pursuer, respectively. The evader’s
control is it’s heading rate, uE = {ψ̇E}. The nonlinear equations of motion in the
2-D Cartesian plane, ẋ = f(x,uE), are defined by a system of nonlinear differential
equations,
ẋP = vP cosψP , ẋE = vE cosψE, ẋD = vD cosψD
ẏP = vP sinψP , ẏE = vE sinψE, ẏD = vD sinψD
ψ̇P = NP λ̇PE, ψ̇E = u(t), ψ̇D = NDλ̇DP ,
(3.40)
where the proportional navigation constants for the pursuer and defender are NP and
ND respectively. Additionally, the line of sight angles from the pursuer to the evader
is λPE and the line of sight angle from the defender to the pursuer is λDP . Moreover,
the control of the evader is bounded and therefore the admissible control of the evader
is bounded by a turning rate constraint ωmax, namely,
u(t) ∈ [−ωmax, ωmax] ∀ t ∈ [t0, tf ]. (3.41)
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The initial state of the engagement scenario is defined as
xT (t0) = x
T
0 = [xD0 , yD0 , ψD0 , xP0 , yP0 , ψP0 , xE0 , yE0 , ψE0 ]. (3.42)
It is also assumed that the engagement scenarios being solved belong to the escape
set, x ∈ Re ⊂ R9. The escape set is defined as the state trajectories wherein the
defender captures the pursuer and the evader escapes capture by the pursuer; this
occurs at the terminal time, tf , and is defined as follows:
Re = {x|(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 = 0, (xP − xE)2 + (yP − yE)2 > 0, t = tf}. (3.43)
The objective is for the evader to maneuver so as to minimize the defender-pursuer
range as well as maximize the pursuer-evader range at final time: the instant in time
when the defender captures the pursuer. The pursuer-evader range and the defender-
pursuer range are denoted by RPE and RDP , respectively. Formulating the objective










= RPE(t0)−RPE(tf ) +RDP (tf )−RDP (t0)
(3.44)
Because the initial conditions are independent of the input, u, a cost function is
desired which equivalently minimizes RDP (tf ) and maximizes RPE(tf ), namely,
min
u
J = −RPE(tf ) +RDP (tf ). (3.45)
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Kinetic Defense of a Non-Maneuvering HVAA in 2-D.
The kinetic defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA in 2-D is outlined in Scenario 2
of Table 1. In this scenario, a pursuer and defender play a differential game. In the
game, the pursuer strives to minimize his distance from the evader at the instant in
time that the pursuer is captured by the defender while the defender aims to maximize
the very same distance.
The dynamics of each agent follows the simple motion model in 2-D from eq. (3.2).
The complete state of the game at an instant in time is defined by xT = [xE, yE, xP ,
yP , xD, yD] ∈ R6. The pursuer’s control variable is its instantaneous heading angle,
uP = {ψP}. The defender’s control variable is also its instantaneous heading angle,
uD = {ψD}. The nonlinear dynamics of the game, ẋ = f(x,uP ,uD), are defined by a
system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations,
ẋP = vP cosψP , ẋE = vE cosψE, ẋD = vD cosψD
ẏP = vP sinψP , ẏE = vE sinψE, ẏD = vD sinψD.
(3.46)
The admissible controls of the pursuer and the defender, are given by ψP ∈
[−π, π] ∀ t ∈ [t0, tf ] and ψD ∈ [−π, π] ∀ t ∈ [t0, tf ], respectively. It is assumed
that the evader is non-maneuverable, and therefore the evader’s heading, ψE, is con-
stant. The evader’s heading is also assumed to be known by both the defender (D)
and pursuer (P ).
The initial state of the game is defined as
xT (t0) = x
T
0 = [xP0 , yP0 , xE0 , yE0 , xD0 , yD0 ]. (3.47)
In this scenario, point capture is considered. This means that the P−D separation
has to become zero at some time tf for the defender to intercept the pursuer. It is
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also assumed that the state of the system belongs to the escape set, denoted by
x ∈ Re ⊂ R6 and defined in eq. (3.43). In other words, given the speed ratios, the
evader heading, and initial conditions (x0), there exists a strategy for D to intercept
P before the latter captures E. The game of capture, that is, the game when the
state belongs to the complement of Re is not addressed in this dissertation.
The termination set, C , which represents interception of the pursuer by the de-





(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 = 0, t = tf
}
. (3.48)
The terminal time, tf , is defined as the first time instant when the state of the system
satisfies eq. (3.48), at which time the terminal state is
xT (tf ) = x
T
f = [xPf , yPf , xEf , yEf , xDf , yDf ]. (3.49)
The objective cost is the separation distance between the pursuer and the evader at
the instant in time that the defender captures the pursuer, tf , and is described as
follows:
J(uP (t),uD(t); x0) = Φ(xf ) =
√
(xPf − xEf )2 + (yPf − yEf )2. (3.50)
The value function is subject to eqs. (3.46) to (3.48) and depends only on the terminal
state and is therefore of the Mayer form. Its value is given by




J(uP (·),uD(·); x0). (3.51)
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Kinetic Defense of a Non-Maneuvering HVAA in 3-D.
The kinetic defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA in 3-D is outlined in Scenario 3
of Table 1. In this scenario, a pursuer and defender play the same differential game as
described by Scenario 2, except that the agents move in 3-D Cartesian space rather
than the 2-D Cartesian plane.
The dynamics of each agent follows the simple motion model in 3-D from eq. (3.4).
The complete state of the game is defined by xT = [xP , yP , zP , xE, yE, zE, xD, yD, zD] ∈
R9. The pursuer’s control is is composed of its instantaneous heading angle and
flight path angle, uP = {ψP , γP}. The defender’s control is also its instantaneous
heading and flight path angle, uD = {ψD, γD}. The nonlinear dynamics of the game,
ẋ = f(x,uP ,uD), are defined by a system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations,
ẋP = vP cos γP cosψP , ẋE = vE cos γE cosψE, ẋD = vD cos γD cosψD
ẏP = vP cos γP sinψP , ẏE = vE cos γE sinψE, ẏD = vD cos γD sinψD
żP = vP sin γP , żE = vE sin γE, żD = vD sin γD.
(3.52)
The admissible controls of the pursuer and the defender for each instance of time
are given by ψP , ψD ∈ [−π, π] and γP , γD ∈ [−π, π], for all time, t ∈ [t0, tf ]. It is
assumed that the evader is non-maneuverable, and therefore the evader’s heading,
ψE, and flight path angle, γE, remain constant. The evader’s heading is also assumed
to be known by both the defender (D) and pursuer (P ).
The initial state of the game is defined as:
xT (t0) = x
T
0 = [xP0 , yP0 , zP0 , xE0 , yE0 , zE0 , xD0 , yD0 , zD0 ]. (3.53)
Just as in the 2-D case, point-capture is considered; this means that the P − D
range goes to zero in order for the defender to intercept the pursuer. It is also assumed
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that the state of the system belongs to the escape set, denoted by x ∈ Re ⊂ R9. The
termination set, C , which represents the interception of the pursuer by the defender




∣∣(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 + (zP − zD)2 = 0, t = tf
}
. (3.54)
The terminal time, tf is the instant in time where the state reaches the terminal, C ,
specified in eq. (3.54). The terminal state is
xT (tf ) = x
T
f = [xPf , yPf , zPf , xEf , yEf , zEf , xDf , yDf , zDf ]. (3.55)
The objective cost is
J(uP ,uD,x0) = Φ(xf ) = (xPf − xEf )2 + (yPf − yEf )2 + (zPf − zEf )2. (3.56)
The objective cost depends only upon the terminal state of the Active Target Defense
Differential Game (ATDDG); its value function is





Maximum Exposure of a Non-Maneuvering Pursuer in 2-D.
The directed energy defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA in 2-D is outlined in
Scenario 4 of Table 1. In the scenario, the defender aims to maximally expose the
pursuer which, in-turn, strives to capture the evader in minimum time. Consider
first, the optimal control problem for the defender to maximally expose a faster, non-
maneuvering pursuer, vP > vD. The constant velocities of the defender (D) and
the pursuer (P ) are defined as vD and vP respectively. The complete state of the
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two-agent scenario is xT = [xD, yD, xP , yP ] ∈ R4, where (xD, yD) and (xP , yP ) are the
positions of D and P respectively, for any time t ∈ [t0, tf ]. The defender’s control
variable is the instantaneous heading angle uD = {ψD}. The equations of motion for
the two-agent scenario follow the simple motion model in eq. (3.2) and are as follows:
ẋD = vD cosψD, ẋP = vP cosψP ,
ẏD = vD sinψD, ẏP = vP sinψP .
(3.58)
The course of the non-maneuvering pursuer, ψP , is assumed to be constant and known
by the defender. The control of the defender is its heading: ψD ∈ [0, 2π). At the onset,
the pursuer is considered to be a distance RD (the WEZ range) from the defender;
at time zero (t0), the initial state x(t0) ≡ x0 ∈ I , where
I = {x|(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 −R2D = 0, t = t0}. (3.59)
Also, the defender is at an aspect angle θP from the pursuer, pictorially shown in
Figure 12. The complementary angle to the aspect angle is the line-of-sight angle,
λPD, also shown in Figure 12. This circular WEZ model assumes that exposure is
independent of the defender’s heading and is range-limited. The WEZ is assumed to
have a fixed radius, RD. In this section, the time-optimal strategy of the defender is













Figure 12. The initial engagement geometry consists of a defender with a circular WEZ
in contact with a faster non-maneuvering pursuer.
Since the pursuer is faster than the defender, escape from the circular WEZ is
guaranteed. Moreover, the termination set which represents the escape of the pursuer
from the WEZ is defined as follows:
C = {x|(xD − xP )2 + (yD − yP )2 −R2D > 0, t = tf}. (3.60)
Exposure of the pursuer by the defender is made so long as the range between the
pursuer and defender is less than or equal to the WEZ radius, RD. The terminal
time, tf , is defined as the instant in time where the state satisfies eq. (3.60); at
which time, the terminal state is: xT (tf ) = [xDf , yDf , xPf , yPf ]. Since the objective
is to maximize the time by which the pursuer remains within the circular WEZ, the






−1 dt . (3.61)
The optimal exposure time is t∗f = min J subject to the termination set in eq. (3.60).
The goal is to find the optimal defender’s heading time history which minimizes the
objective cost in eq. (3.61), namely, ψ∗D(t) = argminψD J .
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Directed Energy Defense of a Non-Maneuvering HVAA in 2-D.
The directed energy defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA is described in Scenario
5 of Table 1. In this HVAA defense scenario, the pursuer aims to capture the evader in
minimum time while the defender aims to maximally continuously expose the pursuer.
The HVAA (evader) is non-maneuvering and as a result, the optimal strategies for
the defender and the pursuer are of interest.
They dynamics of each of the three agents: pursuer, evader, and defender, follow
the 2-D simple motion model as described in eq. (3.2). The pursuer, defender, and
defender have constant velocity vP , vE, and vD respectively. The complete state of
the engagement is xT = [xP , yP , xE, yE, xD, yD] ∈ R6, where (xP , yP ), (xE, yE), and
(xD, yD) are the positions of P , E, and D respectively. Also define ψP , ψE, and ψD as
the instantaneous headings of P , E, and D respectively. Consequently, the equations
of motion for the three-agent scenario are:
ẋP = vP cosψP , ẋE = vE cosψE, ẋD = vD cosψD,
ẏP = vP sinψP , ẏE = vE sinψE, ẏD = vD sinψD.
(3.62)
The non-maneuvering evader is on a fixed course and its position and heading
are known by the pursuer. The pursuer, knowing the state of the evader, wishes to
select a heading which intercepts E in minimum time. Capture is achieved when
P and E are coincident (i.e., point-capture). During this pursuit, the defender has
a circular WEZ with radius RD, and it desires to keep the pursuer inside its WEZ
for the maximum possible continuous time; that is, that P remains inside the WEZ
without interruption.
The initial conditions for the scenario are that P and E are located in arbitrary
locations in the 2-D Cartesian plane; while D is located a distance RD from P . At
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time zero (t0), the initial state x(t0) ≡ x0 ∈ I , where
I = {x|(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 −R2D = 0, t = t0}. (3.63)
The termination set which represents the point-capture of the evader by the pur-
suer is defined as
CA = {x|(xP − xE)2 + (yP − yE)2 = 0, t = tgo}. (3.64)
The instant in time where the state satisfies eq. (3.64) is defined as tgo; also called
the time-to-go. The termination set which represents the escape of the pursuer from
the defender (the P-D range is larger than the WEZ range) is
CB = {x|(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 −R2D > 0, t = texp}. (3.65)
The instant in time where the state satisfies eq. (3.65) is defined as texp; also
called the exposure time. Because of the initial conditions as defined by eq. (3.63),
the exposure time is the amount of time that passes until the pursuer escapes the
defender’s WEZ. The termination set of the entire scenario is CA, that is, the pursuer
captures the evader regardless if the pursuer has escaped the WEZ of the defender
prior to capturing the evader or if the pursuer has captured the evader before escaping
the defender’s WEZ. One objective of this section is to analyze the optimal strategy of
the defender when texp is either less than, greater than, or equal to tgo. Also provided
are the conditions when texp = 0, that is, that the defender can not expose the pursuer
at all no matter the strategy of the defender.
The objective of the pursuer is to capture the evader in minimum time – to make
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1 dt = tgo. (3.66)
The optimal time-to-go is t∗go = min JA subject to the termination set in eq. (3.64)
– the pursuer and evader are collocated at final time. The goal for the pursuer is to
find the optimal heading which minimizes the objective cost in eq. (3.66), namely,
ψ∗P (t) = argmin
ψP
JA. (3.67)
The objective of the defender is to keep the pursuer inside the WEZ for as long
as possible. Since the pursuer is faster than the defender, the pursuer’s escape is
guaranteed for a finite WEZ range, RD. The objective cost of the defender is the




−1 dt = −tf . (3.68)
The final time, tf = min(texp, tgo). This optimization problem ends when the states
of the scenario reaches C = CA ∪ CB. The optimal exposure time is t∗exp = min JB
subject to the termination set in eq. (3.65) – the pursuer is no longer contained inside
the WEZ of the defender. The goal is to find the optimal defender’s heading which





Maximum Exposure of a Non-Maneuvering Pursuer in 3-D.
The directed energy defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA in 3-D is outlined in
Scenario 6 of Table 1. In this scenario, a defender aims to maximally expose a non-
maneuvering pursuer in the 3-D Cartesian space. This scenario is a direct extension
of Scenario 4 to the 3-D Cartesian space. Define the constant speed of the defender
(D) and the pursuer (P ), as vD and vP respectively. The state space is composed of
the position of the defender and the pursuer whose locations in 3-D Cartesian space
are (xD, yD, zD)
T and (xP , yP , zP )
T respectively. The complete state of the exposure
scenario, x, is defined as follows:
xT = [xD, yD, zD, xP , yP , zP ] ∈ R6. (3.70)
The defender’s control is composed of the instantaneous heading angle, ψD, and flight
path angle, γD. The control vector, u, is defined as follows:
uT = [ψD, γD] ∈ R2. (3.71)
In the model, it is assumed that the position and course of the pursuer is constant
and known by the defender. The dynamics for the pursuer and defender are
ẋP = vP cos γP cosψP , ẋD = vD cos γD cosψD
ẏP = vP cos γP sinψP , ẏD = vD cos γD sinψD
żP = vP sin γP , żD = vD sin γD.
(3.72)
As described in eq. (3.72), the course of the pursuer is defined by the pursuer’s
heading, ψP , and flight path angle, γP . The control of the defender is the heading,
ψD ∈ [0, 2π) ∀ t ∈ [t0, tf ], and flight path angle, γD ∈ [−π, π] ∀ t ∈ [t0, tf ]. At the
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onset, the pursuer is a distance RD from the defender, DP = RD|t = t0. Aat initial
time (t0), the initial state x(t0) ≡ x0 ∈ I , where
I = {x|(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 + (zP − zD)2 −R2D = 0, t = t0}. (3.73)
Also, the defender is located at an azimuth, φ, and angle relative to the z-axis, θ,
with respect to the pursuer’s position at the instant in time the scenario begins. The
coordinates, angles, and initial conditions are shown in Figure 13. This spherical
model assumes that exposure is guaranteed so long as the pursuer is within a fixed















Figure 13. The initial geometry of the directed engery defense scenario occurs when
the defender, with spherical WEZ, makes contact with the faster pursuer.
Since the pursuer is faster than the defender, escape from the spherical WEZ is
guaranteed. Moreover, the termination set which represents the escape of the pursuer
from the defender’s WEZ is defined as follows:
C = {x|(xD − xP )2 + (yD − yP )2 + (zD − zP )2 −R2D > 0 = tf}. (3.74)
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The terminal time, tf , is defined as the instant in time where the state and time
satisfies eq. (3.74); at which time, the terminal state is:
xT (tf ) = [xDf , yDf , zDf , xPf , yPf , zPf ].
Since the objective is to maximize the time by which the pursuer remains within the




−1 dt = −tf . (3.75)
The optimal exposure time is t∗f = −min J subject to the termination set in
eq. (3.74). The goal is to find the optimal defender’s heading and flight path angle
time histories which minimize the objective cost in eq. (3.75), namely, u∗ = argminu J .
3.5 Summary
In order to investigate the optimal strategies for the defense of a HVAA, the equa-
tions of motion in 2-D and 3-D have been described to represent aircraft engaged in
pursuit, evasion, and defense. These simple motion models can be used to evaluate
aircraft motion through navigational commands. Using these models, both optimal
control problems and differential games can be formulated. A brief overview of the
indirect method and direct method of computing optimal control was presented fol-
lowed by a brief overview of differential games. Using these methods, this work aims
at proposing and solving various aerial engagements to investigate optimal defensive
strategies that protect a HVAA from a single threat. After the discussion on differ-
ential games and optimal control, Apollonius Circle was presented as a method for
solving a pursuit-evasion differential game. Next, the generic HVAA defense differ-
ential games were described. In the kinetic defense differential game, the defender
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aims at capturing the pursuer before it can capture the evader. In the directed en-
ergy defense differential game, the defender aims at exposing the pursuer for as long
as possible before the pursuer captures the evader. Finally, the solution approach
for solving each research task is presented in brief. The results of this work begin
with Chapter IV where the kinetic defense is investigated. Also, in Chapter IV, four
different direct optimal control methods are compared and contrasted for solving the
optimal strategies for the kinetic defense of a HVAA against an incoming threat when
the evader can maneuver. Next, in Chapter V directed energy defense is provided by
maximizing the time that a pursuer is within a specified range of the defender. These
chapters address the desired research tasks for this dissertation.
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IV. Kinetic Defense of a HVAA
Reflections should be bestowed until the
instances relevant to practice are delineated.
With a judicial amount of reason and trial and
error, an answer should be attainable
— Rufus Isaacs, Rand Report RM-1391-PR
An engagement scenario involving the kinetic defense of a HVAA is investigated in
this chapter. In this defense scenario, an attacking missile or adversary (pursuer) aims
to capture the HVAA (evader) which is teamed with a cooperative missile (defender).
A successful kinetic defense occurs when the defender captures the pursuer before
the pursuer captures the evader. In this work, only scenarios where the defender
provides a successful defense of the evader are considered. This chapter is divided
into four parts: kinetic defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA in 2-D, kinetic defense
of a non-maneuvering HVAA in 3-D, kinetic defense of a maneuvering HVAA in 2-D,
and a direct methods comparison for HVAA defense.
4.1 Kinetic Defense of a Non-Maneuvering HVAA in 2-D
An engagement scenario involving the defense of a non-maneuverable HVAA in
the 2-D Cartesian plane is investigated in this section. In this scenario, an incoming
threat (pursuer) pursues the non-maneuverable HVAA (evader) which is teamed with
a cooperative missile (defender). Because the evader is non-maneuvering, the pursuer
and defender play a simple game: The pursuer aims at minimizing the terminal
distance with respect to the evader while the defender aims to maximize the same
terminal distance. Termination of the game is defined as the time when the defender
intercepts the pursuer, i.e. the pursuer and defender are collocated at final time.
The saddle point state feedback strategies for the pursuer and defender are presented
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in this section and the optimal saddle point strategies are compared to a heuristic
approach found in literature [161]. An example shows that better performance is
obtained by implementing the saddle point strategies derived herein compared to the
heuristic approach.
In the defense differential game of a non-maneuvering HVAA, the speeds of the
pursuer (P ), evader (E), and defender (D) are constant and denoted by vP , vE, and
vD, respectively. The agents are modeled having simple 2-D motion as commonly
found in games of Isaacs [9].
Differential Game.
Described in Section 3.4, a differential game is developed between the pursuer
and the defender concerning the defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA. From the
problem definition, the motion of the three agents are defined as a set of ordinary
differential equations as shown in eq. (3.46). Also, the objective cost is defined in
eq. (3.50) and the value function of the differential game is defined in eq. (3.51).
Define the speed ratio problem parameter µ = vE/vP . In general, the pursuer is
faster than the evader, so 0 < µ < 1. Also, define the speed ratio α = vD/vP . When
the defender is faster than the pursuer, α > 1. The speed ratios µ and α and the
evader’s constant heading ψE are the problem parameters. Using the aforementioned
equations of motion in eq. (3.46) as well as the speed ratios α and µ, the dynamics
may be non-dimensionalized with respect to time and are as follows:
ẋP = cosψP , ẋE = µ cosψE, ẋD = α cosψD,
ẏP = sinψP , ẏE = µ sinψE, ẏD = α sinψD.
(4.1)
Note, that making such a transformation to non-dimensional variables reduces the
number of parameters used in derivation and generalizes solutions through speed
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ratios rather than requiring the use of speeds explicitly. This is an approach that is
leveraged throughout this dissertation. It amounts to having one of the agent’s (in
this case the pursuer) have speed of unity.
There exists one costate for each state, therefore the the costate vector is pT =
[pxP , pyP , pxE , pyE , pxD , pyD ] ∈ R6, and the Hamiltonian of the differential game, in this
case, is the inner product of the nonlinear dynamics from eq. (3.46) and the costates,
p. The Hamiltonian is
H = pxP cosψP + pyP sinψP + αpxD cosψD
+ αpyD sinψD + µpxE cosψE + µpyE sinψE.
(4.2)
where the speeds have been normalized using the pursuer’s speed, vP , as a reference.
Theorem 1. Consider the defense differential game of non-maneuverable aircraft
described by eqs. (3.46) to (3.51). The headings of the pursuer and the defender are
constant under optimal play and their trajectories are straight lines.
Proof. By differentiating the Hamiltonian in eq. (4.2) with respect to ψP and setting
the derivative equal to 0, the optimal heading, ψ∗P is
∂H
∂ψP
= −pxP sinψP + pyP cosψP = 0. (4.3)
Using the trigonometric identity cos2 ψP + sin













The second partial derivative ∂
2H
∂ψ2P
is computed in order to determine wether the
positive or the negative roots of eq. (4.4) are indeed the optimal pursuer headings.
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Doing so, the following is obtained:
∂2H
∂ψ2P
= −pxP cosψP − pyP sinψP . (4.5)












into eq. (4.5), the second partial, ∂
2H
∂ψ2P
> 0. Therefore, the optimal heading in eq. (4.6)
minimizes H and, therefore, it minimizes the terminal distance between P and E.
Similarly, by computing ∂H
∂ψD
= 0 the defender’s optimal heading which maximizes












Additionally, the costate dynamics are obtained by evaluating−∂H /∂x and therefore
ṗxP = ṗyP = ṗxD = ṗyD = ṗxE = ṗyE = 0; hence, all costates are constant and
therefore ψ∗P and ψ
∗
D are constant. Consequently, the optimal trajectories are straight
lines. 
Given from Theorem 1, the optimal trajectories are straight lines. In such an
instance, the Apollonius Circle is a relevant tool to determine the optimal headings
of the agents P and D [9]. In general, a circle can be defined as the locus of points,
I, with a constant ratio of distances to two given points which are called foci. In this
scenario, the foci are P and D, i.e. β = PI
DI
is constant. When the circle is defined
using the constant ratio of distances just described, it is commonly referred to as
an Apollonius Circle and it represents an important tool to analyze pursuit-evasion
problems. Consider agents P and D traveling in straight lines and at constant speeds
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is the speed ratio
parameter. In this scenario, D strives to intercept P . D intercepts P at a point
I = (xI , yI) on the Apollonius Circle and at that point, the distance traveled by P is
equal to β multiplied by the distance traveled by D. Hence, an Apollonius Circle can
be constructed based on the distance between P and D and also based on the speed
ratio parameter β. The center of the circle is denoted by O where the points P , D,
and O are collinear as illustrated in Figure 14.
Figure 14. The Apollonius Circle (P,D) with the interception point (in red) located in
the global frame.
Without loss of generality, consider the relative coordinate frame illustrated in
Figure 15; where the points P and D denote the positions of the pursuer and the
defender, respectively. The x′-axis of this frame goes from P to D which results in
yP = yD = 0. The origin of the coordinate frame is the center of the PD-Apollonius
Circle. This circle is characterized as follows:
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Figure 15. The Apollonius Circlex (P,D) with the interception point (in red) located
in the local frame aligned with P and D.






be the line-of-sight (LOS) angle from P to D. The
headings of the players in the relative frame are given by θP = ψP − λPD and θD =
π + λPD − ψD. The constant heading of the evader is θE = ψE − λPD. Further,
let r1 denote the distance between P , the pursuer position, and O, the center of the
Apollonius Circle. The distance r1 is given by
r1 =
β2d
1− β2 , (4.8)
where d =
√
(xP − xD)2 + (yP − yD)2 is the distance between agents P and D. Also,
let r2 be the radius of the Apollonius Circle. Then, r2 is given by
r2 =
βd
1− β2 . (4.9)
The pursuer strives to minimize the terminal distance between itself and the evader
which is traveling both at constant speed, vE, and at constant heading, ψE. The points
E and E ′ represent the initial and terminal positions of the evader, respectively. The
point I is the final position of the pursuer and also the final position of the defender
since point capture is considered.
Using the Apollonius Circle between P and D, the optimization of two variables
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can be transformed into an optimization problem of only one. The pursuer aims at
a point on the Apollonius Circle, where it will be intercepted by the defender, which
minimizes the terminal PE distance. The optimal interception point is calculated as
follows.
Theorem 2. Assume that x ∈ Re, then, the optimal interception point in the relative
coordinate frame is given by I∗ = (r2 cos η∗, r2 sin η∗) where η∗ is such that ν∗ = eiη
∗
=


















which minimizes the function:






− r2(µ2r1 + r7m−1)ν − r2(µ2r1 + r7m)ν−1






2 − r1r2(ν + ν−1) (4.12)
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and ν = eiη. The polynomial coefficients are




























































































−(r21 + r22)(µr1 + r7mµ )2
b1 = r1r2[(µr1 +
r7m
µ
)2 − 3p( r1r7Q
2




where the parameters p = eiθ5, m = eiθ7, and Q = pm−1 + p−1m.
Proof. Considering the geometry in Figure 15, one may be able to derive a kinematic
linkage which represents the engagement scenario. The Apollonius Circle can be
represented by a crank slider mechanism as seen in Figure 16. This geometry can be
described as a linkage of fixed length r2 = OA′ that rotates about the origin O. As
this linkage rotates about the origin, the linkage length r3 = AA′ can vary; however,
the linkage is anchored and free to rotate about point P which is co-linear with the
x′-axis, i.e. OA lies on the x′-axis. In this initial problem statement, the lengths
r1 and r2 are fixed. r3 is free to change in length and to rotate about P . One can
visualize this motion quite easily, and the following kinematic synthesis shows the
relation between the rational angle η, the length of the slider, r3, and its angle with
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the x′-axis, θP .
Figure 16. Apollonius Circle as Linkage Geometry
The first step in solving the relation between the free variable of the linkage is to
start with the closure equation,
~r2 = ~r1 + ~r3. (4.14)
By expanding eq. (4.14) to include the Cartesian unit vectors: î and ĵ, the following
is obtained:
|~r2| cos(η)̂i+ |~r2| sin(η)ĵ = |~r1 |̂i+ |~r3| cos(θP )̂i+ |~r3| sin(θP )ĵ. (4.15)
Using the following shorthand notation,
|~ri| = ri ∀ i = {1, 2, · · · , n},
cos(η) = cη, sin(η) = sη,
cos(θP ) = cθP , sin(θP ) = sθP ,
cos(θE) = cθE , sin(θE) = sθE ,
(4.16)
the linkage synthesis carried out becomes more compact. The expanded closure equa-
88
tion in eq. (4.15) can be re-written as follows:
r2cη î+ r2sη ĵ = r1î+ r3cθP î+ r3sθP ĵ. (4.17)
Breaking eq. (4.17) into the x and y components and by isolating the slider, r3, to
the left hand side, squaring both sides, then summing both equations, the unknown






1 − 2r1r2cη. (4.18)
Now that the slider lengths are in terms of known variables, the relation of the angles
θP and η as a function of eq. (4.17): sθP = r2sη/r3 can be obtained.
Next, consider the entire kinematic rejoin geometry as seen in Figure 17. The
Figure 17. The geometry which represents the kinetic defense of a non-maneuvering
evader in 2-D can be represented as a multi-linkage system composed of fixed linkages,
sliders, and pin-joints as shown.
previous analysis is repeated beginning with the loop closure equation:
~r2 + ~r4 = ~r7 + ~r5. (4.19)
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Expanding eq. (4.19) into x and y Cartesian unit vectors and separating them into
component equations, the following is obtained:
r2cη + r4c4 = r7c7 + r5cθE , (4.20)
r2sη + r4s4 = r7s7 + r5sθE . (4.21)
The objective is to obtain the angle η which minimizes the distance r4. This is ac-
complished by first eliminating the unknown angle θ4 from the component equations.
Much like before, r4 is isolated on the left hand side of the equals sign, and therefore
r4c4 = r7c7 + r5cθE − r2cη, (4.22)
r4s4 = r7s7 + r5sθE − r2sη. (4.23)







2 − 2r2r5(cηcθE + sηsθE)
− 2r2r7(cηc7 + sηs7) + 2r5r7(cθEc7 + sθEs7).
(4.24)
Next, substitute the relationship between the linkage lengths r5 and r3. For this
problem, recall r5 and r3 have a linear relationship by a positive definite constant µ,






7 − 2µr2r3(cηcθE + sηsθE)
− 2r2r7(cηc7 + sηs7) + 2µr3r7(cθEc7 + sθEs7).
(4.25)
Since it is the goal to minimize the linkage length r4 one recognizes that the mini-
mization of r4 is the same as a minimization of r
2
4. To perform the minimization, the
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cost/payoff can be written as follows:
J = r22 + r
2
7 + µ
2r23 − 2µr2 cos(η − θ5)r3
− 2r2r7 cos(η − θ7) + 2µr7 cos(θ5 − θ7)r3,
(4.26)
where r2, r7, θ5, θ7 are constant and only r3 is a function of the angle η. Taking the





2 − 2r1r2 cos η. (4.27)
From eq. (4.27) and the identity cos η = 1
2
(eiη + e−iη), r3 can be written in terms of
ν = eiη = cos η+ i sin η as it is shown in eq. (4.12). Further, eq. (4.26) can be written
as a function of ν in the following form:






− r2(µ2r1 + r7m−1)ν − r2(µ2r1 + r7m)ν−1




2 − r1r2(ν + ν−1).
(4.28)
Taking the partial derivative of J from Equation (4.28) with respect to ν yields:
dJ
dν
= −r2(µ2r1 + r7m−1) + r2(µ2r1 + r7m)ν−2











2 − r1r2(ν + ν−1)(−p−1 + pν−2).
(4.29)
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Setting eq. (4.29) equal to zero and multiplying by r3,
[(µ2r1 + r7m)ν









−2 − 1)[r7Q− r2(p−1ν + pν−1)]
+µ(pν−2 − p−1)[r21 + r22 − r1r2(ν + ν−1)] = 0.
(4.30)
Dividing eq. (4.30) by µ, moving the terms containing r3 to the right hand side, and




(1− ν2)[r7Qν − r2(p−1ν2 + p)]







2 − r1r2(ν3 + ν).
(4.31)
Taking the square of both sides of eq. (4.31) the common terms are arranged to obtain
eq. (4.10). 
Remark. The solution provided in Theorem 2 only requires the rooting of a
polynomial and determining the optimal solution, ν∗ = cos η∗ + i sin η∗, by com-
puting the associated cost of each root. The angle η∗, is uniquely determined from
η∗ = cos−1Re(ν∗) and η∗ = sin−1 Im(ν∗), where Re(ν∗) and Im(ν∗) represent the
real and the imaginary part of ν∗. This solution, although not explicit, can be eas-
ily implemented in state feedback form which is useful to provide robustness against
unknown guidance laws by the pursuer or different interception strategies by the de-
fender. In other words, given the state feedback solution, either of the players will
see their performance level increased if their opponent does not follow the optimal
strategy obtained in Theorem 2.
The optimal intersection point as defined by Theorem 2 provides the optimal
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r2 cos η∗ − xP
)
+ λPD, (4.33)
where r2 is defined in eq. (4.9), (xD, yD) and (xP , yP ) are the locations of the pursuer
and defender in the cartesian fixed frame, respectively, λPD is the LOS angle form
the pursuer to the defender, and η∗ is defined by Theorem 2.
Particular Case.
In the case where P and D have the same speed, β = vP
vD
= 1, the optimal
interception point can be obtained by rooting a quartic equation. Consider in this
case, the relative frame is shown in Figure 18 where the reachable regions of P and D
are separated by the orthogonal bisector of the segment PD instead of the Apollonius
Circle previously described. Therefore, the optimal interception point, in this case,
has coordinates I∗ = (0, y∗) where y∗ is obtained as follows.
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Figure 18. Apollonius Circle for the particular case: β = 1
Corollary 1. Consider the case β = 1 and assume that x ∈ Re, then, the optimal
interception point in the relative coordinate frame is given by I∗ = (0, y∗) where y∗
the solution of the polynomial equation
(1 + µ2)2y4 − 2(1 + µ2)yEy3
+[y2E + (1 + µ
2)x2D − µ2(yE sinϕ− xE cosϕ)2]y2
−2x2D[(1 + µ2 cos2 ϕ)yE − µ2xE sinϕ cosϕ]y
+x2D(y
2
E − x2D sin2 ϕ) = 0
(4.34)
which minimizes the function
J(y) = (xE − µ
√
x2D + y





In order to highlight the optimal strategies for the defender and pursuer, consider
the same example as in [161], Section III.B. The initial positions are D0 = (0, 0),
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P0 = (0, 10), E0 = (5, 5). The speeds of the missiles are vD = 2, vP = 1. Also,
the same evader’s speed as in [161], vE = 1, is used. The evader fixed heading is
ψE = 60 deg.
Example 1: Optimal Defender and Optimal Pursuer.
Figure 19 shows the optimal trajectories of the encounter, where each one of
the players, P and D, implement the saddle point strategies which were previously
obtained. The value of the game is V (x;ψ∗P , ψ
∗
D) = 1.9864.
Note that the optimal strategies are continuously updated. This means that at
every time instant, the current positions are used to update the state of the system
and compute the optimal interception point which is used to obtain the headings of
P and D. The solution of the defense differential game of non-maneuverable aircraft
possess the invariance property, that is, the interception point and the headings of
the players are constant under optimal play. The interception point in the fixed
frame remains the same when both players apply the optimal strategy derived in this
section. The previous statement does not hold if at least one of the players does not
follow its prescribed optimal strategy. An illustrative comparison with respect to the
heuristic approach in [161] is shown in the next two examples. It is also shown that
the player which implements the heuristic approach loses performance with respect
to the objective of the game.
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V (x;ψ∗P , ψ
∗
D) = 1.9864
Figure 19. The trajectories of the pursuer (red), evader (blue), and defender (black)
in the fixed frame, where the pursuer and defender implement optimal strategies as
dictated by the differential game
Example 2: Optimal Defender and Heuristic Pursuer.
Now consider the case where the pursuer does not follow its optimal strategy
derived in this section. Instead, it follows the heuristic approach in [161]. The
defender implements the optimal strategy obtained in this section. The trajectories
of the engagement under this selection of headings are shown in Figure 20. The
defender is not only able to intercept the pursuer but it does at a distance further
apart from the evader. The terminal PE separation is V (x;ψP , ψ
∗
D) = 2.6613, that
is, the pursuer is doing poorly by following a heuristic approach compared to the





V (x;ψP , ψ
∗
D) = 2.6613
Figure 20. The trajectories of the pursuer (red), evader (blue), and defender (black)
in the fixed frame, where the pursuer implements the heuristic strategy and defender
implements the optimal strategy from the differential game
Example 3: Heuristic Defender and Optimal Pursuer.
Finally, consider the opposite case, that is, the pursuer follows the optimal strategy
derived in this section while the defender implements the heuristic approach in [161].
The resulting trajectories are shown in Figure 21. The terminal PE separation is
V (x;ψ∗P , ψD) = 1.9795. In this case, the terminal distance is less than the value
obtained from the saddle point solution in Example 1, and the defender’s performance
is deteriorated by following the heuristic approach. From this simulated analysis,
V (x;ψ∗P , ψD) ≤ V (x;ψ∗P , ψ∗D) ≤ V (x;ψP , ψ∗D), that is, the saddle point property
holds.
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V (x;ψ∗P , ψD) = 1.9795
Figure 21. The trajectories of the pursuer (red), evader (blue), and defender (black)
in the fixed frame, where the pursuer implements the optimal strategy from the differ-
ential game and defender implements the heuristic strategy
4.2 Kinetic Defense of a Non-Maneuvering HVAA in 3-D
In this section, the kinetic defense of a non-maneuverable HVAA in 3-D is consid-
ered. The pursuer engages the evader while the defender, which aims at intercepting
the pursuer in order to protect the evader, is considered. Posing a scenario of a
non-maneuvering evader, a differential game develops between two players: pursuer
and defender. Preventing the evader from maneuvering, a differential game is posed
where it is the goal of the defender to capture the pursuer as far from the evader
as possible. A non-maneuvering evader would be representative of aircraft which are
very slow to maneuver or are set on a fixed course and heading which is dictated by
its mission or objective.
One common issue with posing differential games in 3-D when compared to those
in 2-D is the tractability of analytic solutions. The added spatial dimension begs
the use of spherical coordinates as well as additional controls. In the 2-D problem,
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one control for each agent is considered (agent headings). However, in 3-D, each
agent has two controls, one for heading and one for flight path angle. In total, the
dynamics become more nonlinear, more controls are required to pose and solve 3-
D differential games, and as a result, analytic solutions are often challenging and
potentially intractable.
Differential Game.
Described in Section 3.4, a differential game is developed between the pursuer and
the defender concerning the defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA. From the problem
definition, the motion of the three agents is defined as a set of ordinary differential
equations as shown in eq. (3.52). Also, the objective cost is defined in eq. (3.56) and
the value function of the differential game is defined in eq. (3.57). Moreover, the
terminal time is not fixed and is determined by the interception of the pursuer by the
defender.
Define the speed ratio problem parameter µ = vE/vP . In general, the pursuer is
faster than the evader, so 0 < µ < 1. Also, define the speed ratio β = vP/vD. It is as-
sumed that the pursuer is slower than the defender; thus, the velocities of the engage-
ment are vD > vP > vE. Using the aforementioned equations of motion in eq. (3.52)
as well as the speed ratios β and µ, the dynamics may be non-dimensionalized with
respect to the defender’s speed and are as follows:
ẋP = β cos γP cosψP , ẋE = µβ cos γE cosψE, ẋD = cos γD cosψD
ẏP = β cos γP sinψP , ẏE = µβ cos γE sinψE, ẏD = cos γD sinψD
żP = β sin γP , żE = µβ sin γE, żD = sin γD.
(4.36)
The optimization is conducted subject to the dynamics in eq. (4.36) and trajecto-
ries with terminal state in eq. (3.55), where uP and uD are the players’ state feedback
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strategies. Define the costates as
pT = [pxP , pyP , pzP , pxE , pyE , pzE , pxD , pyD , pzD ] ∈ R9. (4.37)
In this case, where the objective cost is Mayer; the Hamiltonian of the differential
game is simply the inner product of the dynamics with the costates,
H = 〈pT , f(x,uP ,uD)〉. (4.38)
Using the speed ratios µ and β, the velocities of the agents are normalized with
respect to the defender to obtain the Hamiltonian,
H = pxPβ cos γP cosψP + pyP γ cos γP sinψP
+ pzP γ sin γP + pxEµβ cos γE cosψE
+ pyEµβ cos γE sinψE + pzEµβ sin γE
+ pxD cos γD cosψD + pyD cos γD sinψD
+ pzD sin γD.
(4.39)
Theorem 3. Consider the defense of a non-maneuverable agent differential game in
3-D as described by eqs. (3.52) to (3.57). The chosen heading and flight path angles
of the pursuer and defender under optimal play are constant and their optimal trajec-
tories are straight lines. This is an extension of Theorem 1 from the 2-D Cartesian
plane to the 3-D Cartesian space.
Proof. The costate dynamics from the Hamiltonian in eq. (4.39) are obtained using
the necessary conditions for optimality from eqs. (3.33) to (3.36) which are repeated
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Taking the Hamiltonian with respect to the states, the optimal costates are found to
be constant because
ṗ = 0. (4.41)
Taking the partial of the Hamiltonian with respect to agent controls the following
equations are obtained:
pzP cos γP − pxP cosψP sin γP − pyP sinψP sin γP = 0, (4.42)
pyP cosψP cos γP − pxP cos γP sinψP = 0, (4.43)
pzD cos γD − pxD cosψD sin γD − pyD sinψD sin γD = 0, (4.44)
pyD cosψD cos γD − pxD cos γD sinψD = 0. (4.45)
From the necessary optimality conditions described in eqs. (4.42) to (4.45), the op-
timal headings are found to depend solely upon the costates. Through algebraic











































The costates are constant as described by eq. (4.41), and from eqs. (4.46) to (4.49)
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the optimal control is solely dependent upon the costates. Therefore, the optimal
headings of the pursuer and defender are constant and their optimal trajectories are
straight lines. 
From Theorem 3, the optimal trajectories are straight lines. Using the Cartesian
coordinate frame to describe the 3-D pursuit-evasion differential game, the optimal
strategies for the three-agent scenario are investigated. The governing equations are
simplified by setting the origin of the Cartesian space as shown in Figure 22. By
locating each agent on an orthogonal plane and orienting the y-axis parallel to the
evader, some state variables may be eliminated and the analysis simplified.
ŷ
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Figure 22. Interception of pursuer by defender at terminal time as characterized by a
sphere constructed using the geometry of Apollonius
Using this coordinate frame, the state space is reduced by three variables, and the
intersection sphere of the defender, D, and pursuer, P is described. The two-norm
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distance between the pursuer and the defender is as follows:
d =
√
(xP − xD)2 + y2D + z2P (4.50)
By setting the origin of the space as described in Figure 22, the variables xE =
yP = zD = 0. To fully define the intersection sphere, the sphere’s origin and radius
are first specified. From the geometry of Apollonius, the origin is located collinear
with the points: P , and D, the position of the pursuer and defender. Define the ray
passing through P and D as x̂′, then the origin’s location can be easily obtained.







(xD − xP )̂i+ (yD)ĵ + (−zP )k̂
)
. (4.51)
The origin, O is collinear with x̂′ and it lies in the opposite direction at a distance,
OP =
β2d
1− β2 . (4.52)
Simply reversing the unit vector, x̂′ and multiplying by the magnitude of OP , the
location of the origin is found to to be
O = −OPx̂′ + P. (4.53)
















1− β2 , (4.55)
of the sphere is defined to be that of the radius of the Apollonius Circle whose P and
D foci are at a distance, d, and the speed ratio is β.
Agent Headings.
By Theorem 3, the optimal headings of the players are constant. To obtain the
optimal strategies of the pursuer and the defender the intersection point, I, determines
the appropriate agents’ headings and flight path angles. This is because the sphere is
the locus of all possible interceptions of the pursuer by the defender. The intersection
point, I, as defined by the spherical coordinates, (r, γO, ψO), radius, elevation angle,
and azimuth relative to the sphere’s origin is
xI = r cos γO cosψO + xO,
yI = r cos γO sinψO + yO,
zI = r sin γO + zO.
(4.56)
From eq. (4.56), the pursuer’s and defender’s control which steers toward the inter-
section point is solved.
Pursuer Heading.
The pursuer strategy is specified by the heading, ψP , and flight path angle, γP ,
which leads the pursuer to reach a given intersection point on the intersection sphere.
The pursuer strategy is
uP = {(γP , ψP )|γP ∈ [−π, π], ψP ∈ [0, π]}. (4.57)
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The intersection point, I, using Cartesian coordinates, as a function of the pursuer’s
heading and flight path angle is
xI = PI cos γP cosψP + xP ,
yI = PI cos γP sinψP ,
zI = PI sin γP + zP .
(4.58)
The distance PI is
PI =
√
(xP − xI)2 + y2I + (zP − zI)2. (4.59)
Therefore the pursuer’s strategy uP is obtained as a function of pursuer coordinates
and intersection point coordinates: xP , zP , xI , yI , zI . Explicitly, the pursuer’s flight
path angle and the heading are
γP = sin














Knowing the intersection point, I, one also obtains the corresponding strategy uD
of the defender. The intersection point of the pursuer by the defender in spherical
coordinates is
uD = {(γD, ψD)|γD ∈ [−π, π], ψD ∈ [0, π]} (4.62)
The intersection point, I, can be described in Cartesian coordinate frame as
xI = DI cos γP cosψP + xD,
yI = DI cos γP sinψP + yD,
zI = DI sin γP .
(4.63)
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The distance, DI, is
DI =
√
(xD − xI)2 + (yD − yI)2 + z2I . (4.64)
Therefore the defender’s strategy, uD as a function of the defender coordinates
















The agent headings as defined in eqs. (4.60), (4.61), (4.65) and (4.66) are functions
of a chosen intersection point, I, located on the intersection sphere. An optimization
is performed to minimize the desired objective cost in eq. (3.56) by adjusting the

















The location of the evader at the time of interception, tf is found utilizing the speed
ratio µ as
|EE ′| = vE
vP
|PI| = µ|PI|. (4.69)
A gradient-based method can be to obtain the optimal solution and is utilized to find
the optimal strategies for the pursuer and defender.
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Examples.
Consider an example engagement where the agent positions are: P0 = (5, 0, 10),
E0 = (0, 10, 5), D0 = (10, 5, 0), outlined in Table 4: Simulation Initial Conditions.
Also, consider the agent velocities to be: vP = 0.9, vE = 0.8, and vD = 1.0, while the
evader has fixed heading and climb angle: ψE = π/2 and γE = 0.
Table 4. Simulation Initial Conditions
Agent X-location, DU Y-Location, DU Z-Location, DU
Pursuer 5.00 0.00 10.0
Evader 0.00 10.0 5.00
Defender 10.0 5.00 0.00
Example 1: Optimal Defender and Optimal Pursuer.
Figure 23 shows the optimal trajectories for the scenario where each of the players,
P and D, implement the saddle point strategies outlined from the solution to the
differential game. The value of the game is V (u∗P ,u
∗
D,x0) = 9.9764; summarized in
Table 5: Simulation Results.
Note that the optimal saddle point strategies are computed at every time step and
implemented for both the defender and pursuer. Utilizing the positions of all agents,
the differential game is solved wherein the positions of all agents are used to obtain
the appropriate instantaneous headings of the pursuer and defender. The solution of
the defense of the non-maneuverable agent possesses the invariance property, where
the interception point and headings of all players are constant under the saddle point
solution to the differential game. If, however, any of the agents maneuver in a way
not prescribed by the optimal strategies of the differential game, then the optimal
headings computed will not be constant. The remaining examples in the paper im-
plement heuristic Pure Pursuit strategies for the defender and pursuer showing that
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the performance of the agents only degrades with variation from the saddle point
strategies.
Figure 23. The kinetic defense of a non-manuvering HVAA is simulated assuming the
pursuer and defender implement the optimal saddle point strategies.
Example 2: Optimal Defender and Heuristic Pursuer.
Consider the case where the pursuer does not follow the optimal saddle point
strategy outlined in this work; rather, it implements the Pure Pursuit strategy, where
it’s heading and climb angle are chosen to point toward the evader at each time step.















The pursuer implements the Pure Pursuit guidance strategy defined by eqs. (4.70)
and (4.71) and the defender implements the optimal solution to the differential game
as defined by eqs. (4.65) and (4.66). The resulting simulation can be seen in Figure 24.
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As a result of the sub-optimal strategy performed by the pursuer, the defender is
able to capture the pursuer sooner and as a result the terminal distance is larger:
V (uP ,u
∗
D,x0) = 10.1936. Table 5 compares the performance of the suboptimal pur-
suer strategy against that of an optimal one.
Figure 24. The kinetic defense of a non-manuvering HVAA is simulated assuming
the defender implements the optimal strategy and the pursuer implements the Pure
Pursuit strategy.
Example 3: Heuristic Defender and Optimal Pursuer.
Finally, consider the opposite case, wherein the pursuer follows the optimal strat-
egy derived in this section while the defender implements the sub-optimal Pure Pur-
suit strategy. The Pure Pursuit headings are obtained by pointing the defender















The pursuer, implements the optimal strategy from eqs. (4.60) and (4.61); the
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resulting trajectories are shown in Figure 25. The terminal separation at final time
is, as a result of the suboptimal defender strategy is less than when the saddle point
strategy is implemented. The value function, describing this terminal separation is:
V (u∗P ,uD,x0) = 9.2166, showing that deviation from the solution to the differential
game results in poorer performance for the defender.
Highlighted in Table 5, a comparison of the three simulations is shown, demon-
strating the characteristic of the solution to a differential game. First, both the
pursuer and the defender implement the optimal saddle point strategies and observe
the terminal pursuer-evader range is 9.9764. When the defender implements the Pure
Pursuit strategy and the pursuer implements the optimal saddle point strategy, the
value function is lower and the pursuer gets closer to the evader at final time. The
resulting range is 9.2166. When the pursuer implements the Pure Pursuit strategy
and the defender implements the optimal saddle point strategy, the terminal range
between the pursuer and evader is 10.1936. Upon implementing the heuristic sub-
optimal policy of the Pure Pursuit strategy, performance is reduced for that agent.
This demonstrates that deviating from the optimal saddle point strategy only reduces
performance for that agent, a characteristic of differential games [9].
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Figure 25. The kinetic defense of a non-manuvering HVAA is simulated assuming
the defender implements the Pure Pursuit strategy and the pursuer implements the
optimal strategy.
Table 5. Simulation Results
Defender Strategy Pursuer Strategy Value Function
Optimal Optimal 9.9764
Pure Pursuit Optimal 9.2166
Optimal Pure Pursuit 10.1936
Search Performance.
Utilizing the Matlab function FMINUNC(), the optimal headings are computed
directly. A plot of the entire space is presented in Figure 26.
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Figure 26. The objective cost evaluated over the domain of possible interception points
on the interception sphere at the tenth frame
In Figure 26 one observes that the space in the example is locally convex. By
seeding the optimization search with a guess for the optimal heading angles, one
can converge fairly quickly with fewer functional evaluations than brute-force search-
ing the entire domain for the minimum. Using the Matlab function, FMINUNC(), a
gradient-based search for the optimal headings as described in eq. (4.67) is imple-
mented. The Quasi-Newton gradient-based search algorithm is used to perform a
search for the optimal interception point described by ψ∗O and γ
∗
O. The initial guess
for the optimal headings is selected as the angles, ψO and γO, which describe the
vector from the origin of the interception sphere to the initial location of the evader.
This initial guess is relatively close to the converged global minimum, and optimal
solutions are computed generally within 20-30 functional evaluations. If the initial
guess were to start very far away from the optimal solution, then a gradient-based
solver would not converge on the global solution. As illustrated in Figure 26, ini-
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tial guesses are not far from the global minimum, and in-general, convergence to the
global minimum is achieved.
Using Matlab, the gradient-based search is conducted. The initial guess for the
optimal ψO and γO is shown in light-blue in Figure 26. Upon finding the optimal
interception point, the headings of the pursuer and defender are then implemented
using eqs. (4.60), (4.61), (4.65) and (4.66). Conducting the gradient-based search
outperforms that of a brute force search. Rather than computing the terminal cost
for every point on the sphere, described by the color gradient in Figure 26, the use of
gradient-based techniques require fewer functional evaluations and is more efficient
than the brute force evaluation of all azimuths and elevations of the objective cost.
4.3 Kinetic Defense of a Maneuvering HVAA in 2-D
In this section, a scenario consisting of a defending missile, a pursuer missile,
and evading HVAA which cooperates with the defender is considered. Using optimal
control theory the optimal HVAA strategy which maximizes the distance of the pur-
suer when captured by the defender is posed and solved. Proportional Navigation
guidance laws are selected for the pursuer and defender; while constraints are held
on the evader to prevent instantaneous changes in velocity. A numerical approach is
presented along as an example.
Optimal Control Problem.
Described in Section 3.4, an optimal control problem is formed wherein the evader
aims to outmaneuver its pursuer while a teamed defender uses proportional navigation
to intercept the pursuer. It is assumed that the pursuer is faster than the evader, so
that vP > vE. Also, the defender is assumed to be the same speed as the pursuer,
vD = vP , meaning that the defender can not capture the pursuer vehicle unless the
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evader maneuvers in such a way as to aid in the closure between the defender and
pursuer.
The complete geometry of the HVAA defense scenario is shown in Figure 27; this
is the very same geometry as described in the active target defense scenario, presented
in Figure 6. The only change is that the attacker and target from Figure 6 are called


















Figure 27. The active target defense scenario considers a defender (D) which aims at
capturing a pursuer (P) who in-turn aims at capturing an evader (E).
Although the optimal control problem may be tractable using these equations of
motion, it is possible to reduce the order of the dynamics. To formulate the problem
in this reduced form, the dynamics from eq. (3.40) are transformed into polar form.
By calculating and solving the optimal control problem in relative polar coordinates,
calculation time is reduced since the number of nonlinear dynamic equations of motion
is reduced. Once an optimal solution is found in the relative polar space, the optimal
control may be translated into Cartesian space for visualization and evaluation. The
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polar representation can be formed by taking the velocities along the line-of-sights and
analyzing their closure based upon the line-of-sight angles. The equations of motion
from eq. (3.40) are reduced using the nomenclature as illustrated in Figure 27. The
line-of-sight angles derived from the locations of the defender, pursuer, and evader in














The angle between the velocity of an agent and its line-of-sight to its target, σ, can
be found by subtracting the line-of-sight to the next target from the known heading
as follows:
σP = ψP − λPE, σD = ψD − λDP . (4.75)
Moreover, the angle between an agent’s velocity and the pursuer’s line-of-sight can be
calculated by subtracting the line-of-sight from the pursuer from the agent’s heading
as follows:
φP = ψP − λDP , φE = ψE − λPE. (4.76)
The defender-pursuer range and pursuer-evader range are obtained using the eu-
clidean distance and are as follows:
RDP =
√
(yP − yD)2 + (xP − xD)2, RPE =
√
(yE − yP )2 + (xE − xP )2. (4.77)
The line-of-sight rates between agents are as follows:
λ̇DP =
vP sinφP − vD sinσD
RDP
, λ̇PE =




The angular heading rates for the defender and pursuer are as follows:
ψ̇D = NDλ̇DP , ψ̇P = NP λ̇PE, (4.79)
where ND and NP are the proportional navigation constants. Using the geometry as
illustrated in Figure 27, the range rates between the defernder and the pursuer as
well as the pursuer and the evader are as follows:
ṘDP = −vD cosσD + vP cosφP , ṘPE = −vP cosσP + vE cosφE. (4.80)
Continuing the transformation of the dynamics from Cartesian to relative polar space:
the headings with respect to the line-of-sight σP and σD can be found by differentiating
eqs. (4.75) and (4.76) with respect to time. To complete the polar form of the dynamic
equations the angular rates of each of the agents in the engagement are also needed.
The rate of change between the pursuer’s heading and its line-of-sight to the evader
may be found to be the difference between the heading rate of the pursuer and the
line-of-sight rate between the pursuer and evader, namely:
σ̇P = ψ̇P − λ̇PE = (NP − 1)λ̇PE =
(NP − 1)(vE sinφE − vP sinσP )
RPE
. (4.81)
Similarly, the rate of change between the defender’s heading and its line-of-sight to the
pursuer may be found to be the difference between the heading rate of the defender
and the line-of-sight rate between the defender and pursuer:
σ̇D = ψ̇D − λ̇DP = (ND − 1)λ̇DP =
(ND − 1)(vP sinφP − vD sinσD)
RDP
. (4.82)
Next, by differentiating eq. (4.76), the angular rate of change the pursuer’s heading
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and defender’s line-of-sight is found to be:
φ̇P = ψ̇P − λ̇DP
= NP λ̇PE − λ̇DP
=
NP (vE sinφE − vP sinσP )
RPE




Similarly for the target, the angular rate of change of the target’s heading to the
pursuer’s line-of-sight is calculated. Recall that the input, u, is the rate of the target’s
heading. This will appear in the target’s angular rate of change relative to the line-
of-sight rate:
φ̇E = ψ̇E − λ̇PE = u−
vE sin(φE)− vP sin(σP )
RPE
. (4.84)














vP cosφP − vD cosσD
vE cosφE − vP cosσP
(ND − 1)λ̇DP
(NP − 1)λ̇PE






In this problem, the Hamiltonian is,
H = (vP cosφP − vD cosσD)pRDP
+ (vE cosφE − vP cosσP )pRPE
+
(












NP (vE sinφE − vP sinσP )
RPE















, ṗRPE = −
∂H
∂RPE







, ṗφP = −
∂H
∂φP





Evaluating from the Hamiltonian, the costate dynamics are:
ṗ = Mp. (4.88)




0 0 (ND − 1)ξ1 0 −ξ1 0
0 0 0 (NP − 1)ξ2 NP ξ2 −ξ2
−vD sinσD 0 (ND − 1)ξ3 0 −ξ3 0
0 −vP sinσP 0 (NP − 1)ξ4 NP ξ4 −ξ4
vP sinφP 0 −(ND − 1)ξ5 0 ξ5 0





The time-varying coefficients inside the matrix, M are defined as a function of state
variables and known constants as follows:
ξ1 =


























Now that the state dynamics and the costates have been defined as a function of
time, the next step is to determine necessary conditions for optimal input by means
of Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle since the heading rate is bounded as follows:
|u(t)| ≤ ωPmax ∀ t ∈ [t0, tf ]. (4.91)
Using eq. (4.91) and the Hamiltonian defined in eq. (4.86) the optimal control must
satisfy Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle [146]:
H (x∗(t),u∗(t),p∗(t), t) ≤H (x∗(t),u(t),p∗(t), t). (4.92)
The states (x) and costates (p) are
xT = [RDP , RPE, σD, σP , φP , φE],
pT = [pRDP , pRPE , pσD , pσP , pφP , pφE ].
(4.93)





−ωPmax , for p∗φE(t) > 0





In the case when p∗φE(t) = 0, switching occurs on the input and no information about
the optimal input u∗(t) can be provided. This would result in a singular problem.
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According to the objective, the scenario of interest has free final time and a fixed
constraint of RDP (tf ) = εmiss . Considering the boundary conditions, the boundary



































































The 2n+ 1 (where n is the state dimension) relationship given by
H (x∗(tf ),u
∗(tf ),p
∗(tf ), tf ) = 0. (4.96)
Solving the necessary conditions eqs. (4.85), (4.88) and (4.94), provides the general
solution to the optimal control problem. Applying the boundary conditions given by
eqs. (4.95) and (4.96) provides the solution to the 2-point boundary value problem,
and consequently the optimal control problem.
Example.
The general engagement scenario has many degrees of freedom including initial
conditions of the pursuer, evader, and defender. It can be easily observed that by
varying the location, heading, and speed of each agent involved in the scenario that
target capture or escape could occur. A general engagement is proposed which will
provide an interesting case, like in Figure 28, and a numerical solution to the optimal








Figure 28. The initial three-agent geometry involves a defender and pursuer which are
equidistant to the evader which is located in front of both agents.
Due to the complexity and nonlinearity of the dynamic optimization problem
discussed earlier, a numerical tool such as Matlab can be used to solve the two point
boundary value (TPBV) problem generated by the dynamic equations of motion
from eq. (4.85), the costate equations from eq. (4.88), the boundary conditions from
eqs. (4.95) and (4.96), and subject to constraint in eq. (4.91). There are many issues
with starting with poor initial conditions, and sensitivity to the initial conditions
can play a major role in finding a candidate solution to the TPVB problem. Using
Matlab, one approach is to discretize the equations of motion and costates, and
turn the dynamic optimization problem into a static optimization problem. The
discretized form of the dynamics is advantageous since time vectors and state vectors
are generated at even intervals and computational power is controllable through the
number of intervals during the simulation. To discretize the dynamic equations of
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motion, one can use an Euler method in eq. (4.97) as follows:
x[k + 1] = x[k] + f(x[k], u[k], k)∆t. (4.97)




(vP cosψP [k]− vD cosσD[k]− vE cosψE[k] + vP cosσP [k]). (4.98)
In addition, the dynamic equations of motion written as constraint equations are in
eq. (4.99), as follows:
hRDP [k + 1] = RDP [k + 1]−RDP [k]− (vP cosφP [k]− vD cosσD[k])∆t
hRPE [k + 1] = RPE[k + 1]−RPE[k]− (vE cosφE[k]− vP cosσP [k])∆t
hσD [k + 1] = σD[k + 1]− σD[k]− ((ND − 1)λ̇DP )∆t
hσP [k + 1] = σP [k + 1]− σP [k]− ((NP − 1)λ̇PE[k])∆t
hφP [k + 1] = φP [k + 1]− φP [k]− (NP λ̇PE[k]− λ̇DP )∆t
hφE [k + 1] = φE[k + 1]− φE[k]− (u[k]− λ̇PE[k])∆t
λ̇DP [k] =
vP sinψP [k]− vD sinσD[k]
RDP [k]
λ̇PE[k] =




Using these equations, the entire time history of the scenario is fed to a nonlinear
program solver, such as an SQP solver, to iteratively-solve for the optimal control.
Using the equations of motion as constraints at every time step, the solution that is
found by perturbing the control input is ensured to be a valid scenario.
By looking at the sign of the costate equation, u[k] is known to either be a min-
imum or maximum. For example, if pφE [k] < 0 then u[k] = ωPmax , and if pφE [k] > 0
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then u[k] = −ωPmax ; but, if pφE [k] = 0 then |u[k]| < ωPmax . Although no information
about the optimal control may be gained from a zero costate; also u∗[k] is bounded
by the maximum angular rate ωPmax .
Using the initial conditions an example solution to the optimal control problem is
presented. The boundary conditions to this example are shown in eq. (4.100). The






































































NP = ND = 3 , vP = vD = 1 , vE = 0.5 < vP , ωPmax = 0.2 (4.101)
The optimal control input u[k] is solved using constants and boundary conditions.
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Figure 29. Scenario 1: Optimal Engagement
From Figure 29 it is observed that the evader turns toward the path of the de-
fender, away from the pursuer in an attempt to maximize the distance from the
pursuer while providing strategic assistance to the defender. From the plotted solu-
tion, the evader executes a max turn rate, staying away from the pursuer as much as
possible. This was predicted by eq. (4.94), where the evader is modeled to be turn
rate limited.
In Figure 30 the line-of-sight distances and optimal control are observed during
the engagement. From Figure 30a it may be observed that the evader is unable to
outrun the pursuer since the curve representing the pursuer-evader range, RPE, is
monotonically decreasing. However, the evader is able to maneuver in such a way,
as to aid in the closure of the defender to the pursuer as described by the curved
closure of the defender-pursuer range, RDP . Effectively every engagement, no matter
the initial conditions, may be described as a race of one of these curves to zero; if
RDP goes to zero first, the evader escapes the pursuer; however, if RPE goes to zero
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before RDP can, then the evader is captured.








(a) Distances Between Agents









(b) Heading Rate of Evader
Figure 30. Line-of-sight and Optimal Control During Engagement Scenario
The heading rate of the evader as seen in Figure 30b shows that the maximum
turn rate was executed for the first half of the engagement and then was not limited
in the final half of the scenario. This curve describes that the costate pφE = 0 for the
second half of the scenario, while pφE < 0 for the first half.
4.4 Direct Method Comparisons for HVAA Defense
In this section, each of the four direct methods described in section 3.3 are com-
pared for the sake of computing the optimal control of the kinetic defense of a maneu-
vering HVAA in 2-D as presented in section 4.3. The HVAA defense scenario in 2-D is
illustrated in Figure 27. In the engagement scenario, it is assumed that the velocities
of the defender, pursuer, and evader (vD, vP , and vE) are constant. Using the 2-D
Cartesian fixed-frame, the dynamics of the three agents are described in eq. (3.40).
The input to the system being is heading rate of the evader aircraft, u(t) = ψ̇E(t).
As described in section 4.3, it is assumed that the pursuer is faster than the
evader, so that vP > vE. Similarly, the defender is assumed to be the same speed as
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the pursuer, vD = vP .
Direct Optimization Problem Definition.
The objective is to find the optimal control: u∗(t) which produces a minimum,
min
u
J = −RPE(tf ) +RDP (tf ),














vP cosφP − vD cosσD
vE cosφE − vP cosσP
(ND − 1)λ̇DP
(NP − 1)λ̇PE











vE sinφE − vP sinσP
RPE
.
The constraints on the input are:
|u(t)| ≤ ωmax ∀ t ∈ [t0, tf ].
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The final time, tf , is judiciously chosen prior to capture.
Numerical Considerations.
For all four methods, each uses the SQP search implemented within Matlab using
the function FMINCON(). Furthermore, the initial conditions and final time are the
same for each simulation. To ensure that the same problem is being posed for each
direct method, the parameters outlined in Table 6 provide a summary of the constants
within the equations of motion. These values are implemented for each direct method.
Table 6. Simulation Parameters
Parameter Variable Value
Pursuer speed, DU/TU vP 1.00
Defender speed, DU/TU vD 1.00
Evader speed, DU/TU vE 0.50
Pursuer PN gain NP 3.00
Defender PN gain ND 3.00
Final time, TU tf 11.0
Max turn rate, rad/TU ωmax 0.20
Number of points N 50.0
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The initial agent locations and headings are identical for all four simulations.
Figure 28 describes the initial agent locations and headings used for each simulation.
Numerically, the values in Cartesian space are summarized in Table 7. Converting
the Cartesian frame to the relative polar coordinate frame the initial agent locations
are as defined in Table 8.
Table 7. Initial Conditions (Cartesian Frame)
Agent X-Location, DU Y-Location, DU Heading, rad
Defender -5.00 0.00 π/2
Pursuer 5.00 0.00 π/2
Evader 0.00 10.0 π/2
Table 8. Initial Agent States (Relative Polar)
State Variable Value
Defender-pursuer range, DU RDP (t0) 10.0000
Pursuer-evader range, DU RPE(t0) 11.1803
Defender closing heading angle, rad σD(t0) 1.5708
Pursuer closing heading angle, rad σP (t0) -0.4636
Pursuer escaping heading angle, rad φP (t0) 1.5708
Evader escaping heading angle, rad φE(t0) -0.4636
Direct Method Setup.
To make a fair comparison between each of the direct methods, the dynamics and
number of discrete time points are held constant between methods. Moreover, the
convergence criteria, used to determine if a minimum has been found, is also held
constant. Aside from the actual algorithmic implementation of each direct method,
the guess size and corresponding discretization are varied to meet each method’s
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requirements.
Concerning the initial guess used for the four direct methods, each method is
provided their required states and or control to begin the gradient based search for
the minimum. Prior to running the optimization, a single shoot of a max turn rate
towards the defender is computed. This single shoot is used as an initial guess for
each of the methods. This provides a feasible initial guess for all methods and the
information from this initial shooting of the dynamics is discretized and provided to
each algorithm just as Table 10 describes.
In the case of the SSM, the discretization of time and control is defined to be
evenly spaced into 50 points. By implementing the Runge-Kutta Method for forward
propagation of the equations of motion, the fixed-time step solver provides trajectories
of the states at every point. The initial guess for the optimal control is a max positive
heading rate command. The total size of the initial guess is 50.
For the MSM, time is discretized evenly from t0 to tf with a total of N points,
just as defined for the SSM. Similar to the SSM, the Runge-Kutta Method propagates
states forward through time. The number of segments used for the MSM is 5; resulting
in 24 equality constraints (See Table 10). At each of the continuity constraints, the
initial guess for the states is the value of the state at the initial condition. The guess
for the optimal control, just like the SSM, is a max positive heading rate command.
The total size of the guess is 74.
The ECM implements the dynamics as an equality constraint, and as a result,
requires a much larger guess than the SSM and MSM. Time is discretized evenly
from t0 to tf with a total of 50 points. Since the initial state is provided as presented
in Table 8, the size of the guess for the states is 294. Adding the size for the control
makes the total guess size 344. The dynamics are upheld using a lower order method:
first-order Euler approximation. To make the initial guess a fair comparison, the state
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trajectories are guessed to be the initial conditions at every point and the optimal
control is guessed to be a max positive heading rate command at every point.
For the case of the PSM, time is broken into multiple fixed segments, and for each
segment, the LGR points set the discretization of time so that differentiation matrices
may be implemented. Just as implemented for the ECM, the number of points for
the state trajectories and control are the same. Using the multiple segments, the size
of the Differentiation Matrices are selected to be of relatively low order. The use of
differentiation matrixes is more accurate than the first-order Euler methods used by
the ECM, but the accuracy of the dynamics is greater. The total size of the guess, for
the PSM is the same as the ECM: 344. To make the initial guess a fair comparison
to the other methods, the state trajectories are guessed to be the initial conditions
at every point and the optimal control is guessed to be a max positive heading rate
command at every point. To conclude the setup of each of the four direct methods,
Table 10 describes the objective cost, initial guess, and type of discretization.
Table 9. Method Size
Method Initial Guess No. Ukn. Eq. Const. NLP Output
SSM u[k], k = 1..50 50 0 u∗k, k = 1 . . . 50
MSM
u[k], k = 1..50
x[j], j = 2..5
50 + 6(5− 1) = 74 6(5− 1) = 24
u∗k, k = 1 . . . N
x∗j , j = 2 . . .M
ECM
u[k], k = 1..50
x[k], k = 2..50
50 + 6(50− 1) = 344 6(50− 1) = 294
u∗k, k = 1 . . . 50
x∗k, k = 2 . . . 50
PSM
u[k], k = 1..50
x[k], k = 2..50
50 + 6(50− 1) = 344 6(50− 1) = 294
u∗k, k = 1 . . . 50
x∗k, k = 2 . . . 50
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Table 10. Direct Method Setup
Method Objective Cost Initial Guess Guess Size Discretization
SSM RDP (tf )−RPE(tf ) uk = ωmax, k = 1 . . . 50 50
Evenly Spaced
1 Shooting
MSM RDP (tf )−RPE(tf )
uk = ωmax, k = 1 . . . 50




ECM RDP (tf )−RPE(tf )
uk = ωmax, k = 1 . . . 50




PSM RDP (tf )−RPE(tf )
uk = ωmax, k = 1 . . . 50





A summary of the four direct-method simulations can be seen in Table 11. Pre-
sented in the table are metrics for each of the direct methods. The metrics are
computation time, number of iterations, number of functional evaluations, function
evaluation, and feasibility of the solution. The computation time represents the total
time it takes from feeding the NLP the initial guess to the time the optimal control
and state trajectories are produced. The number of iterations is the number of times
the NLP updates the guess being optimized. Function evaluations are the number
of times the objective cost is calculated until the convergence criteria of the NLP
occurred. The ‘Fval’ column represents the value of the objective cost. The feasi-
bility represents two-norm of the vector containing all the equality constraints upon
convergence. In the MSM the feasibility represents the total error in the continuity
constraints for each shooting interval. In the case of the ECM and PSM, the feasi-
bility represents the accuracy by which the model of the dynamics is upheld. For the
sake of comparison, the PSM uses LGR collocation points and a differentiation matrix
which is much more accurate than using first-order Euler approximation. Although
the feasibility of the ECM is better than the PSM, the method of implementing the
dynamics performed by the PSM is more accurate than the ECM.
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The total computation time for each direct method is presented in the third col-
umn of Table 11. From this column, the fastest direct method is observed to be the
ECM, while the slowest is the SSM. The relatively slow convergence times produced
by the shooting methods are a reminder that forward propagation of the dynamics
obtained using an ODE solver is not computationally efficient. Moreover, the MSM
efficiently computes the shootings in parallel, and the addition of the continuity con-
straints does not out-weigh the cost of breaking the problem into multiple segments.
The collocation methods employed by the ECM and PSM are an efficient means of
transcribing the dynamic problem into a static one. Although the PSM is slower
than the ECM, this is attributed to the number of collocation points which are held
constant across all methods. Since the LGR selected points give rise to the efficient
computational methods previously described, the number of points required by the
PSM to obtain a solution with the same accuracy as the other methods is less. In the
effort to make a fare computational comparison, the number of collocation points is
kept constant. Further, the implementation of fixed meshing makes it challenging to
have enough points where necessary. Since the segmentation was fixed, the PSM is
forced to have smooth state trajectories, where the other methods were free to have
sharp changes. This is observed around 8 TU in Figure 31b, where the evader heading
for the PSM is smoother than the other methods. As a result, the PSM would have
faster convergence if fewer points and adaptive meshing were implemented.
The number of iterations and function evaluations conducted by the even collo-
cation method were much larger than the other direct methods. Since the method
converted the dynamics into nonlinear constraints, a large number of iterations and
evaluations were required to satisfy the feasibility requirement. Even though more
function evaluations were required, the effort to compute the equality constraints was
far less expensive than using an ODE solver.
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The final objective costs produced by all four methods are very similar. From
Table 11 the range of the pursuer to the evader upon the capture of the pursuer by
the defender is approximately 2.7 DU. The lower performance of the ECM and PSM
are attributed to the lack of adaptive meshing for both the ECM and PSM.
Table 11. Direct Method Performance
Method NLP Comp. Time Iter F. Evals Fval Feasibility
SSM FMINCON() 14.1 sec 32 1632 -2.76 0
MSM FMINCON() 5.4 sec 27 2214 -2.76 1.788E− 9
ECM FMINCON() 1.2 sec 31 10881 -2.75 1.019E− 9
PSM FMINCON() 8.2 sec 21 6930 -2.71 3.590E− 8
In Figure 31a the engagement computed by each of the direct methods is shown.
From this figure, it is observed that each of the four methods computes a similar so-
lution for the optimal evasion engagement. Moreover, the states of the optimization
are visualized in Figure 31. In Figure 31b the heading angles for each of the agents
are presented. From the figure, it can be observed that around 7.5-8.5 seconds, the
evader’s heading rate makes a drastic change, while the pursuer and defender have
smooth curves described by the PN equations. The line-of-sight ranges shown in
Figure 31c show that a race to zero between the two line-of-sight rates occurs. If
the line-of-sight range RPE reaches zero prior to RDP then the evader is captured;
but, if instead RDP goes to zero faster than RPE then the evader successfully escapes
the pursuer. In the engagement, the evader successfully escapes the pursuer by ma-
neuvering, in such a way, as to aid the defender. In Figure 31d the optimal control
determined by each of the direct methods is presented. Due to the nature of the
control limits the optimal control shows the classical bang-bang behavior. In all four
cases, the transition from a positive max turn rate to a negative max turn rate occurs
around 8 seconds.
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(a) Engagement Comparison (b) Agent Heading Comparison
(c) Line-of-sight Comparison (d) Optimal Control Comparison
Figure 31. The simulation results of the HVAA defense scenario when solved with each
of the four direct methods of optimal control
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the kinetic defense of a HVAA was presented. Using differen-
tial game theory the optimal strategies for a defender and pursuer were first solved
when the evader was non-maneuvering; first in 2-D in Section 4.1, next in 3-D in
Section 4.2. Next, in Section 4.3 the evader was allowed to maneuver and aid in
his own defense by leveraging the defender’s motion, thus maximizing his separation
from the pursuer/defender at final time. Finally, in Section 4.4 a comparison was
conducted between different ways of finding the optimal control for the maneuvering
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evader directly; four methods were considered: Single Shooting Method, Multiple
Shootings Method, Even Collocation Method, and Pseudospectral Method.
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the use of Apollonius Circle allowed for the differential
game to be transformed from a problem of minimax to one of pure minimization.
Using optimal control theory the minimization problems were solved, providing the
optimal defender and pursuer strategies. The examples in Section 4.1 Section 4.2
demonstrated that, for any agent, any variation from the differential game solution
yielded poorer performance for that player.
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 the kinetic defense of a maneuvering evader was considered.
In the HVAA defense scenario, both the pursuer and defender are assumed to use a
Proportional Navigation guidance law and the evader’s control strategy is solved
using optimal control theory. The resulting maneuver made by the evader was to
head toward his defender in an effort to assist the defender’s capture of the pursuer.
In Section 4.4, attention was given to the direct method used to solve the optimal
control problem. The four methods implemented were the Single Shooting Method,
Multiple Shootings Method, Even Collocation Method, and Pseudospectral Method.
Considering the three-player engagement, the four methods found similar solutions
for the optimal control and the corresponding state trajectories; but, the size of
each method varied. Using a fixed mesh, the four methods were implemented in
Matlab. The results highlight the importance of adaptive meshing techniques and
the advantages of using direct transcription rather than ODE solvers.
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V. Directed Energy Defense of a HVAA
Problems worthy of attack prove their worth
by fighting back.
— Paul Erdös
In defensive counter air (DCA) operations, aircraft defense can be provided by two
means, kinetic or directed energy. Kinetic defense aims at providing defense through
physical capture or damage by proximity. Directed energy defense provides damage
by bombarding a target with electrons over time – this is achieved by leveraging
the electromagnetic spectrum. Directed energy defense is unique in that defense is
provided over a prolonged period of time rather than at a specific time instant, as
shown previously with kinetic defense.
This chapter considers the defender to be an aircraft equipped with a directed
energy weapon. Using this weapon, the defender aims to “expose the pursuer” for
as long as possible. The exposure time which neutralizes an asset depends upon
many factors outside the scope of this dissertation. Rather than focus on the physical
aspects which dictate the amount of exposure time required to neutralize an asset,
time guarantees for exposure time are presented. In this dissertation, as will be shown
in this chapter, one can compute the maximum possible exposure time based upon
the initial vehicle locations, speeds, and headings. The calculated exposure time can
be used to provide insight into requirements for the physical systems involved and
provide insight into the flight paths for a successful defense of a HVAA from a single
incoming threat.
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5.1 Maximum Exposure of a Non-Maneuvering Pursuer in 2-D
This section considers a two-agent scenario containing a defender and a non-
maneuvering pursuer. The defender is maneuverable and is slower than the course-
holding pursuer. In this scenario, the defender is endowed with a specified circular
WEZ within which the defender strives to contain the pursuer for as long as possible.
The heading of the defender which maximizes the exposure time, i.e. the pursuer
remains inside the radius of the circular WEZ of the defender is solved using the
calculus of variations. The exposure time is computed based upon the angle by which
the pursuer is initially within the WEZ of the defender as well as the relative speed
ratio of the defender with respect to the pursuer. Presented, along with an example,
are the zero-time of exposure heading, maximum time of exposure heading, and proof
that exposure is persistent under optimal control.
Optimal Control Problem.
Described in Section 3.4, an optimal control problem is developed between the
pursuer and the defender concerning the defense of a non-maneuvering HVAA. From
the problem definition, the motion of the agents are defined as a set of ordinary
differential equations as shown in eq. (3.58). Also, the objective cost is defined in
eq. (3.61). This is equivalent to maximizing exposure time where tf is now exposure
time. Define the speed ratio between the defender and the pursuer as: α = vD/vP . In
the scenario, the pursuer is faster than the defender and therefore: 0 < α < 1. Using
the speed ratio parameter, the non-dimensional dynamics in eq. (3.58) are re-written
as
ẋD = α cosψD, ẋP = cosψP ,
ẏD = α sinψD, ẏP = sinψP .
(5.1)
Since the objective cost is Mayer, the Hamiltonian is the inner product of the
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dynamics in eq. (5.1) with the costates and is
H = pxDα cosψD + pyDα sinψD + pxP cosψP + pyP sinψP , (5.2)
where the costates are pT = [pxD , pyD , pxP , pyP ].
Necessary Conditions for Optimality:.
Using the Hamiltonian in eq. (5.2), the necessary conditions for optimality are
obtained by taking the partial derivatives as described in eqs. (3.10) to (3.12). Using
the first-order necessary conditions for optimality one may be able to formulate and
draw conclusions about the optimal control. Since the objective cost is Mayer, the
optimal Hamiltonian at final time is zero, H ∗(tf ) = 0. Where the superscript, ∗,















=− αp∗xD(t) sinψ∗D(t) + αp∗yD(t) cosψ∗D(t)
=− p∗xD(t) sinψ∗D(t) + p∗yD(t) cosψ∗D(t).
(5.3)
Bringing the two terms in eq. (5.3) to either side of the equation, squaring, and using
the trigonometric identity cos2 ψ∗D = 1− sin2 ψ∗D, one may obtain the following:
p∗2xD(t) sin
2 ψ∗D(t) = p
∗2
yD
(t)(1− sin2 ψ∗D). (5.4)


















From the necessary conditions in eq. (5.6) it may be inferred that the optimal costate
trajectories are constant, i.e.: p∗(t) = p∗ because the defender is holonomic. More-
over, since the costates are constant, the optimal heading of the defender is constant
under optimal play. This result may be derived from eq. (5.5). Therefore, the result-













Next, consider the transversality conditions which are used to formulate the re-
lationship between the states and costates at final time. In eq. (5.7), the optimal
defender heading depends solely upon the costates, which are constant. Leveraging
the transversality conditions as described by eq. (3.14), the optimal defender head-
ing can be obtained as a function of the final states and problem parameters. From
eq. (3.61), the terminal penalty in the objective cost is constant, ∂Φ
∂x
= 0. The terminal
manifold is defined in eq. (3.60) and therefore the terminal manifold is
m(x∗(tf ), tf ) = (x
∗
D(tf )− x∗P (tf ))2 + (y∗D(tf )− y∗P (tf ))2 −R2D. (5.8)
Substitution of eq. (5.8) into the transversality conditions from eq. (3.14), the follow-
ing is obtained:













Recall, that the slack variable from the transversality conditions is represented here




= 2δ(xD − xP ), p∗yP =
∂m
∂yP




= 2δ(xP − xD), p∗yD =
∂m
∂yD
= 2δ(yP − yD).
(5.10)
Taking the square root of eq. (5.5) and substituting the costates from eq. (5.10) the
following is obtained:
sinψ∗D(tf ) =
±2δ(yPf − yDf )√
4d2(xPf − xDf )2 + 4d2(yPf − yDf )2
. (5.11)
Simplifying eq. (5.11), a relationship between the states of the defender and pursuer
at the final time, tf , is
sinψ∗D(tf ) =
±(yPf − yDf )
RD
. (5.12)
From eq. (5.12), the angle from the defender to the pursuer at final time is found to
be the same as the optimal heading. An illustration of the optimal engagement is

























Figure 32. Optimal Two-Agent Engagement Geometry
Solution to the Optimal Control Problem.
Knowing the course of the pursuer, the optimal heading of the defender which
maximizes the exposure time may be analytically obtained. Without loss of generality,
the defender-pursuer scenario is rotated about the pursuer such that the pursuer
velocity is aligned with the vertical axis as shown in Figure 32.
The necessary conditions of optimality in eqs. (3.10) to (3.12) have shown that
optimal heading in eq. (5.7) is constant. The transversality conditions in eq. (3.14)
have shown that the angle from the defender to the pursuer at final time is the same
as the optimal heading eq. (5.12). Using the law of cosines, the optimal heading of
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the defender may be obtained.







; where α ∈ (0, 1) is the speed ratio of the defender to the
pursuer and λPD ∈ [−π, π] is the bearing from the pursuer to the defender.





+R2D − 2RDPS cosλPD. (5.13)
Using the speed ratio, the distance traversed by the pursuer is the same as α multiplied
by the distance traversed by the defender,
DS = αPS +RD. (5.14)








+R2D + 2αRDPS = PS
2
+R2D − 2RDPS cosλPD. (5.16)
Canceling R2D terms on either side of the equals sign in eq. (5.16),
α2PS
2
+ 2αRDPS = PS
2 − 2RDPS cosλPD. (5.17)
Dividing both sides of eq. (5.17) by PS (this assumes that PS 6= 0; but if PS = 0
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then capture would have occurred),
α2PS + 2αRD = PS − 2RD cosλPD. (5.18)
Solving eq. (5.18) for PS a formulation for the time of exposure is obtained as a
function of the exposure radius, RD ≥ 0, speed ratio α ∈ (0, 1) and initial pursuer-
defender angle, λPD ∈ [−π, π],
PS =
2RD(α + cosλPD)
1− α2 . (5.19)
Since the cosine of an angle is the adjacent distance over the hypotenuse, the following
is obtained:














(α2 − 1) sinλPD




Special Case: λPD = 0.
When the line-of-sight angle, λPD, is zero the speed ratio does not come into play
and the optimal heading of the defender is ψD = π/2 as expected. This result can be
obtained from setting λPD = 0 in eq. (5.22).
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Invariance of Exposure.
Suppose the defender is within a range, RD, of the pursuer at a time t0. Un-
der optimal play, the pursuer remains within the WEZ until the termination set is
reached. Figure 32 described the geometry for the optimal two-agent scenario. The
instantaneous range between P and D, ρ, is less than RD in the open interval, (t0, tf )
as proved in Theorem 5. Recall, t0 is the instant in time when the pursuer is inside the
defender’s WEZ and tf is the instant in time when the pursuer leaves the defender’s
WEZ.
Theorem 5. ρ < RD ∀ t ∈ (t0, tf ), where ρ is the defender-pursuer range at any
time from the open interval starting at t0 and ending at tf .





+ (DQ+QS)2 − 2PS(DQ+QS) cosω. (5.23)




2 − 2PS(αPS +RD) cosω. (5.24)
Expanding and solving eq. (5.24) for cosω,
cosω =
PS(1 + α2) + 2αRD
2(αPS +RD)
. (5.25)




2 − 2FS HScosω. (5.26)
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2 − 2FS(αFS +RD)cosω. (5.27)




















Notice in eq. (5.29),
ρ2 =R2D +
FSRD














therefore, for values of t ∈ (t0, tf ), ρ < RD.

Exposure Limaçon.
The function which describes the pursuer distance while being exposed is provided
by eq. (5.19). The pursuer distance while being exposed is a function of the bearing
from the pursuer to the defender (λPD), the radius of exposure (RD), and speed ratio
between the defender and the pursuer (α). Using the range PS, the polar equation
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2RD(vD + vP cosλPD)
v2P − v2D
. (5.31)
Plotting the time of exposure as a function of the angle from the pursuer to the
defender (λPD) produces a limaçon whose cusp is located at the pursuer location.
By setting tf = 0, the angle λPD which result in Zero Exposure Time (ZET). From
eq. (5.31), values of λPD which result in non-positive values of tf represent angles for
which exposure of the pursuer by the defender is not possible. Thus, setting tf ≤ 0
in eq. (5.31), the following is obtained:
2RD
vP (1− α2)
(α + cosλ0PD) ≤ 0. (5.32)
where λ0PD represents angles where exposure of the pursuer by the defender are not
possible. From eq. (5.32), the regions where the defender is unable to expose the
pursuer occurs when the angle λPD lies in the following range:
λ0PD ∈ [cos−1 (−α) , π] ∪ [−π,− cos−1 (−α)]. (5.33)
Assuming the defender implements the optimal heading which maximizes exposure
time of the faster pursuer, eq. (5.31) can be algebraically manipulated to provide the



















Consider the scenario with radius of exposure, RD = 1.0; speed ratio, α = 0.8;
pursuer’s constant heading, ψP = π/2 rad; and pursuer-defender line-of-sight angle,
λPD = 7/18π rad. Also, consider the velocity of the pursuer to have speed vP = 1
DU/TU. Using eq. (5.22), the optimal defender heading, ψ∗D is computed and is ψ
∗
D ≈
1.726 rad. Using the calculated optimal defender heading, the max-time exposure of
the faster non-maneuvering pursuer can be seen in Figure 33. In the figure, the
defender is represented by the black line, the WEZ is represented by the dashed line,
and the faster pursuer is represented by the red line. Not pictured is the evader –





Figure 33. The max-time exposure of a faster non-maneuvering pursuer by a slower
defender endowed with a circular WEZ
For the scenario described in Figure 33, consider the defender-pursuer range
147
throughout the engagement. In Theorem 5 the defender-pursuer range remains less
than the range of the WEZ under optimal play until the pursuer escapes. In Fig-
ure 34, the defender range is represented by the dashed black line and, the instanta-
neous defender-pursuer range is represented by the solid black line. As expected, the
defender-pursuer range remains less than the defender range for the entire engage-
ment, as required.
Figure 34. The instantaneous agent range is less than the exposure range for the entire
engagement which lasts 6.345 time-units.
Next, consider arbitrary defender-pursuer aspect angles: λPD ∈ [−π, π]. In the
event that the defender selects the optimal heading described by eq. (5.22), the expo-
sure time can be computed using eq. (5.31). In Figure 35 the maximum exposure time
is found for arbitrary aspect angles, λPD. From the figure, the blue line represents
all cases where the defender is able to expose the pursuer for a non-zero amount of
time. The green line represents the computed exposure time from eq. (5.31). While
the negative values signify that the defender is unable to defender the pursuer for any
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amount of time. The green dot designates the angle λ0PD for which there is zero ex-
posure time. Finally, the black dot is the computed maximum exposure time, which
occurs when λPD = 0.
λPD = 0
Figure 35. Time of exposure of the non-maneuvering pursuer by the defender as a
function of the line-of-sight angle λPD when α = 0.8 and RD = 1.0
A plot which describes the exposure time for arbitrary defender-pursuer headings
was shown in Figure 35. However, how this relates to an actual engagement scenario
may be unclear. Plotting the exposure time in a polar sense for each aspect angle,
λPD, the limaçon which describes the exposure time for each aspect angle, λPD, can
be seen in Figure 36. In the figure, the gray shaded region represents the region
where exposure of the pursuer by the defender for all possible defender-pursuer line-
of-sight angles (λPD). The green region represents the pursuer headings for which
the defender is unable to expose the faster pursuer. Considering, the scenario in
this example, the red line represents the course taken by the pursuer, the black line
represents the defender under optimal play, and the dashed black circles represent




Figure 36. The exposure limaçon describes the range by which exposure is guaranteed
as a function of the line-of-sight angle, λPD, for a given defender-pursuer speed ratio,
α, and exposure radius, RD.
5.2 Directed Energy Defense of a Non-Maneuvering HVAA in 2-D
In this section, directed energy is considered as a means of defending a slow
non-maneuverable HVAA (evader) against an incoming threat (pursuer). In the en-
gagement, the faster pursuer aims at intercepting the non-maneuvering evader in
minimum time. To aid the evader, a teamed defender equipped with a directed en-
ergy weapon is considered. Rather than focus on the technology or the more critical
aspects of the directed energy device, it is assumed that the efficacy of the defensive
device is increased by maximizing the cumulative exposure time that the pursuer is
in a WEZ of fixed range about the defender; and by this assumption, the objective of
the defender is to maximally expose the pursuer prior to the capture of the evader.
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Optimal Control Problem.
Consider a three-agent engagement scenario comprised of a fast pursuer (P ) which
is engaged on a slow non-maneuvering evader (E). To aid in the defense of the evader,
a defender (D) is considered which aims at keeping the pursuer in its WEZ for as long
as possible. A circular WEZ with radius RD is considered. This section considers the
question: How should the defender act so as to keep the pursuer in the circular WEZ
for as long as possible? It is assumed that the pursuer’s strategy is one of min-time
capture of the evader and as a result, its strategy is unaffected by the presence of the
defender.
Described in Section 3.4, two optimal control problems are developed: one for
the pursuer and one for the defender. The pursuer aims to capture the evader in
minimum time and the defender aims to maximize the cumulative time that the
pursuer remains inside its WEZ. The three-agent scenario equations of motion are
described in eq. (3.62). The objective cost of the pursuer is defined in eq. (3.66) and
the objective cost of the defender is defined in eq. (3.68). The speed ratio between
the pursuer and evader is defined as µ = vE/vP . Similarly, the speed ratio between
the pursuer and the defender is defined as α = vD/vP . Since the pursuer is faster
than both the defender and the evader the domain of the speed ratios is µ, α ∈ (0, 1).
Without loss of generality, consider the non-dimensionalization of time so that the
pursuer’s speed is unity. Utilizing the speed ratio parameters, the equations of motion
in eq. (3.62) may be simplified as
ẋP = cosψP , ẋE = µ cosψE, ẋD = α cosψD,
ẏP = sinψP , ẏE = µ sinψE, ẏD = α sinψD.
(5.36)
Two optimization problems are formulated and solved, and their interaction is
investigated in this section. The costate vectors pTA = [pxP ,A pyP ,A pxE ,A pyE ,A] and
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pTB = [pxP ,B pyP ,B pxD,B pyD,B] are introduced in order to formulate the Hamiltonians
for solving the two optimization problems (A and B) as defined by the minimization
of the objective costs in eqs. (3.66) and (3.68). Using the calculus of variations, the
Hamiltonian for the minimization described in eqs. (3.64) and (3.66) is the following:
HA = pxP cosψP + pyP sinψP + pxEµ cosψE + pyEµ sinψE. (5.37)
The Hamiltonian for the minimization described in eqs. (3.65) and (3.68) is
HB = pxP cosψP + pyP sinψP + pxDα cosψD + pyDα sinψD. (5.38)
The procedure for solving the optimal strategies of the pursuer and the defender is
to first formulate and solve for the min-time capture of the evader by the pursuer – to
solve the optimization problem as described in eqs. (3.64), (3.66), (3.67) and (5.37).
Then, using the solution to the optimization problem A, the optimal strategy for the
defender is then posed and solved as described by eqs. (3.65), (3.68), (3.69) and (5.38).
Using the first-order optimality conditions, conclusions about the optimal behavior
of the defender and the pursuer can be drawn. Using the Hamiltonians in eqs. (5.37)
and (5.38), the necessary conditions for optimality are found using the partial deriva-
tives in eqs. (3.10) to (3.12). Moreover, at final time for each of the optimization
problems, the optimal Hamiltonian is zero, HA(tgo) = HB(texp) = 0. Recall, the
superscript, ∗, represents optimality. Also, the control, u(t), for the pursuer or de-
fender (depending upon the problem being solved) are defined as u(t) = {ψP (t)} for
problem A and u(t) = {ψD(t)} for problem B.
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Optimal Control Problem, A - Pursuer Strategy.
Lemma 1. The optimal strategy for the pursuer is a straight-line constant-heading
strategy.
Proof. Evaluating eq. (3.11) using the Hamiltonian, HA from eq. (5.37) the costate
dynamics are as follows:
ṗ∗xP ,A = ṗ
∗
yP ,A




where the “A” subscript notation identifies the corresponding Hamiltonian. Further,
evaluating the partial of HA with respect to the pursuer’s control ψP in eq. (3.12),
0 = −p∗xP ,A sinψ∗P + p∗yP ,A cosψ∗P . (5.40)
rearranging and squaring each side of eq. (5.40), the following is obtained:
p∗2xP ,A sin
2 ψ∗P = p
∗2
yP ,A
cos2 ψ∗P = p
∗2
yP ,A
(1− sin2 ψ∗P ). (5.41)










Since the costates are constant, the pursuer’s heading is constant under optimal
play. 
By Lemma 1, the pursuer’s heading is constant under optimal play; thus, the use
of Apollonius Circle is a useful tool for solving for the min-time interception of the
evader by the pursuer as was demonstrated in Section 4.1.
Lemma 2. The optimal heading for the pursuer which captures the non-maneuvering
evader in minimum time is ψ∗P = sin
−1(µ sin(ψE − θE)) + θE where µ is the speed
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ratio between the evader and the pursuer, ψE is the heading of the evader, and θE is
the angle from the pursuer to the evader relative to the x-axis in the Cartesian fixed
frame.
Proof. From necessary conditions for optimality, the optimal strategy for the pursuer
is a straight-line trajectory. Moreover, the evader is non-maneuvering, and therefore,
the geometry of Apollonius provides the optimal strategy for the pursuer to capture
the slower non-maneuvering evader in minimum time [9].
In Figure 37, the Apollonius Circle is shown in magenta, where the origin is located
at O. The distance d = PE, the speed ratio µ = vE
vP
, the position of P and E are used
to construct the Apollonius Circle which defines the locus of min-time interceptions
possible by the pursuer because the evader is non-maneuvering. Along the vector ~PE
the geometry defined by Apollonius: OE = µ
2d
1−µ2 and Rapol = OI =
µd
1−µ2 .
Evaluating the distance normal to PO which locates point I from E and P , the
following can be obtained:
EI sin(ψE − θE) = PI sin(ψ∗P − θE). (5.43)
Recall, the speed ratio µ defines the relationship between EI and PI to be: EI =
µPI. Substitution into eq. (5.43), the following is obtained:
µPI sin(ψE − θE) = PI sin(ψ∗P − θE). (5.44)
Solving for ψ∗P ,
ψ∗P = sin
−1(µ sin(ψE − θE)) + θE. (5.45)

154










where σ1 = µ cos(ψE − θE)/(1 − µ2), σ2 = 1/(1 − µ2), and d is the distance between
P and E.
Proof. Because the velocity of the pursuer has been normalized to 1, the time-to-go
in seconds is the same as the length PI. This means, the length PI provides the






2 − 2EO EI cos(ψE − θE). (5.47)
Define the distance between the pursuer and evader as d and the evader-pursuer
ratio is vE/vP = µ, where µ < 1. From the Apollonius Circle, EO = µ
2d/(1 − µ2),





















cos(ψE − θE). (5.48)
Bringing all the terms to the right hand side and simplifying eq. (5.48),
0 = PI
2 − 2µd
1− µ2 cos(ψE − θE)PI −
d2
1− µ2 . (5.49)
Using the quadratic equation, PI may be solved in terms of the evader-pursuer speed
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ratio and the pursuer-evader distance using eq. (5.49). Letting
a = 1
b = −2µd cos(ψE − θE)
1− µ2
c = − d
2
1− µ2 ,




. Substitution of a, b, and c,
into the quadratic formula the distance PI can be solved. The positive case is where
the pursuer moves forward and captures the evader, while the negative case is where
the pursuer moves backward and intersects the Apollonius Circle at a point of no
interest. The quadratic equation for the solution of PI is the following:
PI =
µd cos(ψE − θE)
(1− µ2) + d
√(





1− µ2 . (5.50)










where σ1 = µ cos(ψE − θE)/(1− µ2), σ2 = 1/(1− µ2), and d is the distance between
P and E. 
Optimal Control Problem, B - Defender Strategy.
Lemma 4. The optimal strategy for the defender is a straight-line constant-heading
strategy.
Proof. Evaluating eq. (3.11) using the Hamiltonian, HB from eq. (5.38) the costate
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dynamics are as follows:
ṗ∗xP ,B = ṗ
∗
yP ,B




where the “B” subscript notation identifies the corresponding Hamiltonian. Thus,
from eqs. (5.39) and (5.51) the costates for each individual optimization problem are
constant under optimal play.
Taking the partial in eq. (3.12) using the Hamiltonian in eq. (5.38) with respect
to the control of the defender ψD, the following is obtained:
0 = −p∗xD,Bα sinψ∗D + p∗yD,Bα cosψ∗D. (5.52)
Therefore, as derived in Lemma 1, the optimal heading of the defender as a function










Since the optimal costates are constant, the heading of the pursuer is constant under
optimal play. 
Evaluating eq. (3.12) using the Hamiltonian, HA from eq. (5.37) the optimal con-
trol is found to depend solely upon the costates and the parameter µ. Similarly,
evaluating eq. (3.12) using the Hamiltonian, HB from eq. (5.38) the optimal control
is found to depend solely upon the costates and the parameter α. Since the optimal
costates are constant, it may be inferred that the optimal control for the defender
and the pursuer is also constant; hence, all optimal strategies are straight-line trajec-
tories. Because all optimal strategies for the pursuer and defender are straight-line
trajectories, the optimal heading for the pursuer is described using the geometry of
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Apollonius, and the optimal strategy for the defender is that of the maximum-time
exposure from Section 5.1.
Three scenarios of interest are examined: When tgo ≥ texp, when tgo < texp, and
when texp = 0.
Time-to-go greater than or equal to exposure time.
The engagement when the time-to-go (tgo) is greater than or equal to the maximum


















Figure 37. The directed energy defense scenario wherein the maximum possible expo-
sure time is less than the time-to-go.
From Figure 37, the interception point made by the pursuer and evader occurs
after the pursuer escapes the WEZ of the defender; this means that the heading taken
by the defender is one which maximizes the time that the pursuer is inside the WEZ.
Lemma 5. Suppose that scenario terminates in P exiting the WEZ prior to capturing
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(α2 − 1) sinλPD
α2 + 2α cosλPD + 1
)
, (5.54)
where α is the speed ratio between the defender and the pursuer and λPD is the line-
of-sight angle (positive counter clockwise) from the pursuer to the defender.
Proof. See Theorem 4 from Section 5.1. 
Exposure time greater than time-to-go.
Consider the case when the time-to-go is less than the maximum possible exposure
time; this case is illustrated in Figure 38. Since the defender’s optimal strategy
provides the maximum possible exposure of the pursuer, the question which needs to
be answered is, “What heading bounds provide an exposure time of at least time-to-



















Figure 38. The directed energy defense scenario wherein the maximum possible ex-
posure time is greater than the time-to-go. In this case, suboptimal headings may be
used to provide an exposure time equal to the time-to-go.
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In order to solve for the defender headings which provide exactly tgo exposure time,
when the maximum possible exposure provided by the optimal heading from eq. (5.54)
is implemented, one begins with locating the interception point with respect to the
defender’s initial location. Where necessary, the subscript [D] is used to represent a
point measured from the defender’s initial position, D. For example, the point I with
respect to D is I[D] = (xI[D], yI[D]); more explicitly,
xI[D] = xI − xD, yI[D] = yI − yD. (5.55)
The location of the defender at time-to-go with respect to D is Q[D] = (xQ[D], yQ[D]).











Recognizing that the speed ratio between the defender and the pursuer is α, the
distance traversed by the pursuer is PI and the distance traversed by the defender is
αPI. Therefore the location of the defender at the time-to-go is
Q[D] = αPI cosψDx̂+ αPI sinψDŷ. (5.57)
In the pursuer Cartesian fixed frame located at P , the location of the defender at the
time-to-go is
Q = αPI cosψDx̂+ αPI sinψDŷ + xDx̂+ yDŷ. (5.58)
Substitution of eq. (5.57) into eq. (5.56), the following is obtained:
R2D =
(








Expanding eq. (5.59), collecting terms in ψD, and moving all terms to the right hand
side the following is obtained:
0 =−R2D + x2I[D] + y2I[D] + α2PI
2 − 2αPIxI[D] cosψD − 2αPIyI[D] sinψD. (5.60)
Notice that eq. (5.60) has the form A cosψD +B sinψD + C = 0, where
A = −2αPIxI[D], B = −2αPIyI[D], C = −RD + x2I[D] + y2I[D] + α2PI
2
. (5.61)
Using the trigonometric half-angle formula, sinψD and cosψD may be re-written as







Let τ = tan(ψD/2), then eq. (5.60) may be re-written in terms of τ .
0 = A
1− τ 2
1 + τ 2
+B
2τ
1 + τ 2
+ C
= A(1− τ 2) + 2Bτ + C(1 + τ 2)
= (C − A)τ 2 + 2Bτ + (A+ C).
(5.62)









B2 − C2 + A2
C − A .
(5.63)
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Therefore, because of the quadratic expression, two solutions for ψD exist.

















Axiom 1. When the exposure time is greater than the time-to-go, all headings in the
closed interval,
ψD ∈ [ψD1 , ψD2 ], (5.65)
provide a final time of time-to-go.
Axiom 2. The maximum exposure time (texp) as a function of the line-of-sight angle,
λPD, the speed of the pursuer, vP , the speed of the defender, vD,and radius of the
WEZ, RD is
texp =
2RD(vD + vP cosλPD)
v2P − v2D
. (5.66)
Axiom 3. The line-of-sight angle, λPD, takes on angles from [−π, π]. The exposure
time (texp) is as described in eq. (5.66). For all possible values of λPD, the maximum
possible exposure time occurs when λPD = 0;
texp = max
λPD






Axiom 4. Setting eq. (5.66) equal to zero, the line-of-sight angles by which exposure
is not possible are in the interval
λPD ∈ [−π,− cos−1(−α)] ∪ [cos−1(−α), π]. (5.68)
Axiom 5. The final time is limited when the evader is captured by the pursuer before
the pursuer escapes the defender’s WEZ; this occurs when texp > tgo. In the event
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that 2RD/(vP − vD) > tgo the line-of-sight angle where tgo = texp occurs at the angle








Notice, λPD,go in eq. (5.69) is found by substituting tgo for the exposure time, texp
in eq. (5.66) and then solving for λPD,go.
Solution to the Optimal Control Problem.
From the defender’s perspective, the optimal control problem ends when either the
pursuer captures the evader or when the pursuer escapes the WEZ of the defender,
C = CA ∪CB. In cases where the line-of-sight angle λPD is as described in eq. (5.68),
the defender terminates immediately, as it is unable to keep the pursuer in the WEZ
for any amount of time. From the pursuer’s perspective, the optimal control problem
ends when it captures the evader, CB.
Exposure Time.
Theorem 6. Given the optimal control problem specified by eqs. (3.65), (3.68) and (5.36)





tgo from eq. (5.46) λPD ∈ Λgo
texp from eq. (5.66) λPD ∈ Λ∗







∣∣∣∣∣ −π ≤ λPD ≤ − cos




















Proof. Three scenarios are possible:
1. P captures E before escaping D’s WEZ.
In the first case, λPD ∈ Λgo implies that P captures E before escaping D’s
WEZ. Therefore, from Lemma 3 tgo < texp. Therefore, t
∗
f = tgo by Axiom 5.
2. P captures E after escaping D’s WEZ.
In the second case, λPD ∈ Λ∗ implies that P captures E after escaping or lies
on the border of D’s WEZ. Therefore, from Axiom 2, t∗f = texp from eq. (5.66).
3. D is incapable of exposing P for any amount of time. λPD ∈ Λ0 implies that D
is unable to expose P for any amount of time and therefore t∗f = 0 by Axiom 4.

Corollary 2. In the event that texp < tgo, Λgo is empty.
Proof. texp is the maximum possible time that the pursuer is contained in the WEZ
of the defender by Axiom 3. If λPD ∈ Λgo then by Axiom 2,
texp =



























Therefore, texp ≥ tgo. By contradiction, in order for λPD to be an element of Λgo, texp
must be greater than tgo; but, by the assertion, texp < tgo. 
Defender Strategy.
Theorem 7. The defender’s strategy depends upon the initial locations of the agents
as well the problem parameters: α, µ, λPD, and ψE. In the event that the defender
in unable to expose the pursuer for any amount of time, e.g. texp = 0 no matter the
heading that ψD should take, the defender’s strategy is of no consequence. However,





{ψD|ψD ∈ [ψD1 , ψD2 ]} λPD ∈ Λgo
cos−1
(
(α2 − 1) sinλPD
α2 + 2α cosλPD + 1
)
λPD ∈ Λ∗
undefined λPD ∈ Λ0.
(5.73)
Proof. Three scenarios are possible
1. P captures E before escaping D’s WEZ
In the first case, λPD ∈ Λgo implies that P captures E before escaping D’s
WEZ. Therefore by Axiom 1, ψ∗D = {ψD|ψD ∈ [ψD1 , ψD2 ]}.
2. P captures E after escaping D’s WEZ
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In the second case, λPD ∈ Λ∗ implies that P captures E after escaping D’s







3. D is incapable of exposing P for any amount of time.




Consider the directed energy defense scenario with the WEZ radius of 2 distance
units (DU), the speed ratio between the evader and the pursuer is µ = 0.5, the speed
ratio between the defender and the pursuer is α = 0.6, and the speed of the pursuer
is vP = 1 DU/TU. The evader takes a heading of 110 deg. To highlight the defender
strategy in eq. (5.73), two cases are considered: λPD = −70deg and λPD = −40deg.
Common to the examples, the pursuer is located at the origin, P = (0, 0), and the
evader is located at E = (6, 2).
The first step in both examples is to construct the Apollonius Circle and determine
the heading of the pursuer as well as the time-to-go. Using eq. (5.45), the optimal
pursuer strategy which intercepts the evader in minimum time is found to be 48.4 deg.
from East. Using eq. (5.46) the time-to-go is found to be 7.189 TU. The maximum
possible exposure time, independent of the bearing of the defender from the pursuer
is found using eq. (5.67); texp = 10.000 TU. Also, the sets Λ0,Λexp,Λgo, and Λ∗ are
found to be:
Λ0 = [−180,−126.870]deg ∪ [126.870, 180]deg,
Λgo = [−56.620, 56.6120]deg,
Λ∗ = (−126.870,−56.620]deg ∪ [56.620, 126.870)deg.
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Example 1: λPD = -70 deg.
The first example highlights the case where the exposure time is less than the
time-to-go. For this example, consider the defender to be 70 deg starboard from the
pursuer’s heading and 2 DU from the pursuer – at the onset, the pursuer is inside the
defender’s WEZ. This example is shown in Figure 39.
Figure 39. The directed energy defense scenario where the bearing from the pursuer
to the defender is 70 deg starboard. The speed ratio between the evader to the pursuer
is µ = 0.50 and the speed ratio between the defender and the pursuer is α = 0.60.
In Figure 39, the solid red line represents the pursuer’s course, the solid black
line represents the defender’s course, and the solid blue line represents the evader’s
course. The points P , E, and D represent the initial location of the pursuer, evader,
and defender respectively. The points S represent the location of the pursuer when it
escapes the defender’s WEZ, who is located at the point Q. The point I represents
the capture location of the evader by the pursuer which is dictated by the Apollonius
Circle centered at the point O.
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In this example, the angle λPD = −70 deg ∈ Λ∗ and the exposure time and
optimal heading are found using eqs. (5.70) and (5.73) respectively. texp = 5.888 TU
and ψ∗D = 68.281 deg from East.
From this scenario, the defender heads toward the pursuer in order to maximize
the time that the pursuer stays inside the WEZ. If the defender were to deviate from
this optimal heading (ψ∗D), the time that the pursuer is exposed would be less than
the calculated 5.888 TU. Since the pursuer does not capture the evader before the
defender loses contact with the pursuer, the defender has a unique optimal heading
that maximizes the time that the pursuer is inside the WEZ.
Example 2: λPD = -40 deg.
The second example highlights the case where the exposure time is less than the
time-to-go. For this example, consider the defender to be 40 deg starboard from the
pursuer’s heading and 2 DU from the pursuer. This example is shown in Figure 40.
168
Figure 40. The directed energy defense scenario where the bearing from the pursuer
to the defender is 40 deg starboard. The speed ratio between the evader to the pursuer
is µ = 0.50 and the speed ratio between the defender and the pursuer is α = 0.60.
In Figure 40, the solid red line represents the pursuer’s course, the solid black
line represents the defender’s course, and the solid blue line represents the evader’s
course. The points P , E, and D represent the initial location of the pursuer, evader,
and defender respectively. The point I represents the capture location of the evader
by the pursuer which is dictated by the Apollonius Circle centered at the point O.
Since the pursuer is inside the defender’s WEZ for the entire engagement, there exists
an interval of headings which the defender can take which ensure that the pursuer is
contained in the WEZ for the entirety of the engagement until the pursuer captures
the evader. The limiting headings are shown by the arc between Q2 and Q1.
In this example, the angle λPD = −40 deg ∈ Λgo and the exposure time and
optimal heading are found using eqs. (5.70) and (5.73) respectively. texp = tgo = 7.189
TU and using eq. (5.64) the limiting headings ψD1 = 45.869 deg and ψD2 = 76.584 deg
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from East. This means, that if the defender takes any heading between 45.869 and
76.584 deg, the pursuer will stay inside the WEZ for the entirety of the engagement.
Next, consider every possible line-of-sight angle from the pursuer to the defender,
λPD ∈ [−180, 180] deg. Assuming that the defender implements the strategy de-
scribed in eq. (5.73) and the pursuer captures the evader in minimum time using the
optimal heading in eq. (5.45), the exposure time as a function of the line-of-sight
angle λPD is shown in Figure 41.
Figure 41. The exposure time as a function of the line-of-sight angle λPD is depicted
in this polar plot when E = (6, 2), α = 0.6, and µ = 0.50. This polar plot is a graphical
representation of eq. (5.70)
In Figure 41 the blue limaco̧n describes the time that the pursuer could remain
inside the WEZ of the defender if the evader were not captured by the pursuer. The
yellow circle represents the time-to-go – the evader is captured by the pursuer. The
red lines describe the line-of-sight headings by which the pursuer is unable to be
contained inside the WEZ of the defender regardless of the defender’s strategy. The
black circles represent the angle and time at which the pursuer is inside the defender’s
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WEZ for exactly the same time as the time-to-go.
In Figure 42 the strategy of the defender as a function of the line-of-sight angle
λPD is presented.
Figure 42. The defender’s heading (ψD) as a function of the line-of-sight angle λPD as
described in eq. (5.73). The case presented is that of the examples where E = (6, 2),
α = 0.6, and µ = 0.50.
The red regions in Figure 42 represent line-of-sight angles where the defender
is unable to contain the pursuer for any amount of time. The blue line represents
the optimal strategy of the defender. The shaded blue region represents the cases
where the time-to-go limits the amount of time that the pursuer is contained in the
defender’s WEZ.
One interesting observation about the shaded blue region in Figure 42 is that the
shaded region is widest at λPD = 0. This is because the maximum possible exposure
time texp occurs at λPD = 0 and because the pursuer captures the evader before it
can escape the WEZ of the defender. Also, due to the fact that the amount of time
171
that the defender can keep the pursuer inside the WEZ decreases as it deviates from
the optimal heading ψ∗D, the amount of deviation when λPD = 0 is a maximum; thus,
the blue shaded region is the widest when λPD = 0.
As expected, the shaded region collapses to a unique heading at the angle λPD,go
= ±56.620 deg as described in eq. (5.69). This means that for headings λPD ∈ Λ∗
the defender’s strategy is unique and is ψ∗D as described in eq. (5.54).
5.3 Maximum Exposure of a Non-Maneuvering Pursuer in 3-D
In Section 5.1 the max-time exposure of a non-maneuvering pursuer was posed
and solved. Next, in Section 5.2, the evader was introduced; as a result, special
consideration was given to scenarios where the evader was captured before or after
escaping the defender’s WEZ. In this section, the results of Section 5.1 are extended
to 3-D Cartesian space.
It is now well understood that when the pursuer and defender are holonomic
(have simple motion) and the evader does not maneuver that the optimal trajectories
for the pursuer and defender are straight-line trajectories. For this reason, one may
omit the evader when considering the HVAA defense scenario if the pursuer’s optimal
strategy is a straight-line trajectory. This greatly reduces the number of free variables
and directs attention to the defender’s optimal strategy which maximally exposes a
non-maneuvering, but faster, pursuer.
Optimal Control Problem in 3-D.
A governing assumption in this scenario is that the pursuer is faster than the de-
fender, vD < vP . Without loss of generality, the speed ratio between the defender and
the pursuer is defined as: α = vD/vP , resulting in 0 < α < 1. Using normalization,
the nonlinear dynamics, ẋ(t) = f(x(t),u(t), t), can be represented as function of the
172
speed ratio, α, rather than their individual speeds as follows:
ẋD = α cos γD cosψD, ẋP = cos γP cosψP ,
ẏD = α cos γD sinψD, ẏP = cos γP sinψP ,
żD = α sin γD, żP = sin γP .
(5.74)
In this scenario, the Hamiltonian is defined as the inner product of the costates and
the dynamics, H = 〈p, f(x,u, t)〉. The Hamiltonian can be written more explicitly
as follows:
H =pxDα cos γD cosψD + pyDα cos γD sinψD + pzDα sin γD
+ pxP cos γP cosψP + pyP cos γP sinψP + pzP sin γP ,
(5.75)
where the costates are pT = [pxD , pyD , pzD , pxP , pyP , pzP ].
Necessary Conditions for Optimality:.
Utilizing the Hamiltonian in eq. (5.75), the necessary conditions for optimality
are formulated by taking the partial derivatives in eqs. (3.10) to (3.12). Recall, the
superscript, ∗, represents optimally. Evaluating the necessary condition described in









−p∗xDα cos γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗yDα cos γ∗D cosψ∗D
−p∗xDα sin γ∗D cosψ∗D − p∗yDα sin γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗zDα cos γ∗D

 . (5.76)
Algebraic manipulation of the first term in eq. (5.76) provides a relationship between
the optimal heading of the defender and the costates for the defender:
0 = −p∗xDα cos γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗yDα cos γ∗D cosψ∗D. (5.77)
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The derivation for reaching eqs. (5.78) and (5.79) from eq. (5.77) can be found in
Appendix A.1. The following equation:
0 = −p∗xDα cos γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗yDα cos γ∗D cosψ∗D
= cos γ∗D
(
−p∗xD sinψ∗D + p∗yD cosψ∗D
)
,
implies that either cos γ∗D = 0, or, more generally
(
−p∗xD sinψ∗D + p∗yD cosψ∗D
)
= 0.














which implies that the two vectors are perpendicular. Therefore, the optimal defender












wherein the signs of the two expressions are coupled. vSimilarly, through algebraic
manipulation of the second term from eq. (5.76), the optimal flight path angle of the
defender is found as a function of the optimal costates of the defender. The second
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term from eq. (5.76) is repeated here for convenience.
0 = −p∗xDα sin γ∗D cosψ∗D − p∗yDα sin γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗zDα cos γ∗D (5.81)


















Further expansion and substitution of eqs. (5.78) and (5.79) into eq. (5.82), the opti-










The algebraic derivation which starts with eq. (5.81) and results in eq. (5.83) can be
found in Appendix A.2. Further evaluation of the necessary conditions for optimality
shows that the optimal heading and flight path angle by the defender is constant for
the entire engagement. Evaluating the necessary condition in eq. (3.11) one finds the




= ṗ∗zD = ṗ
∗
xP




Since the states are not explicit in the Hamiltonian in eq. (5.75), the optimal
costates are constant, i.e. p∗(t) = p∗ because the defender is holonomic. Since the
optimal costates are constant, the optimal control is constant. Therefore the resulting
optimal trajectory of the defender is a straight-line trajectory. The optimal heading
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Next, consider the transversality conditions from eq. (3.14) which are used to
formulate the relationship between the states and costates at final time. Recalling
eq. (3.14) from Section 5.1 the terminal manifold is different in the 3-D case. The
terminal manifold as defined in eq. (3.74) states that the range of the pursuer and
the defender is larger than the defender’s WEZ at final time. Therefore the terminal
manifold m is
m(x∗(tf ), tf ) =(x
∗
D(tf )− x∗P (tf ))2 + (y∗D(tf )− y∗P (tf ))2
+ (z∗D(tf )− z∗P (tf ))2 −R2D.
(5.87)
Substitution of eq. (5.87) into the transversality condition eq. (3.14) and intro-
ducing the slack variable δ, the following is obtained:





























= 2δ(zPf − zDf ), p∗zP = ∂m∂zP = 2δ(zDf − zPf ).
(5.89)
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Substitution of the costates from eq. (5.89) into the optimal control from eqs. (5.85)
and (5.86), the optimal heading and flight path angle of the defender can be formu-





























Simplifying eqs. (5.90) to (5.92), one is able to eliminate the slack variable and find
the resulting optimal heading and flight path angle at final time as a function of the
final defender and pursuer states:
cosψ∗D = ±
(xPf − xDf )√
(xPf − xDf )2 + (yPf − yDf )2
, (5.93)
sinψ∗D = ±
(yPf − yDf )√
(xPf − xDf )2 + (yPf − yDf )2
, (5.94)
cos γ∗D = ±
√
(xPf − xDf )2 + (yPf − yDf )2
RD
. (5.95)
From eqs. (5.93) to (5.95) the angle from the defender to the pursuer at final
time is either the same as the optimal heading or anti-parallel. The latter case is
clearly suboptimal since the defender would be aimed directly away from the pursuer
at final time. Thus, the sign ambiguity in eqs. (5.93) to (5.95) may be eliminated.



























Figure 43. The max-time exposure of a faster pursuer by a slower defender in 3-D
Cartesian space.
Solution to the Optimal Control Problem.
The optimal heading and flight path angle of the defender which maximizes the
exposure time of a non-maneuverable pursuer may be analytically obtained, provided
the pursuer’s heading, flight path angle, and speed are given. Without loss of general-
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ity, the defender-pursuer scenario is rotated about the pursuer such that the pursuer
velocity is aligned with the vertical axis as shown in Figure 43.
Optimal Defender Heading.
Because the headings of both agents are constant, the plane formed by the points
P , D, and S is invariant – it remains perpendicular to the (x, y)-plane. From eq. (5.93),
the optimal defender heading is aimed directly towards the (x, y) projection of the
pursuer. Thus the optimal heading of the defender which maximizes exposure time
is:
ψ∗D = φ+ π, (5.96)
where φ is the (constant) azimuth of the defender with respect to the pursuer.
Optimal Defender Flight Path Angle.
A drawing of the two-agent max-time exposure scenario is shown in Figure 43.
Consider 4DSP ; using the law of cosines the following equation describes the rela-
tionship between the range between the defender to pursuer at final time (DS), the
path by which the pursuer is exposed (PS), the WEZ (RD), and the pursuer-defender





+R2D − 2RDPS cos(θ). (5.97)
Using the speed ratio between the defender and the pursuer the distance traversed
by the defender over the engagement is proportional to the distance traversed by the
pursuer: DQ = αPS, and therefore:
DS = αPS +RD. (5.98)
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+R2D − 2RDPS cos θ. (5.99)
Through algebraic manipulation, eq. (5.99) may be solved for PS. The derivation is
shown in Appendix A.3. The resulting solution for PS is
PS =
2RD(α + cos θ)
1− α2 . (5.100)
Next, the optimal path angle is solved using triangle 4DWS. Recognizing that the





Substitution of eqs. (5.98) and (5.100) into eq. (5.101), the optimal flight path is





(1− α2) sin θ
α2 + 2α cos θ + 1
)
. (5.102)
Special Case: θ ≡ 0.
When the angle from the pursuer to the defender, θ ≡ 0, the defender is directly
in front of the path of travel of the pursuer. Substitution of θ ≡ 0 in eq. (5.102), the
optimal flight path angle,γ∗D = π/2, as expected.
Exposure Invariance.
It is important to show that once the pursuer is inside the defender’s WEZ of
radius RD) that the pursuer remains within the WEZ until the termination set is
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reached. Figure 43 shows the geometry for the optimal two-agent scenario. To prove
that the pursuer stays within the defender’s WEZ, define the two-norm range between
the defender and pursuer:
ρ(t) =
√
(xD(t)− xP (t))2 + (yD(t)− yP (t))2 + (zD(t)− zP (t))2 ∀ t ∈ (t0, tf ).





+ (DQ+QS)2 − 2PS(DQ+QS) cosω. (5.103)
Notice that eq. (5.103) is identical to eq. (5.23). Therefore, by Theorem 5, it follows
that exposure is invariant in 3-D.
Exposure Manifold.
The function which describes the pursuer distance while being exposed is found
in eq. (5.100). The pursuer distance while being exposed is a function of the pursuer-
defender angle, θ, the radius of exposure, RD, and the speed ratio, α. Using PS in
eq. (5.100), the exposure time is found by dividing PS by the pursuer’s speed. The
polar equation for exposure time is therefore,
tf =
2RD(α + cos θ)
vP (1− α2)
=
2RD(vD + vP cos θ)
v2P − v2D
. (5.104)
Plotting the time of exposure as a function of the pursuer-defender angle, θ,
produces a limaçon whose cusp is located at the pursuer location. Note that the
boundary for zero-time of exposure solutions exist when tf = 0. From eq. (5.104),
values of θ which result in non-positive values of tf represent angles for which the
exposure time is zero. Thus, setting the length tf ≤ 0 in eq. (5.104), one obtains the
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conditions for zero time of exposure:
2RD(vD + vP cos θ)
v2P − v2D
≤ 0. (5.105)
From eq. (5.105), the regions wherein the defender is unable to expose the pursuer










Assuming the defender implements the optimal heading which maximizes exposure
time of the faster pursuer, eq. (5.100) can be algebraically manipulated to provide
the defender-pursuer angles which guarantee a desired exposure time. The following
is the equation which describes the pursuer-defender angle, θ, which guarantees the

















An illustration of the maximum exposure of a slower pursuer in 3-D is presented
in this section. In this example, the defender is endowed with an WEZ of RD = 2.
The defender is half as fast as the pursuer and as a result, the speed ratio is α = 0.5.
Consider the pursuer vehicle to be moving with a flight path angle of π/2 rad, a
heading of 0 rad, and a speed of 1 DU/TU. Define the azimuth to be π/3 rad and the
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pursuer-defender angle, θ, to be π/6 rad. From eq. (5.102), the optimal flight path
angle is calculated to be ≈ 1.393 rad. The heading is selected to point toward the
pursuer, and therefore is 4π/3 rad. Using the optimal flight path angle and heading,





Figure 44. The maximum-time exposure of a faster pursuer by a slower defender in
3-D Cartesian Space
In Figure 44, the defender’s path is represented by the blue line, the WEZ is
represented by the shaded blue sphere, and the faster pursuer’s path is represented
by the red line. The initial locations are the filled-in circles and the final time locations
of both agents are represented by crosses.
In order to ensure exposure of the pursuer by the defender, the instantaneous
range between the two-agents would need to be less than or equal to the WEZ, RD.
In Figure 45 the instantaneous range between the defender and the pursuer is found
to be contained in the defender’s WEZ for the entire engagement.
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Figure 45. The instantaneous range is inside the exposure region for the entirety of
the scenario.
For various angles, θ, the possible exposure time, when the defender implements
the optimal strategy, is presented in Figure 46. The figure is shown in both polar
and Cartesian form for the sake of presenting the angular and time information eas-
ier. Note that exposure time is independent of azimuth since φ does not appear in
eq. (5.104) and therefore only plots for various elevation angles are presented.
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Figure 46. The relationship of the exposure time as a function of the relative elevation
angle, θ, shown in both Cartesian and Polar plots
In Figure 46, the red lines represent zero-time of exposure while blue lines represent
positive non-zero time of exposure. By plotting the exposure time for all possible
angles, θ, the maximum exposure occurs when the pursuer and defender move co-
linear with one another (θ = 0) as expected. From Figure 46, one may observe the
zero-exposure time angles as well as the exposure time limaçon. For the example, the
zero-exposure time angle is found by computing eq. (5.106). In the example, the zero
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time of exposure occurs between θZET ∈ [−π,−2π/3] ∪ [2π/3, π] rad.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this section, a defender endowed with a circular WEZ aims at maximally ex-
posing a faster non-maneuvering pursuer. Using the calculus of variations/optimal
control theory, the heading for the defender which keeps the pursuer inside the de-
fender’s WEZ for as long as possible is posed and solved. It is found that for a
non-maneuvering pursuer, the optimal heading for the defender is constant under
optimal play. Further, the optimal heading is only dependent upon the line-of-sight
angle from the pursuer to the defender at initial time, the radius of the WEZ, and
the speed ratio of the defender to the pursuer. Also proven, in this section, is the
fact that exposure is invariant under optimal play, e.g. the defender-pursuer range
is less than the radius of the WEZ for the entire engagement. Finally, the exposure
time as a function of he initial line-of-sight angle from the pursuer to the defender is
investigated. An example illustrates the exposure time as a function of the defender-
pursuer line-of-sight angle; the limaçon describing the exposure time of the pursuer
is shown.
In conclusion, the directed energy defense of a non-maneuvering evader against
an incoming threat has been presented. Making use of the calculus of variations two
optimization problems are posed and solved in tandem; first, the min-time capture
of a non-maneuverable evader and then the max-time exposure of the pursuer by a
defender with a circular engagement zone. From the costates, the optimal trajectories
of the pursuer and the defender were shown to be straight-line trajectories. Leveraging
the optimal defender strategy from Section 5.1 the optimal defender strategy and
exposure time is found in closed-form.
In order to demonstrate the various intricacies surrounding the target defense
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scenario, two examples are presented. The first example demonstrates the defender’s
optimal strategy when the pursuer captures the evader after escaping the defender’s
WEZ and the second demonstrates the defender’s optimal strategy when the pursuer
captures the evader before it can escape the defender’s WEZ. Also presented are
conditions for which the line-of-sight angle limits the time of exposure – the exposure
time is zero, independent of the defender’s chosen strategy or limited by the time-to-
go.
In conclusion, using a spherical WEZ centered at the defender and commanding
the instantaneous heading and flight path angle of the defender, the time by which
the pursuer remains inside the WEZ has been maximized. Using the calculus of vari-
ations and optimal control theory the optimal instantaneous heading and flight path
angle of the defender required to maximize the exposure of a faster non-maneuvering
pursuer has been posed and solved. First, the optimal heading and flight path angle
of the defender is shown to be constant. Next, the exposure time is shown to be
independent of initial azimuth angle and dependent upon the relative elevation angle,
WEZ, and speed ratio. Using the relations for exposure time, the regions where expo-
sure is not possible are described. Finally, an example that highlights the maximum
exposure of a non-maneuvering faster pursuer by a slower defender is presented. The
figures presented in the example illustrate the optimal defender strategies which keep
a pursuer inside a spherical WEZ as it relates to the HVAA defense problem of a
non-maneuvering evader in 3-D.
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VI. Conclusions
When pursuing a PhD, routinely ask
yourself,“Is this necessary [to graduate]?” If
not, then ignore it; if so, then get to work.
— David B. Doman
6.1 Summary of Remarks
In this dissertation, an investigation into the optimal means of defending a high
value airborne asset was undertaken. First, in Chapter I, the HVAA defense sce-
nario was motivated and described. In Chapter II a general survey of pursuit-evasion
differential games involving multiple pursuers and evaders was conducted. As part
of the survey, an in-depth survey of pursuit-evasion differential games as they relate
to HVAA defense was performed. Special attention to work related to the kinetic
and directed energy defense was highlighted along with the research gaps that this
dissertation addressed. Chapter III provides a cursory overview of both differential
game theory and optimal control theory. Also described in Chapter III are the vari-
ous mathematical models and techniques which are leveraged to pose and solve the
vagarious HVAA defense scenarios. Additionally, various kinetic and directed energy
defense scenarios in the scope of the research were defined – the equations of motion
as well as the metrics for optimization are presented for each scenario discussed in
this dissertation.
The research contributions of Chapter IV focus on the kinetic defense of a HVAA
against an incoming threat. Concerning kinetic defense, three different scenarios were
posed and solved. Two scenarios involved the optimal pursuer-defender strategies
when the HVAA was non-maneuvering: one in 2-D and another in 3-D. Leveraging
Apollonius Circle geometry, the differential game between the pursuer and defender
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was reformulated into a single-agent minimization problem. The results of the solved
differential games showed that any deviation from the derived optimal strategies re-
sulted in better performance for the adversary. The third scenario investigated a
maneuvering HVAA in the 2-D Cartesian plane and assumed the PN control law
for the defender and the pursuer. The tactical conclusion, in brief, was that a ma-
neuvering HVAA should generally turn toward the defender in order to aid in the
HVAA’s own defense. Lastly, a comparative study for finding the optimal control for
a turn-rate limited HVAA was conducted. The following four direct methods were
investigated: Single Shooting Method, Multiple Shootings Method, Even Colloca-
tion Method, and Pseudospectral Method. In the investigation, special attention was
given to the computational time, number of algorithmic iterations, number of cost-
functional evaluations, ultimate functional evaluation, and the feasibility of solutions.
The Even Collocation Method outperformed the convergence times of the other direct
methods. One reason the Even Collocation Method outperformed the other meth-
ods was that an ODE solver was not used; rather, the dynamics were upheld using
equality constraints. Although the Pseudospectral Method also makes use of the
equality constraints to uphold the dynamics, it requires adaptive meshing in order
to handle bang-bang phenomenon; as a result, the Even Collocation Method out-
performed the Pseudospectral Method. Although the dynamics from the first-order
Euler approximation used in the Even Collocation Method were not as accurate as the
Gaussian quadrature methods used in the Pseudospectral Method, the solution was
of acceptable fidelity and was provided much faster. The Even Collocation Method
is, therefore, more appropriate for real-world applications.
Next, in Chapter V the HVAA defense scenario was posed and solved for a defender
which uses directed energy as a defense mechanism. Because energy weapons deal
damage over time rather than at a single time instant, the objective for the defender
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was to keep the pursuer inside its WEZ for as long as possible. This amounted to
solving for the maximum-time exposure defense. Using the calculus of variations,
the flight vector for the defender which maximally exposes the superior pursuer was
posed and solved in both 2-D and 3-D Cartesian space. Using the optimal flight
vector for the defender, guarantees for exposure time were presented as well as the
initial conditions for which the defender is unable to expose the pursuer for any
amount of time. The exposure invariance was also proven, showing that the optimal
defender strategy provided continuous exposure for the entire engagement. Numerical
simulations were presented which confirm the analysis throughout the chapter. Also
presented was the directed energy defense of a HVAA wherein a pursuer captures the
HVAA in minimum time while the defender aims to maximally expose the pursuer.
In the analysis of the three-agent scenario, two cases were shown to exist: the HVAA
being captured before the defender loses contact with the pursuer and the HVAA
begin captured after the defender loses contact with the pursuer. In the former, there
exists a region of headings that the defender could take which provide an exposure
time equal to that of the time-to-go (time until the HVAA is captured). Finally,
the strategies of the defender, based upon the initial engagement geometry, were
illustrated with examples.
6.2 Research Questions Answered
In section 1.3, the research tasks and scope of work were defined. The Hypothesis
of this work was that The successful defense of a High Value Airborne Asset may be
solved utilizing differential game theory as well as optimal control theory. Below are
the original research questions and answers for each of them.
Research Question 1: How may meaningful mathematical models be generated
for HVAA defense scenarios?
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Using the kinematic models described in eqs. (3.1) to (3.4), aircraft models which
neglect aircraft mass, wind disturbances, a spherical earth, and many other physical
phenomenon are formed. Each of the models and their governing assumptions are
discussed in section 3.2. Using these low-fidelity kinematic models, attention is driven
as to the navigation and tactics of aircraft. As a result of using these low-fidelity
models, the state spaces are thus reduced. The models allow for aerial engagements
to be posed and solved analytically; as a result, conclusions about the actions taken
by the pursuer, evader, and defender may be drawn for the purpose of HVAA defense.
Research Question 2: How may HVAA defense scenarios be posed and solved
as either optimization problems or differential games?
In order for one to pose HVAA defense scenarios as either an optimal control prob-
lem or a differential game, one begins with the objective of each of the players/agents.
Using the vehicle states, their control inputs, and time, the goals/aims of each of the
agents is represented as either a function or functional. Using an objective cost or
value function, as described in eqs. (3.5) and (3.30), subject to equations of motion,
as described in eqs. (3.6) and (3.28), and boundary conditions or path constraints, as
described in eq. (3.8) eq. (3.7) respectively, an optimization problem is formed.
Once the optimal control problem or differential game is posed. The question
becomes, How does one solve an optimal control problem or differential game? Two
approaches for solving optimal control problems include the indirect method and the
direct method as described in Section 3.3. However, for solving differential games,
the indirect approach is most common. In this research, differential games, where
the solution is a minimax, are transformed into optimal control problems, where the
solution is found from pure minimization or maximization. This transformation is
made possible by leveraging the geometry of Apollonius.
The optimal control problem or differential game which develops as a result of
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the individual HVAA defense scenarios are setup in Section 3.4. For each scenario,
the objective cost or value function is defined (depending upon if the scenario is an
optimal control problem or differential game). The solutions for these scenarios are
contained within Chapters IV and V. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the differential games are
transformed into optimal control problems – the defender’s optimal strategy is formed
from the geometry of Apollonius and the pursuer’s strategy is obtained through min-
imization of the terminal pursuer-evader range at final time. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4
the optimal control for the HVAA to out-maneuver its pursuer and aid its defender is
solved using the direct method. In Sections 5.1 to 5.3 the indirect method is leveraged
to solve for the optimal strategies of the pursuer and defender.
Research Question 3: How may HVAA defense differential games be trans-
formed into optimal control problems which may be solved either analytically or nu-
merically?
Using Apollonius Circle, the optimal strategy for a faster pursuer to capture a
slower non-maneuvering evader is found. In Section 3.3, the construction of Apollo-
nius Circle is described. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 the differential game which develops
between the pursuer and the defender is transformed from a differential game to an
optimal control problem. This transformation is performed as follows: The optimal
strategies for the pursuer and defender are shown to be straight-line trajectories by
evaluating the necessary conditions for optimality as described by eqs. (3.33) to (3.36).
In general, for agents with simple motion, as described by eqs. (3.2) and (3.4), the
partial of the Hamiltonian with respect to the costates is zero. This means, that the
costates for each of the agents are constant throughout the trajectory. Also, using
the partial of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control for each of the agents,
the optimal control for both each player is found to depend solely upon the costates
(which are known to be constant). This means that optimal trajectories for each of
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the players are straight-line trajectories. Under this assumption, (optimal trajecto-
ries are straight-line trajectories trajectories) Apollonius Circle geometry describes
the locus of possible interceptions of a faster agent against a slower one. This means,
that if the pursuer’s strategy is known by the defender and the defender is faster than
the pursuer, then its course is known and dictated by Apollonius Circle geometry and
the interception point is dictated based upon the course of the pursuer. All that is
left is to find the course of the pursuer which minimizes the range of the intercep-
tion point to the evader at the time that that interception is made. This range is
determined to be the objective cost to be minimized subject to the pursuer’s chosen
course. The result is a transformation of a differential game involving two players to
a minimization of one player’s strategy – the solution of which determines the saddle
point strategy and the solution to the differential game.
Research Question 4: In the event that a HVAA can’t maneuver, what are the
optimal strategies of both the defender and the pursuer in the three-agent problem?
In the event that a HAVAA can’t maneuver, the optimal strategies for the pursuer
are dictated upon the mechanism by which the defender uses. In Chapter IV the
defense mechanism is kinetic – the defender aims to capture the pursuer. In Chapter V
the defense mechanism is energy-based – the defender aims to expose the pursuer
continuously for as long as possible.
In the event that the defense mechanism is kinetic, the optimal strategy for the
pursuer and defender are coupled. In 2-D, the saddle point strategy for the defender
and the pursuer is found in defined by the location of the intersection point in Theo-
rem 2. Consequently, the optimal headings for the defender and pursuer are described
in eqs. (4.32) and (4.33), respectively. In 3-D, the intersection point for the defender
and pursuer is found through the minimization described by eq. (4.67), the result-
ing intersection point is defined by eq. (4.56). Once the intersection point is known,
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amount of distance the pursuer traverses is given by eq. (4.59). As a result, the op-
timal strategy for the pursuer is described by eqs. (4.60) and (4.61) and the optimal
strategy for the defender is described by eqs. (4.65) and (4.66).
In the event that the defense mechanism is energy-based, the optimal strategy
for the pursuer is assumed to be of min-time capture of the evader as dictated by
Apollonius Circle; this choice of heading is found in eq. (5.45). The optimal strategy
of the defender is one of maximum exposure of the faster pursuer; the optimal strategy
is found in eq. (5.22) when considering 2-D engagements and in eqs. (5.96) and (5.102)
when considering 3-D engagements.
Research Question 5: How should the HVAA aid in its own defense if it is able
to maneuver?
In the event that a fast pursuer engages a slower maneuverable HVAA which is
teamed with a defender which is similar (in capability) to the pursuer, the HVAA
should maneuver so as to minimize the defender-pursuer separation rate and maxi-
mize the pursuer-evader separation rate as defined in eq. (3.45). Using optimal control
theory, the optimal evader strategy is found to depend upon the costate which cor-
responds to the evader’s heading. The optimal control is presented in eq. (4.94). At
first, this optimal control problem appears to be tractable in closed form; however,
when the costates which correspond to the evader’s heading are zero, the problem be-
comes singular and therefore direct methods are necessary to find the optimal control
which maximizes the objective cost in eq. (3.45). Using an NLP, the optimal strategy
for the evader is to turn toward its defender in order to “drag” the pursuer toward
the defender. To separate itself from the pursuer (when captured by the defender),
the evader turns away from the defender and the pursuer at a time dictated by the
NLP. An example of this behavior is shown in Figure 29.
Research Question 6: What unique aspects occur when the defender is a missile
194
or directed energy weapon, and what are the critical parameters for the defender to be
successful?
The unique aspects which occur when the defender is a missile are investigated
in Chapter IV. When the defender is modeled as a missile, the defense mechanism is
kinetic in nature – damage to the pursuer is dealt through capture. It is the aim of
the defender-evader team to have the defender capture the pursuer as far from the
evader at the time of capture. In this work, cases where the defender is successful
are only considered; therefore, the pursuer strives to be intercepted as close to the
evader as possible. These problems are solved using Apollonius Circle geometry when
the evader is non-maneuvering (Sections 4.1 and 4.2) and an NLP when the evader
is turn-rate limited (Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
The critical parameters for the defender to be successful include the vehicle speeds,
initial state, and the control limits (if applicable) of each agent. The vehicle speeds
dictate the speed ratios which are used to simplify the equations of motion for each
of the posed scenarios. The initial conditions must be in the escape set – defense is
successful. The control limits for the turn-rate of the evader dictate how the evader
can maneuver to escape the pursuer and aid the defender in its own defense.
The unique aspects which occur when the defender is a directed energy weapon are
investigated in Chapter V. When the defender is modeled as a directed energy weapon,
the defender strives to keep the incoming threat inside its weapon engagement zone
for as long as possible – damage to the pursuer is dealt over time. It is the aim of
the pursuer to capture the evader in minimum time and for the defender to contain
the pursuer inside its WEZ for as long as possible. The optimal strategies for the
defender are solved using the indirect method of optimal control theory (Sections 5.1
to 5.3).
The critical parameters for the defender to be successful include the relative vehicle
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speeds, initial state of the agents, and WEZ radius of the defender. The relative
vehicle speeds dictate the amount of time that the pursuer is contained inside the
WEZ of the defender as well as the optimal defender heading. The initial state of
the agents are used to determine if exposure of the pursuer is even possible and if so,
for how long the pursuer could be exposed. The WEZ radius is critical, as it appears
in the equation for the optimal heading that the defender should take to keep the
pursuer inside its WEZ for as long as possible.
Research Question 7: What numeric methods are suitable for aerospace hard-
ware systems which require fixed time steps and minimal computational effort?
In general, it is important to reduce the computational effort to compute a solu-
tion. For this reason, closed form solutions are desired in the aerospace community.
Closed form solutions may be computed quickly and efficiently when compared to
running a nonlinear program solver. When closed form solutions aren’t possible, nu-
meric solutions which require few evaluations are desired, this could be a table look
up, or a selection between multiple candidate solutions. Less desired are solutions
which require the use of an NLP solver. Modern techniques for solving NLPs in con-
junction with more capable hardware have made it possible to solve NLPs in real time
onboard aerospace platforms. Least desired of all possible approaches are algorithms
which require brute force search over an entire state space. These generally require
large amounts of memory and the computational effort, in some cases, can cause a
problem to be unsolvable.
In Section 4.1, eight candidate solutions for the optimal defense are found in closed
form when solving the roots of the polynomial in eq. (4.10). These candidates are
then evaluated, one at a time, to find the optimal interception point and consequently,
the optimal saddle-point strategies for the defender and the pursuer.
In Section 4.2, a Quasi-Newton gradient search is performed to solve the optimiza-
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tion problem defined in eq. (4.67). This search provides an approximate location of
the interception point and consequently, approximate optimal saddle-point strategies
for the defender and the pursuer.
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 NLPs are used to pose the kinetic defense of a maneuvering
HVAA in 2-D where the pursuer and defender are assumed to be guided by the
proportional navigation guidance law and the HVAA maneuvers to escape capture
of the pursuer while assisting the defender in capturing the pursuer. In Section 4.4,
four direct methods for solving the optimal control problem are compared. The four
methods compared were the Single Shooting Method, Multiple Shootings Method,
Even Collocation Method, and Pseudospectral Method. Assuming a fixed mesh,
the Even Collocation Method outperformed the convergence time of the other direct
methods. Since the dynamics are approximated using low-order methods, and the
use of ODE solvers is no longer required, the solution converges very fast. However,
the use of ODE solvers to forward propagate the dynamics makes shooting methods
more accurate. In a real-world scenario, where the evader is a piloted aircraft, fast
solutions of low fidelity are more valuable than late solutions of high-fidelity. For this
reason, the Even Collocation Method outperforms the other direct methods and is
more appropriate for real-time applications.
In Chapter V the optimal strategies for the defender are obtained in closed-form
using the indirect method of optimal control theory. The optimal defender strategies
are straight-line trajectories and therefore implementation in aerospace systems is
feasible.
6.3 Publications and Presentations
Papers and presentation which have been produced as a result of this body of
work are listed in Appendix C.
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6.4 Contributions
This research improves beyond visual range analysis for the defense of HVAAs
through mathematical analysis and simulation. Specifically, the contributions address
the expectations in Section 1.5 and are the following:
1. Numeric and analytic solutions to HVAA defense optimal control problems and
differential games
2. Optimal strategies for providing successful defense of a HVAA using either a
kinetic or directed energy defense weapon
3. A comparative study of direct methods for finding optimal strategies for HVAA
defense, focusing on methods suitable for hardware implementation
4. Provide tools for mission analysis concerning HVAA defense, remote sensing,
and pursuit-evasion.
A summary of the optimal HVAA defense scenarios, as defined in Table 1, are
provided in Table 12 below. The optimal strategies are found either numerically
or analytically. Where analytic solutions are available, the referenced equation or
theorem is provided. The definitions for each of the optimal defense scenarios is
found in Section 3.4.
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Table 12. HVAA Defense Strategies
Scenario Optimal Strategy Summary
1 Using ECM, as described in Section 3.3, the HVAA should steer
toward its defender in order to assist the closure of the defender-
pursuer range; Figure 29 illustrates this behavior.
2 The optimal headings for the defender and pursuer are provided by
eqs. (4.32) and (4.33), respectively.
3 The optimal strategy for the pursuer is provided by eqs. (4.60)
and (4.61) and the optimal strategy for the defender is provided by
eqs. (4.65) and (4.66). The optimal interception point which defines
these strategies is found using gradient based search.
4 The optimal defender heading which maximally exposes a non-
maneuvering pursuer is provided by eq. (5.22). Using this strategy,
the time of exposure is provided by eq. (5.31).
5 The optimal pursuer heading which captures a non-maneuvering
evader in minimum time is provided by eq. (5.45). The optimal
defender heading which maximally exposes the pursuer is provided
by eq. (5.54). If the time-to-go is less than the maximum possible
exposure time, the headings which the defender should take are in
the interval provided by eq. (5.65).
6 The optimal defender’s heading and flight path angle which maxi-
mally exposes a non-maneuvering pursuer are provided by eqs. (5.96)
and (5.102), respectively.
6.5 Future Research
There are a myriad of avenues one can take which extend the work of this disser-
tation. The following are a list of some of the more obvious extensions or research
which is out of the scope of this dissertation and can be considered as future work.
The investigations performed in this work were restricted to games of degree –
it was always assumed that the defender was able to provide successful defense for
the evader. Future extensions to this work include considerations of game of kind,
especially in 3-D.
Another extension is the consideration of a HVAA which is restricted to “race-
tracks”, “circles”, or a series of “linear flight paths”. How may the defender or pursuer
be influenced if the evader is maneuvering from a prescribed flight-path?
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Obvious extensions for the directed energy defense scenario are to consider sce-
narios where the defender does not make initial contact with the pursuer. Questions
arise as to the multi-phase optimal control problem for the acquisition of the pursuer
and maximum exposure prior to the pursuer’s capture of the evader. The defense
of a maneuvering HVAA was considered for kinetic defense in Chapter IV, future
work should consider the cooperation of a maneuvering HVAA which is teamed with
a defender, equipped with a directed energy weapon.
The directed energy defense scenarios which were posed and solved in this dis-
sertation assumed a circular or spherical WEZ. The directed energy weapon was
considered to be effective, independent of angle, and have a fixed effective range.
This makes solving the optimal control problems convenient to solve, but is not real-
istic. Rather than considering a circle or spherical WEZ, a pie-shaped or cone-shaped
WEZ would allow for angular limits on the WEZ. More generally, a numeric model
for WEZ range and effectiveness would be desired; but, such models would require
the use of numeric techniques for analysis of optimal strategies for the HVAA, the
defender, and the pursuer.
One interesting idea is to consider flight-testing the proposed algorithms on real
hardware to investigate the efficacy of the analytic solutions in the “real world”. As is
common in engineering, the models used in this dissertation have a set of assumptions
which abstract them from the real world. This abstraction allows engineers to draw
conclusions; but, the accuracy of the underlying models is reduced. One idea is to try
and “fly” the proposed algorithms to ascertain if the analytic solutions (based upon
an abstracted reality) actually work in the real world on hardware.
Other future research includes other Air Force operations which relate to defensive
counter air missions. Some examples include mutual support, fighter combat air
patrol, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It may be possible to use the
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mathematical tools from this dissertation to pose and solve other kinds of engagements
which may be of use for mission analysis (sea, land, air, and space).
6.6 Summary
This dissertation has shown the optimal strategies for a defender to protect a high
value airborne asset by either kinetic or directed energy means. Using the calculus
of variations, optimal control theory, and the geometry of Apollonius, the optimal
strategies were found either analytically or numerically. The impacts of this work
have made a significant contribution to the war-gaming analysis within Air Force
Research Laboratory, Aerospace Systems Directorate. Using the optimal strategies
for the defender, more complex and realistic air combat analysis can be performed
as it relates to the mission of the Untied States Air Force. Moreover, this research
provides some foundation for 3-D engagements as they relate to space applications in
support of the United States Space Force.
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Appendix A. Select Derivations
In this appendix, select derivations which are too wordy to be included in the
body of the dissertation are provided herein.
A.1 Optimal Heading as a Function of Optimal Costates
This derivation starts with eq. (5.77) and derives eqs. (5.78) and (5.79) through
algebraic manipulation.
0 = −p∗xDα cos γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗yDα cos γ∗D cosψ∗D












p∗2xD(1− cos2 ψ∗D) = +p∗2yD cos2 ψ∗D






















A.2 Optimal Flight Path Angle as a Function of Optimal Costates
This derivation starts with eq. (5.81) and derives eq. (5.83) through algebraic
manipulation.
0 = −p∗xDα sin γ∗D cosψ∗D − p∗yDα sin γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗zDα cos γ∗D
0 = −p∗xD sin γ∗D cosψ∗D + p∗yD sin γ∗D sinψ∗D + p∗zD cos γ∗D
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A.3 Optimal Path of Target Exposure, PS
The derivation of the target exposure length starts with eq. (5.99) and derives






+R2D − 2RDPS cos θ
Expanding all terms in the equation the following is obtained:
α2PS
2
+R2D + 2RDαPS = PS
2
+R2D − 2RDPS cos θ
Removing R2D from both sides:
α2PS
2
+ 2RDαPS = PS
2 − 2RDPS cos θ
Divide both sides of the equation by PS:
α2PS + 2RDα = PS − 2RD cos θ
α2PS = PS − 2RD cos θ − 2RDα
α2PS − PS = −2RD cos θ − 2RDα
(α2 − 1)PS = −2RD(cos θ + α)
(1− α2)PS = 2RD(α + cos θ)
Therefore:
PS =
2RD(α + cos θ)
1− α2
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A.4 Optimal Flight Path Angle
Substitution of eqs. (5.98) and (5.100) into eq. (5.101) the optimal flight path
























(1− α2)RD sin θ
2RDα(α + cos θ) +RD(1− α2)
=
(1− α2) sin θ
2α(α + cos θ) + (1− α2)
=
(1− α2) sin θ
2α2 + 2α cos θ + 1− α2
=
(1− α2) sin θ





(1− α2) sin θ
α2 + 2α cos θ + 1
)
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Appendix B. On Pontryagin’s Optimal Control Canonical
Example
Appendix B contains an in-depth analysis of Pontryagin’s optimal control canon-
ical example when the target set is not a simpleton – circular and rectangular target
sets are considered. This work contains the same analysis that was important in
describing how a popular optimal control problem may be approached using differen-
tial game theory. The result of the work is worth inclusion in this dissertation, but
publication was not made possible until after the dissertation.
208
1
On Pontryagin’s Optimal Control Canonical
Example
Isaac E. Weintraub and Meir Pachter
Abstract
In this paper, Pontryagin’s canonical optimal control example, which entails a double integrator plant, is
revisited. However, rather than controlling the state to the origin, we require the end state to reach a terminal set
that contains the origin in its interior. Indeed, in industry, it is required to control to a prescribed tolerance rather than
reach a desired end state; achieving tight tolerances is expensive, and from a theoretical point of view, constraining
the end state to a terminal manifold of co-dimension n-1 renders the optimal control problem well-posed. Thus, the
correct solution of the optimal control problem is obtained. Two target sets are considered: a smooth circular target
and a square target with corners. Closed-loop state-feedback control laws are developed which drive the double
integrator plant from an arbitrary initial state to the target set in minimum time. This is accomplished using Isaacs’
method for the solution of differential games, which entails Dynamic Programming (DP), working backward from
the Usable Part of the target set, as opposed to obtaining the optimal trajectories using the necessary conditions
provided by Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP). Special attention is given to the critical Usable Part of the
target set in the process of obtaining the global solution of the optimal control problem at hand. In this paper,
Isaacs’ method for the solution of differential games is applied to the solution of optimal control problems and the
juxtaposition of the PMP and DP is undertaken.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, the Pontryagin Maximum Principle (PMP) and Dynamic Programming (DP) methods for
the solution of optimal control problems are juxtaposed. Isaacs’ method for the solution of differential
games is applied to the solution of optimal control problems and the canonical example from [1, pp.
23-27] concerning the application of the PMP to the synthesis of optimal controls is revisited. The
objective in [1] is to show that the necessary conditions for optimality embodied in the PMP yield a
closed set of conditions such that the optimal control time-history can be obtained. The application of the
PMP assumes the existence of an optimal control time-history and requires a Two-Point Boundary-Value
Problem (TBVP) be solved, but with the provision that hard control constraints are allowed – it is a
necessary condition for optimality akin to the situation in the calculus of variations. The objective of this
work is to use the canonical example from reference [1] to demonstrate the application of differential
game theory / Isaacs’ method [2] to optimal control problems and obtain their global solution. Isaacs’
method is based on the constructive method of DP which provides sufficient conditions for optimality. It
entails solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) Partial Differential Equation (PDE) using the
method of characteristics. The hyperbolic HJBI PDE is solved using the method of characteristics with
the boundary conditions exclusively specified on the Usable Part (UP) of the terminal manifold / target set
which is of co-dimension 1 and where the pursuer / controller can enforce termination. The optimal state
feedback control law is synthesized as opposed to obtaining an optimal control time history. The global
solution is thus obtained and, in addition, the part of the state space where optimal trajectories exist is
characterized. In this paper, rather than using the PMP, Isaacs’ method for the solution of Differential
Games is adapted to the solution of (much simpler) optimal control problems. The importance of the UP
of the terminal manifold, where the boundary conditions are specified, is emphasized. Furthermore, we
I. Weintraub is with the Aerospace Systems Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433.
isaac.weintraub.1@us.af.mil
M. Pachter is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB,
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derive time-optimal state feedback control laws which extend Pontryagin’s canonical example concerning
the regulation to a terminal state to that of a target manifold of co-dimension 1. This is very much in-
line with engineering practice where tolerances are specified - “zero tolerance” is expensive. And from a
mathematical point of view, this renders the optimal control problem well-posed.
In this paper Isaacs’ method [2] is employed rather than using PMP to synthesize time-optimal controls
for reaching a desired terminal manifold. Emphasizing the advantages of using Isaacs’ method rather
than PMP, we focus on the iconic example from [1] which entails the dynamics of a double integrator.
Time-optimal state feedback control laws are derived which globally cover the whole state space rather
than constructing an optimal trajectory which leads from a specified state to a terminal state / the origin.
Furthermore, instead of a specific terminal state / point target, in this paper, a terminal manifold is
considered. This is in tune with the engineering practice of using a finite tolerance and also renders the
optimal control problem well-posed. We submit, that this is the mathematically correct way to deal with
controlling to a point target in optimal control and differential games.
We consider the problem of reaching a specified target manifold, C , of co-dimension 1 rather than
a terminal state from an arbitrary initial state in the state space in minimum time. Physical systems
commonly cope with some allowable tolerance such as position or velocity error. Thus, it is the objective
of this paper to investigate time-optimal control which drive a double-integrator plant which models a
point mass traveling on a straight line and needs to be brought to rest at the origin in minimum time,
allowing for a small error in terminal position and velocity.
Indeed, when using Isaacs’ method, it becomes clear that the proper termination of optimal control
problems (and differential games) in Rn calls for the specification of terminal manifolds whose dimension
is n− 1. And in the context of pursuit-evasion differential games, the proper treatment of “point capture”
requires the consideration of a terminal manifold which is a sphere of radius 0 < ε << 1 centered at the
origin and point capture means letting ε → 0. This is required from a mathematical point of view and
makes sense from and engineering point of view.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the physical control problem is posed using non-
dimensional variables. In Section III, a circular terminal manifold centered at the origin with radius l
is considered. The control to a non smooth target manifold with corners, a square, is investigated in
Section IV. Lastly, in Section V we draw conclusions.
II. CONTROL PROBLEM
Consider a point-mass with mass, m, which is controlled on a straight line using a bounded force, F .
The maximum applicable force is Fmax. According to Newton’s Second Law,
F (t) = ma(t), −Fmax ≤ F (t) ≤ Fmax.
Hence, the dynamics are




F (t), v(0) = v0, 0 ≤ t ≤ tf ,
where x is the position on the line of the point mass, and v is its velocity. The initial position of the
point-mass is x0 and its initial velocity is v0. The goal is to drive in minimum time, tf , the position and
the velocity to a bounded region described as
−L ≤ x(tf ) ≤ L, −V ≤ v(tf ) ≤ V.
It is convenient to use non-dimensional variables. The non-dimensionalization is performed as follows:
x→ x/L, x0 → x0/L, v → v/V, v0 → v0/V,
t→ tV
L
, tf → tf
V
L




where L is a characteristic length and V is a characteristic velocity. As is best practice in physics, also
the time variable is rendered dimensionless. The dynamics in non-dimensional form are
dx
dt
= v(t), x(0) = x0
dv
dt
= αu(t), v(0) = v0, 0 ≤ t ≤ tf
−1 ≤ u(t) ≤ 1,




III. CIRCULAR TARGET SET
The physical state variables: x1(t) , x(t), x2(t) , v(t) ans the non-dimensional dynamics are
dx1
dt
= x2(t), x1(0) = x10
dx2
dt
= αu(t), x2(0) = x20
0 ≤ t ≤ tf , −1 ≤ u(t) ≤ 1.
(1)
Consider the terminal manifold l2 = x2(tf ) + β2v2(tf ). The parameter l is non-dimensional – it is the
tolerance parameter and β is a non-dimensional weight parameter which trades off the importance of the
terminal position error and the terminal velocity error. The optimal control problem is parameterized by
α > 0, l > 0, and β > 0. For the sake of demonstration, the weight parameter β is assumed to have the
value β = 1 so we confine our attention to the terminal manifold / target set, C , described by a circle
with radius l about the origin of the state space (x1, x2) and the physical parameter α = 1.
The terminal manifold of co-dimension 1 (as required) is the circle:
l2 = x21(tf ) + x
2
2(tf ).
The terminal manifold of co-dimension 1 is parameterized by 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2π and therefore
x1(tf ) = l cos θ
x2(tf ) = l sin θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2π.
(2)
The terminal manifold is parameterized by 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2π: C = {(x1, x2)|x1 = l cos θ, x2 = l sin θ}. The
outward pointing unit normal to the terminal manifold at (l cos θ, l sin θ) is ~n = ( cos θsin θ ). The circular target
set and the associated normals are shown in Figure 1.
A. Isaacs’ Method
The Usable Part (UP) of the terminal manifold is where its penetration can be enforced by the controller.
The Usable Part, Boundary of the Usable Part (BUP) and the Non-Usable Part (NUP) are
UP , {x|min
u
〈~n, f(x, u)〉 < 0}
BUP , {x|min
u
〈~n, f(x, u)〉 = 0}
NUP , {x|min
u
〈~n, f(x, u)〉 > 0}.
(3)
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Fig. 1: Circular target set with outward pointing normal
For the circular terminal manifold and double-integrator system the UP, NUP and BUP – see (3) – are
as follows
UP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | min−1≤u≤1 〈(
cos θ
sin θ ) , (
x2
αu )〉 < 0}
BUP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | min−1≤u≤1 〈(
cos θ
sin θ ) , (
x2
αu )〉 = 0}
NUP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | min−1≤u≤1 〈(
cos θ
sin θ ) , (
x2
αu )〉 > 0}
(4)
Having assumed, β = 1, the UP will depend on the problem parameters, α and l. The UP is therefore
UP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | min−1≤u≤1(x2 cos θ + αu sin θ) < 0}
.
Therefore
UP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | min−1≤u≤1((l cos θ + αu) sin θ) < 0}
.
Therefore θ = 0, θ = π are not in the UP.
1) Consider the θ range 0 < θ < π
UPa =
{
{( l cos θl sin θ ) | cos−1 αl < θ < π} if αl < 1
{( l cos θl sin θ ) |0 < θ < π} if αl ≥ 1
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(a) The circular terminal manifold when 0 < lα ≤ 1 (b) The circular terminal manifold when lα > 1
Fig. 2: The UP, BUP, and NUP of the circular terminal manifold varies depending upon the problem
parameters l and α. The NUP presents itself when l
α
> 1
2) Consider the θ range π < θ < 2π
UPb =
{
{( l cos θl sin θ ) |π + cos−1 αl < θ < 2π} if αl < 1
{( l cos θl sin θ ) |π < θ < 2π} if αl ≥ 1
The UP = UPa ∪ UPb. Hence
UP =
{
{( l cos θl sin θ ) |0 < θ < π, π < θ < 2π} if lα ≤ 1




> 1, let θ , cos−1(α
l
). The UP, BUP, and NUP of the circular terminal manifold varies
depending upon the problem parameters l and α as described in (5). In Figure 2, the BUP, UP, and NUP
for the circular terminal manifold is shown.
For the rest of this paper, the problem parameter is assumed to be α = 1, so the terminal manifold
varies upon l.
The Hamiltonian,
H = 1 + λ1(t)x2(t) + λ2(t)αu(t). (6)
With the understanding that the co-states, λ1 and λ2, are the partial derivatives of the Value function
with respect to the states, DP yields the condition for optimality, minu H , such that u(t)∗ = −sign(λ2(t)).
Therefore the optimal Hamiltonian is
H ∗ = 1 + λ1(t)x2(t)− α|λ2(t)|
H ∗(t) ≡ 0, so
H ∗|t=tf = 0 (7)
The method of characteristics employed to solve the HJBI PDE yields the Euler-Lagrage equations
ẋ1(t) = x2(t), x1(t = 0) = x10
ẋ2(t) = −αsign(λ2(t)), x2(t = 0) = x20
λ̇1(t) = 0, λ1(t = tf ) = a cos θ
λ̇2(t) = −λ1(t), λ2(t = tf ) = a sin θ, a > 0
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The terminal costates are also established courtesy of DP. We consider trajectories which emanate from
the UP in (10), in retrograde time τ > 0, and therefore we have the retrograde dynamics,
x̊1(τ) = −x2(τ), x1(τ = 0) = l cos θ
x̊2(τ) = αsign(λ2(τ)), x2(τ = 0) = l sin θ
λ̊1(τ) = 0, λ1(τ = 0) = a cos θ
λ̊2(τ) = λ1(τ), λ2(τ = 0) = a sin θ, τ ≥ 0; θ ∈ UP
(8)
The optimal Hamiltonian is zero, also at final time, and when evaluated at retrograde time, τ = 0 where
the co-states are specified,
H ∗|τ=0 = 0
so evaluating (6) at final time, the coefficient a is found to be:
a =
1
α| sin θ| − l sin θ cos θ , ∀ θ ∈ UP (9)
From the structure of the UP we deduce that a is positive, as required. Two cases need to be considered:
when 0 < l
α
≤ 1 and when l
α
> 1. As will be demonstrated later the UP, BUP, and NUP as defined in
(4) differs in both cases.
Assuming, 0 < l
α
≤ 1, the Usable Part (UP) and the Boundary of the Usable Part (BUP) are
UP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | 0 < θ < π, π < θ < 2π}
BUP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | θ = 0, θ = π}.




> 1, the UP, BUP, and NUP are
UP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | θ < θ < π, θ + π < θ < 2π}
BUP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | θ = 0, θ = θ, θ = π, θ = π + θ}
NUP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | 0 < θ < θ, π < θ < π + θ}.
Therefore the UP, BUP, and the NUP of the circular terminal manifold / target set are
UP =
{
{( l cos θl sin θ ) | 0 < θ < π, π < θ < 2π} if 0 < lα ≤ 1




{( l cos θl sin θ ) | θ = 0, θ = π}. if 0 < lα ≤ 1







{( l cos θl sin θ ) | 0 < θ < θ, π < θ < π + θ}. if lα > 1
(12)
Using the evaluation of the coefficient a according to (9) the retrograde equations in (8) are:
x̊1(τ) = −x2(τ), x1|τ=0 = l cos θ
x̊2(τ) = αsign(λ2(τ)), x2|τ=0 = l sin θ
λ1 =
cos θ
α| sin θ|−l sin θ cos θ
λ̊2(τ) = λ1(τ), λ2|τ=0 = sin θα| sin θ|−l sin θ cos θ




sin θ+τ cos θ
α| sin θ|−l sin θ cos θ , τ ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, π) ∪ (π, 2π)
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We first consider the case where the problem parameters satisfy 0 < l
α
≤ 1. The following abbreviations
are used as necessary: cθ ≡ cos θ, sθ ≡ sin θ, tθ ≡ tan θ. The UP of the circular terminal manifold
{(x1, x2)|x21 + x22 = l2} is partitioned into four quadrants as follows:
1) Trajectories “emanating” in retrograde fashion from points on the UP of the terminal manifold which
correspond to the parameter 0 < θ < π/2. For this case, λ2(τ) > 0 ∀ τ ≥ 0, so the optimal control
u∗(t) = −1.
x̊2 = 1, τ ≥ 0
Therefore
x2(τ) = l sin θ + τ
x1(τ) = l cos θ − lτ sin θ −
1
2
τ 2, τ ≥ 0
Solving for the curve:
x1 =− 12x22 + l cos θ + 12 l2 sin2 θ,
x2 > l sin θ, θ ∈ (0, π/2)
2) Trajectories “emanating” from points on the terminal manifold which correspond to π/2 ≤ θ < π.
In this case λ2(τ) changes sign from positive to negative at τ = − tan θ(> 0). For this case:
x̊2 =
{
1, if 0 ≤ τ < −tθ




lsθ + τ, if 0 ≤ τ < −tθ




l(cθ − τsθ)− 12τ 2, if 0 ≤ τ < −tθ
l(cθ − τsθ) + t2θ + 12τ 2 + 2τtθ, if − tθ < τ














l2s2θ − t2θ, if lsθ − tθ > x2
3) Trajectories “emanating” from points on the terminal manifold which correspond to π < θ < 3π/2.
In this case λ2(τ) is negative for all τ ≥ 0.
x̊2 = −1, τ ≥ 0
Therefore
x2(τ) = l sin θ − τ, τ ≥ 0
Therefore





x22 + l cos θ − 12 l2 sin2 θ, θ ∈ (π, 3π2 )
4) Trajectories “emanating” from points on the terminal manifold which correspond to 3π/2 ≤ θ < 2π.
For this case λ2(τ) changes sign from negative to positive at τ = − tan θ(> 0).
x̊2 =
{
−1, if 0 ≤ τ < −tθ





lsθ − τ, if 0 ≤ τ < −tθ






l(cθ − τsθ) + 12τ 2, if 0 ≤ τ < −tθ
lcθ − t2θ − 12τ 2 − (lsθ + 2tθ)τ, if − tθ < τ










x22 − 12 l2s2θ, if lsθ ≥ x2 > lsθ + tθ






l2s2θ, if lsθ + tθ > x2
The optimal trajectories are parabolae of the form x1(x2) = ±x22 + c.
When θ ∈ (0, π
2
) ∪ (π, 3π
2
) no switching occurs.
When θ ∈ (π
2
, π), τs = − tan θ. We calculate x1(τs) = lcos θ − 12 tan2 θ and x2(τs) = l sin θ − tan θ.
When θ ∈ (3π
2
, 2π), τs = − tan θ. We calculate x1(τs) = lcos θ + 12 tan2 θ and x2(τs) = l sin θ + tan θ.

















x2(θ) = l sin θ + tan θ, θ ∈ (3π2 , 2π)
(15)
The switching line (14) is anchored to the circular terminal manifold on the BUP point (−l, 0) where
θ = π and the switching line (15) is attached to the circular terminal manifold at the BUP point (l, 0)
where θ = 0.









4x21 − 2x1 − 2l2 ∓ 2l
√
l2 − 2x1 + 1
2x1 − 1









4x21 − 6x1 + 2− 2l2 ∓ 2l
√
l2 + 2x1 − 1
2x1 − 1
Hence, the equation of the switching line from (14) is:
x2 =
(
l − 2x1 − 1
l ±
√
l2 − 2x1 + 1
) √4x21 − 2x1 − 2l2 ∓ 2l
√
l2 − 2x1 + 1
2x1 − 1
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l2 + 2x1 − 1
) √4x21 − 6x1 + 2− 2l2 ∓ 2l
√
l2 + 2x1 − 1
2x1 − 1
The overall picture of the optimal flow field when the tolerance parameter, 0 < l ≤ 1 is shown in
Figure 3 or when the tolerance parameter l > 1 is shown in Figure 4. The parts of the terminal manifold
which correspond to the UP, BUP, and NUP are clearly indicated.
Fig. 3: The circular terminal manifold and family of trajectories in the state space when the parameters
α = 1 and l = 1. The curves (a) and (b) are where the value function is not continuous. The switching
lines, curves (c) and (d), determine when the optimal control switches from −1 to 1 or from 1 to −1
respectively.
In Figures 3 and 4, curves (c) and (d) are switching lines (SL) which are momentarily crossed by
the optimal trajectories, incurring an infinitesimal loss of optimality. The SL terminate at the BUP and
therefore are not optimal trajectories themselves. Curves (a) and (b) are those where the value function
/ time-to-go is not continuous. The value function increases / jumps from above the curve (a) to below
curve (a). The value function decreases/ jumps from above curve (b) to below curve (b). It is, however,
continuously differentiable away from the curves (a) and (b). In Figure 5 the canonical optimal flow field
where the target set is the origin is shown. The action in Figures 3 and 4 is lost in the case of a point
target because the curves (a) and (c) coalesce into one curve and so do curves (b), (d) and the optimal
10
Fig. 4: The circular terminal manifold and family of trajectories in the state space when the parameters
α = 1 and l = 2. The curves (a) and (b) are where the value function is not continuous. The switching
lines, curves (c) and (d), determine when the optimal control switches from −1 to 1 or from 1 to −1
respectively.
flow field in between. And these two consolidated curves, contrary to popular belief, are not optimal
trajectories. This demonstrates the need to eschew “point targets” and rephrase the control problem so
that it is mathematically well posed, and is engineering relevant. We see that Figure 5 is quite different
from the optimal flow fields shown in Figures 3 and 4.
It is also interesting to present the isocost surfaces. The isocost “surfaces” are curves in the (x1, x2)
state space / plane. The τ = 0 isocost surface / curve is the UP of the target set.
UP = {( l cos θl sin θ ) | 0 < θ < π, π < θ < 2π} (16)









Fig. 5: The “classical” rendition of the optimal flow field. Note that lines (a) and (b) here represent
optimal trajectories, but in-fact, line (a) is the consolidated curve (d) from Figures 3 and 4 and a part of
the optimal flow field trajectories from Figures 3 and 4. Similarly, line (b) here is the consolidated curve
(c) and part of the optimal flow field from Figures 3 and 4.
The parameter range {θ| 0 < θ < π, π < θ < 2π} is partitioned as follows:
{θ | 0 < θ < π, π < θ < 2π} =





< θ < π, tan θ < −τ}
∪ {θ|π
2
< θ < π, tan θ ≥ −τ}





< θ < 2π, tan θ < −τ}
∪ {θ|3π
2
< 2π, tan θ ≥ −τ}
Let
φ , arctan(τ), τ > 0,
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then,
{θ|0 < θ < π, π < θ < 2π} =





< θ < π − φ}





< θ < 2π − φ}
∪ {θ|2π − φ ≤ θ < 2π}.





l(cos θ − τ sin θ)− 1
2
τ 2 0 < θ ≤ π
2




< θ < π − φ
l(cos θ − τ sin θ) + 1
2
τ 2 + tan2 θ + 2τ tan θ π − φ ≤ θ < π
l(cos θ − τ sin θ) + 1
2
τ 2 π < θ ≤ 3π
2




< θ < 2π − φ
l(cos θ − τ sin θ)− 1
2





l sin θ + τ 0 < θ ≤ π
2
l sin θ + τ π
2
< θ < π − φ
l sin θ − 2 tan θ − τ π − φ ≤ θ < π
l sin θ − τ π < θ ≤ 3π
2
l sin θ − τ 3π
2
< θ < 2π − φ
l sin θ + 2 tan θ + τ 2π − φ ≤ θ < 2π
(18)
The τ -isocost curves are continuous. A figure showing the isocost curves for τ = 1, 2, · · · , 8 are shown
in Figure 6. In order to obtain the isocost surfaces which lie outside the switching lines (yellow lines)
in Figure 6 the retrograde equations are propagated backward in time (τ > 0) from the switching lines
in the state space (x1, x2). The total sum of the propagation from the switching line and the retrograde
time corresponding to a point on the switching line is equal to the total retrograde time as pictured in
Figure 6.
IV. SQUARE TARGET SET
Recall, the tolerance specification from Section II repeated here for convenience.
−L ≤ x(tf ) ≤ L, −V ≤ v(tf ) ≤ V
and also let L be the characteristic length. Using the non-dimensional variables as defined in Section II,
the terminal manifold is the square
−1 ≤ x(tf ) ≤ 1, −1 ≤ v(tf ) ≤ 1.
The square, non-smooth, terminal manifold ABCD and the associated normals is shown in Figure 7.
A square target set is used to show how to solve optimal control problems using Isaacs’ method when
the terminal manifold has corners and is not smooth. This is not apparent when considering a point target
rather than a proper terminal manifold of co-dimension 1.
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Fig. 6: The Isocost surfaces for τ = {1, 2, . . . , 8} in the state space, (x1, x2)
TABLE I: Usable Part of the Square Terminal Manifold
Segment ~n 〈~n · f〉 Usable Part (UP)






−u u = 1⇒ BC ⊂ UP
CD ( 10 ) x2 {(x1, x2)|x1 = 1, x2 ∈ [−1, 0)} ⊂ UP
AD ( 01 ) u u = −1⇒ AB ⊂ UP
A. Usable Part
In the best tradition of dynamic programs, we again “start” from the end. We start with identifying
the UP of the terminal manifold by analyzing each of its four sides which make up the square ABCD,
AB, BC, CD, and AD. For each side, the inner-product used to determine the UP, the BUP, and the
nonusable part (NUP) are presented in Table I.
Note that the vertices {B,D} /∈ UP, so no optimal trajectories terminate at points B and D. Also, at
the square’s vertices / corners A and C, multiple optimal trajectories terminate because at A and C, the
normals to the terminal manifold are not unique, but form a cone whose vertex angle is π/2. And these
normals are the terminal costates, each of which will give rise to an optimal trajectory. Such a family
of optimal of optimal trajectories will contribute to forming the optimal flow field which must cover the
14
Fig. 7: The square target set ABCD with outward pointing normals shown in the state space (x1, x2).






s1,−1 < s1 ≤ 1 on BC
1 on CD






s3, 0 < s1 ≤ 1 on AB
−1 on BC
s4,−1 ≤ s4 < 0 on CD
1 on AD
(20)









a5 cos θ1 at A, where π2 < θ1 < π
a5 cos θ2 at C, where 3π2 < θ2 < 2π











a6 sin θ1 at A, where π2 < θ1 < π
a6 sin θ2 at C, where 3π2 < θ2 < 2π
a3 > 0, a4 > 0, a6 > 0
(22)
Therefore a family of optimal trajectories will terminate at points A and C.
Recall the Hamiltonian, H = 1 + λ1x2 + λ2u, and since u∗ = −sign(λ2), the optimal Hamiltonian,
H ∗ = 1+λ1x2−sign(λ2)λ2. The optimal Hamiltonian is zero, including at the final time, just as described
in Section III. The coefficient a is determined by evaluating the Hamiltonian at the final time, tf where
the co-states are known. This is accomplished by substitution of the values from (19) to (22) into (6).













sin θ1 − cos θ1
, π
2
≤ θ1 ≤ π
a6 =
1
cos θ2 − sin θ2
, 3π
2
≤ θ2 ≤ 2π
(23)
Note that a5 > 0 and a6 > 0 over the domain of θ1 and θ2 as required. Moreover, substitution of the a











, −1 ≤ s4 < 0 on CD
0 on AD
cos θ1
sin θ1−cos θ1 ,
π
2
≤ θ1 ≤ π at A
cos θ2
cos θ2−sin θ2 ,
3π
2











sin θ1−cos θ1 ,
π
2
≤ θ1 ≤ π at A
sin θ2
cos θ2−sin θ2 ,
3π
2
≤ θ2 ≤ 2π at C
(25)
The Euler-Lagrage / characteristic equations are
ẋ1(t) = x2(t), x1(t = 0) = x10
ẋ2(t) = −sign(λ2(t)), x2(t = 0) = x20
λ̇1(t) = 0, λ1(t = tf ) = Eq. (24)
λ̇2(t) = −λ1(t), λ2(t = tf ) = Eq. (25)
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In retrograde time, τ , we consider trajectories which emanate from the UP, and therefore we have
x̊1(τ) = x2(τ), x1(τ = 0) = Eq. (19)
x̊2(τ) = −sign(λ2(τ)), x2(τ = 0) = Eq. (20)
λ̊1(τ) = 0, λ1(τ = 0) = Eq. (24)
λ̊2(τ) = −λ1(τ), λ2(τ = 0) = Eq. (25)
τ ≥ 0
(26)
Because the dynamics for λ1 are zero, λ1(τ) = λ1(τ = 0), τ ≥ 0. Using this information, we calculate,











τ, −1 ≤ s4 < 0 on CD
1 on AD
τ cos θ1+sin θ1
sin θ1−cos θ1 ,
π
2
≤ θ1 ≤ π at A
τ cos θ2+sin θ2
cos θ2−sin θ2 ,
3π
2
≤ θ2 ≤ 2π at C
τ ≥ 0





s3 − τ, 0 < s3 ≤ 1 on AB
−1− τ on BC
s4 + τ, −1 ≤ s4 < 0 on CD
1 + τ on AD
1 + τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ − tan θ1 at A
1− 2 tan θ1 − τ, − tan θ1 ≤ τ at A
−1− τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ − tan θ2 at C






−1− s3τ + τ
2
2
, 0 < s3 ≤ 1 on AB
s1 + τ +
τ2
2
, −1 < s1 ≤ 1 on BC
1− s4τ − τ
2
2
, −1 ≤ s4 < 0 on CD
s2 − τ − τ
2
2
, −1 ≤ s2 < 1 on AD
−1− τ − τ2
2
, 0 ≤ τ ≤ − tan θ1 at A
−1− τ





, − tan θ1 ≤ τ at A
1 + τ + τ
2
2
, 0 ≤ τ ≤ − tan θ2 at C





, − tan θ2 ≤ τ at C
π
2
≤ θ1 ≤ π, 3π2 ≤ θ2 ≤ 2π
(28)
17







, x2 ≤ s3,xf ∈ AB
x22−1+2s1
2
, x2 ≤ −1,xf ∈ BC
s24−x22+2
2
, x2 ≥ s4,xf ∈ CD
1−x22+2s2
2








+ 2 tan θ1
− tan2 θ1
,









− 2 tan θ2
+ tan2 θ2
,
tan θ2 − 1 ≤ x2,
xf ∈ C
− 1 < s1 ≤ 1, −1 ≤ s2 < 1
0 < s3 ≤ 1, −1 ≤ s4 < 0
π
2
≤ θ1 ≤ π, 3π2 ≤ θ2 ≤ 2π
(29)
Notice that the sign of λ2 changes at the time instant τs = − tan θ1 for trajectories emanating from
point A, and τs = − tan θ2 for trajectories emanating from point C. The trajectories specified in (29)
provide the optimal trajectories for x1 and x2, provided a single parameter: s1, s2, s3, s4, θ1, or θ2. These
trajectories potentially fill the two-dimensional state space: (x1, x2).
Two switching curves exist:
1) The switching curve pertaining to the family of optimal trajectories which terminate at vertex, A of







, x2 ≥ 1 (30)
2) The switching curve pertaining to the family of optimal trajectories which terminate at the vertex







, x2 ≤ −1 (31)
No switching occurs on the four families of optimal trajectories which terminate on the four sides of
the terminal manifold. The optimal flow field for reaching the square target manifold is shown in Figure 8.
In Figure 8 the blue lines with blue arrow heads represent switching lines. The switching line which
is anchored at point A is described by (30); while the switching line which is anchored at point C is
described by (31). The switching lines (a) and (b) are, themselves, optimal trajectories for reaching the
UP since they are anchored at point A and C respectively. The switching lines (a) and (b) are when the
optimal control used for reaching the UP of the terminal manifold switches from 1 to -1 and from -1 to
1, respectively.
The corners B and D are not in the UP and therefore trajectories which pass thought these points
continue and terminate at points A and C respectively. These are “touch-and-go” trajectories. The touch-
and-go trajectory which passes though point B has the equation: x1 = x22/2− 3/2 and the touch-and-go
trajectory which passes through point D has equation x1 = −x22/2 + 3/2. All of this is missed when the
target set is a point, as in Pontryagin’s canonical example.
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Fig. 8: The optimal flow-field and two switching curves, (a) and (b), for the square target manifold.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the PMP and DP methods for solution of optimal control problems are juxtaposed. We
advocate solving optimal control problems by leveraging Isaacs’ constructive method for the solution of
differential games. Isaacs’ method is based on the method of DP as opposed to the PMP which is rooted in
the calculus of variations and provides necessary conditions for optimality, which however can afford the
construction of an optimal trajectory. We also emphasize the importance of formulating mathematically
well-posed optimal control problems, that is, the need to move away from “point capture” and instead
consider terminal manifolds of co-dimension 1; point capture is then the limiting case where the terminal
manifold is shrunk to a singleton and the terminal manifold is a point target. This is also aligned with
engineering practice where finite tolerances are specified.
Two examples are used to highlight the solution of min-time optimal control problem for reaching
both a smooth and non-smooth terminal manifold, rather than a point target. This not only renders the
mathematical optimal control problem well-posed, but from an engineering point of view, is more realistic,
in that it represents an acceptable terminal tolerance / error. The first case is a circular terminal manifold,
the second is a square terminal manifold with corners. The former highlights how to pose and solve optimal
control problems when the terminal manifold is smooth, while the latter highlights the solution process
when the terminal manifold has corners. While Isaacs’ method naturally requires the terminal manifold
being of co-dimension 1, it becomes apparent the classical PMP based approach hides critical aspects of
19
the optimal control problem when a point target is considered; this is highlighted in this paper. While
PMP is a necessary condition of optimality, which however allows the construction of candidate optimal
trajectories, Isaacs’ method directly yields the optimal flow field and also the region of controllability.
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